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Abstract
This study examines the competing roles advocated for 
collateral in a loan contract: solving problems of adverse 
selection, underinvestment, incentive contracting, bankruptcy 
and dilution of the monitoring services provided by banks. 
These theories cannot be separated based upon the effect of 
collateral on the borrowing firm's share price. Market based 
evaluations for security produce: 1) a positive response for 
small firms in an event study, but not confirmed with 
multiple regression; 2) a negative association for NASDAQ 
listed firms with regression, but not with event study 
methods; and 3) no response for NYSE/Amex firms with either 
method although they comprise the large majority of secured 
loans in the study. However, these findings are consistent 
with an increased default risk explanation for secured debt. 
Logit regression indicates that secured loans can be 
distinguished from unsecured on the basis of financial 
distress. Firms with deteriorating asset values, decreasing 
liquidity, reduced earnings, high ratios of book-to-market 
value of equity and high interest expense as a percentage of 
cash flows receive secured loans. These results are 
consistent with Smith and Warner's (1979), Stulz and 
Johnson's (1985) and Barro's (1976) view that collateral is 
an effective monitoring device when firms pursue risky 
projects. They are also consistent with the findings of
Franks and Torous (1989), Weiss (1990) and Slovin, Sushka and 
Waller (1992) that collateral provides the lender adequate 
protection under bankruptcy.
This study supports the view of Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock (1992) that the information provided to the market 
as a result of bank monitoring is limited to firms that are 
not highly monitored by other external agents (small firms, 
NASDAQ traded firms and firms that do not have investment 
grade bonds) . The lack of a market reaction to secured loans 
for NYSE/Amex firms in this study provides evidence that the 
presence of other external monitors reduces the informational 
content of a security provision in a loan announcement. The 
employment of COMPUSTAT data to determine that financial 
distress is a characteristic of firms that obtain secured 
loans indicates that in general bankers use publicly 
available information to decide when a security provision 
should be attached to a loan contract.
viii
Chapter 1: Introduction
The objective of this thesis is to determine the role of 
collateral in the loan contracting process. Several 
competing explanations for the purpose of collateral have 
been offered. These explanations are separable by their 
effect on the borrowing firm's share price and the level of 
default risk of the firm associated with collateralized 
loans. Not all of these competing explanations have been 
empirically evaluated in the same study. Nor has a study 
been performed on the empirical implications of the competing 
theories for share price response and firm riskiness. 
Studies have found higher riskiness for secured loans, but 
have not provided conclusive evidence of the associated 
riskiness of the firm receiving a secured loan. These 
studies also do not provide evidence on the effect of 
collateral on the share price of the firm. Other studies 
have found that the existence of collateral in a loan 
contract does not significantly affect the share price of the 
borrowing firm. However, these studies do not combine an 
analysis of share price effects of secured loan announcements 
based upon bank monitoring theories with those based on the 
competing theories of collateral. The contributions of this 
study are 1) its focus on separating the various competing 
theories on the role of collateral within the framework of 
theories on the effect of external monitoring agents on share
1
2price and 2) empirical analysis of both share price reaction 
to secured loan announcements and the difference in riskiness 
of firms that receive secured and unsecured loans.
To separate the competing theories of collateral this 
study differs from previous empirical studies in two aspects. 
First, this study incorporates the effects on share price 
predicted by the various theories of collateral within those 
effects associated with theories of bank monitoring. Several 
competing explanations for the effect of collateral on the 
share price of the borrower have been developed. However, 
collateral is not the only element of a bank loan to affect 
share price. Previous empirical studies have documented 
various loan characteristics, pre-announcement information 
and levels of external monitoring as important factors in the 
market response to bank loan announcements. No previous 
empirical study considers the combined effects of these 
factors when evaluating the influence of a collateral 
provision on the market's response to bank loan 
announcements. This thesis derives hypotheses to resolve the 
competing explanations for the effect of collateral on the 
firm's share price in the presence of other factors that 
affect market response to the information present at a bank 
loan announcement.
Second, this study employs financial ratios to measure 
the default risk of the firm. Previous empirical studies 
have found a higher risk premium for secured loans. One of
these studies concludes that riskier firms receive secured 
loans based on the finding that banks that have higher 
proportions of secured loans have higher proportions of non­
performing loans. One shortcoming of this approach is that 
the number of secured loans made toy a bank may not be 
proportionate to its number of delinquent loans. A direct 
measurement of the financial ratios indicative of distress 
for the firm overcomes this deficiency. The finding of a 
significant relation between default risk and security would 
provide evidence that borrower characteristics are as 
important as loan characteristics in determining when a 
security provision is to be included in a loan contract.
This study analyzes five different explanations for the 
use of security in a loan: 1) to signal firms with high
quality projects, as proposed by Chan and Kanatas (1985) and 
Igawa and Kanatas (1990); 2) to reduce the underinvestment 
problem, as proposed by Stulz and Johnson (1985); 3) to
resolve incentive contracting problems, as proposed by Barro 
(1976), Smith and Warner (1979), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), 
Stiglitz (1985) and Stulz and Johnson (1985); 4) to preserve 
repayment priority in bankruptcy, as proposed by Franks and 
Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), and Slovin, Sushka, and Waller 
(1992); 5) to reduce the level of monitoring that lenders 
perform for the benefit of the borrowing firm's shareholders, 
as proposed within Diamond's (1984) model.
4These five theories can be separated by their 
assumptions concerning market reaction to bank loan 
announcements and the difference in default risk between 
secured and unsecured loans. For the first two explanations, 
secured debt has less risk to the lender than does unsecured 
debt. These theories predict a positive market response for 
secured loans. For incentive contracting explanations where 
collateral is employed to resolve moral hazard problems for 
lenders, collateral indicates more default risk for secured 
debt than for unsecured debt. A positive as well as a 
negative share price effect is possible depending on who 
bears the costs or retains the benefits of collateral. 
Bankruptcy based explanations of collateral also imply that 
the firm has increased default risk. Three different market 
reactions are possible depending on the market’s prior 
assessment of the probability of bankruptcy for the firm. 
Sitglitz’ corporate control explanation of bank lending is 
based on the assumption that bank loans have reduced risk 
relative to other forms of financing, but no default risk 
differences exist between secured and unsecured bank loans. 
Share price may remain constant or be reduced depending on 
the efforts of the firm's managers. A negative or neutral 
effect on shareholder wealth for secured loans is also 
consistent with the bank monitoring model of Diamond (1984), 
depending on the effect of collateral on the monitoring 
efforts of lenders.
A confounding effect on using share price effects to 
separate these roles for collateral is Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock's (1992) finding that share price effects may not be 
significant for some firms that receive secured loans because 
the market is already aware of the information contained in 
bank loan announcements for these firms. They find bank 
monitoring an important source of information for market 
participants for small firms. Since the market is cognizant 
of the financial status of large firms, the granting of 
collateral for loans to them has been anticipated by the 
market and thus no share price effects are generated.
Although Slovin, Johnson and Glascock find shareholders 
of small firms to be the primary beneficiaries of bank 
monitoring, the empirical results of Reinganum (1990), and 
Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield (1993) suggest that the 
monitoring associated with the exchange on which a firm is 
listed on is likely an important determinant of market 
reaction to secured debt. These studies further strengthen 
the argument that interpretation of market reaction to 
secured debt announcements is likely to be relevant only for 
firms that do not receive other forms of market monitoring.
The major finding of this study is that the various 
theories of the function of collateral cannot be separated 
solely based upon their effect on the borrowing firm's share 
price. Secured debt is a significant component of share 
price response to loan announcements only for groups of
lightly monitored firms. However, no consistent relation 
between market response and collateral is found. There is a 
positive market response for small firms in an event study, 
but no confirmation in a multiple regression of market 
returns against loan characteristics, pre-announcement 
information and various forms of monitoring. Multiple 
regression indicates a negative relation between security and 
market response for NASDAQ listed firms, a result not 
produced with event study methods. No market response for 
NYSE/Amex firms is observed although they comprise the 
majority of secured loans in the study.
The common element in the market response based 
explanations for secured debt of this study is that they 
support an increased default risk explanation for secured 
debt, a result consistent with Berger and Udell (1986) and 
Booth's (1992) finding of increased risk premiums for secured 
loans. In order to provide further empirical support for the 
increased default risk explanation of secured debt, firms 
that receive secured loans are analyzed for distress. Logit 
regression indicates that secured loans can be distinguished 
from unsecured on the basis of financial distress. Firms 
with deteriorating asset values, decreasing liquidity, 
reduced earnings, high ratios of the book to market value of 
equity and high interest expense as a percentage of cash flow 
receive secured loans. These results support increased 
default risk based explanations of secured debt. The
financial distress found for the firms that receive secured 
loans extends prior research that finds that riskier loans 
are collateralized.
In summary, the results of this thesis supports Smith 
and Warner, Stulz and Johnson and Barro's view that 
collateral is used to solve moral hazard problems. They also 
support the findings of Franks and Torous, Weiss, Slovin, 
Sushka and Waller, that collateral gives the lender adequate 
protection under bankruptcy. The use of collateral to solve 
moral hazard and bankruptcy problems can be considered parts 
of a single dilemma. Lenders require collateral as an aid in 
monitoring firms with risky projects (moral hazard). Since 
these firms have higher probabilities of bankruptcy, 
collateral also gives the lender adequate protection should 
the firm declare bankruptcy.
Chapter 2: Literature Review
The appropriate literature involves the importance of 
collateral in a loan, and the monitoring services provided to 
the borrower’s shareholders by the lender. The first branch 
mostly addresses problems associated with asymmetric 
information: namely adverse selection and moral hazard for 
the lender, and underinvestment for the borrower. Also 
included under the first branch is the resolution of 
bankruptcy claims for the lender. The second branch of the 
literature is concerned with direct monitoring by the lender 
and effects on the lender's monitoring by that of other 
external agents of the borrower, such as investment bankers 
and bond rating agencies.
These two branches of the literature are connected in 
that collateral is generally considered to lower the lender's 
costs of monitoring the borrower. Depending on the 
information presumed to underlie the lender's (borrower's) 
decision to require (offer) collateral, a security provision 
is likely to increase, decrease or have no effect on 
shareholders' wealth for the borrower.
A question that arises is whether collateral dilutes the 
monitoring services of the lender by focusing attention on an 
asset rather than on the activities of the borrower. The 
monitoring of an asset is passive in nature and suggests a 
reduced level of surveillance by the lender. The monitoring
of a firm by a lender implies that the lender has to be as 
astute as the borrower in assessing the future prospects of 
the f irm.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. 
Section 2.1 reviews the various theories for the use of 
collateral. Section 2.2 reviews securities issuance from the 
perspective of the the monitoring services provided by 
external agents. Section 2.3 summarizes the literature 
review. A summary of the various theories relating to 
secured debt and monitoring is contained in Appendix A.
2.1. Collateral
The literature suggests that the importance of a 
security provision in a loan contract lies in four areas. 
First, the offering of collateral by a borrower solves an 
adverse selection problem for lenders. Second, secured loans 
enable a firm's managers to resolve underinvestment problems. 
Third, lenders require secured debt to resolve moral hazard 
problems inherent in financial contracting (incentive 
contracting). Fourth, collateral confers super-priority 
status to the lender in bankruptcy proceedings.
2.1.1. Adverse selection
Chan and Kanatas (1985) justify the use of collateral in 
the private negotiations between a lender and borrower in the 
absence of moral hazard. They note that collateral can be 
used as an observable variable on which participants can 
agree and base a loan contract when the lender and firm have
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the same information but different beliefs about payoffs on 
the firm's projects. When the lender has a lower valuation 
of the firm's projects than the borrower, collateral is a 
signal of the high quality of the borrower's project. The 
borrower offers collateral and gets a lower rate because the 
borrower forecasts little risk of default and the subsequent 
loss of the collateral. Borrowers with low quality projects 
cannot mimic this behavior because of their higher 
probability of default and subsequent loss of collateral.
In Chan and Kanatas' model, secured loans receive a 
default risk discount. The offering of collateral should 
affect the borrowing firm's share price positively due to the 
signal that it sends to the market that the firm is 
undertaking a high quality project that will increase 
shareholder wealth. Unsecured loans do not affect share 
price since the market assumes that the firm has average 
quality projects. Empirical evidence does not support the 
view that secured loans increase shareholder wealth for the 
borrowing firm. Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Slovin, 
Johnson and Glascock (1992) find no evidence that the 
existence of collateral in a loan announcement increases 
shareholder wealth. In cross-sectional studies, Berger and 
Udell (1986) and Booth (1992) find a positive relationship 
between interest rates and the existence of a security 
provision in a loan, indicating a risk premium for secured 
loans. This evidence is not supportive of the view that
secured loans have a reduced risk premium as a general class. 
Berger and Udell also find that banks with higher proportions 
of secured loans have higher proportions of charged off, past 
due, non-accrual and renegotiated loans, and conclude that 
riskier firms receive secured loans. This finding suggests 
that firms that receive secured loans are riskier than firms 
that do not receive secured loans. However, Berger and 
Udell's finding is based on the assumption that the 
percentage of non-performing loans in a bank's portfolio is 
proportional to its percentage of secured loans.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) note collateral can have both 
beneficial incentive effects and countervailing adverse 
selection effects depending on the wealth of the borrower and 
the amount of collateral required by the bank. Collateral is 
used as a screening mechanism by bankers when they cannot 
observe the wealth of the borrower or the project undertaken. 
Under the assumption that wealthier entrepreneurs undertake 
riskier projects, the use of collateral as a screening device 
by banks to solve adverse selection problems results in low 
wealth, low risk entrepreneurs receiving loans with low 
levels of collateral requirements. However increasing 
collateral requirements to some higher critical level results 
in riskier average and marginal borrowers. The model of 
Stigliz and Weiss categorizes the level of collateral 
required for a loan as a screening device of the banker, but 
implications for the impact of collateral on shareholder
12
wealth are conditional on the level of collateral required by 
the lender. At low collateral levels a secured loan is a 
positive signal to the market of the high quality of the 
borrower. At high collateral levels a secured loan is a 
negative signal of the low quality of the borrower.
2.1.2 Underinvestment problem
Stulz and Johnson (1985) note that secured debt can be 
used by the firm's managers to increase the value of the firm 
in two ways. First, secured debt can reduce the firm's 
monitoring and contracting costs. This explanation is based 
on incentive contracting and will be deferred until section 
2.1.3. Second, the reduced monitoring costs of secured debt 
allows it to be used to solve Myers' (1977) underinvestment 
problem.
Myers notes that the value of the firm is dependent on 
its option to pursue new growth opportunities. Since in some 
states of nature the value of the project will be less than 
the required investment, the firm cannot issue riskless debt 
to finance new projects. If the state of nature is known to 
the firm and it issues (risky) unsecured debt that matures 
after the investment option expires, the firm will forego 
positive net present value projects in those states of nature 
where project returns are insufficient to return their 
investment and repay debt. In these states debtors would be 
repaid in full but investors would receive only partial 
repayment. Since this entails a decline in the equity of
13
shareholders, managers do not pursue the project even though 
it has a positive net present value.
Stulz and Johnson note that issuing secured debt allows 
the firm to resolve this underinvestment problem. When the 
firm has an asset in place and can acquire another asset to 
pursue a project, it is advantageous for the firm to pledge 
the new asset as collateral. The security provision diverts 
from the unsecured lenders some payoffs of the new asset that 
would otherwise accrue to them. Since monitoring and 
contracting costs are lower for secured debt than unsecured 
debt, funds are provided at a lower interest rate. The 
riskless nature of secured debt allows any gains in the new 
project to accrue entirely to shareholders, increasing the 
incentive of shareholders to undertake the new project and 
increase the value of the firm. Unsecured loans do not 
affect shareholder wealth since they do not have a reduced 
interest rate or allow the firm to undertake otherwise 
unfeasible projects. The lack of significance for collateral 
found by Lummer and McConnell and Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock does not support the prediction of the model of 
Stulz and Johnson that secured loans increase shareholder 
wealth. The higher interest rates for secured loans found by 
Berger and Udell do not support Stulz and Johnson's view that 
secured loans have lower interest rates.
14
2.1.3 Incentive contracting
Barro (1976) suggests two functions for collateral. 
First, collateral can be used to solve moral hazard problems 
for a lender since it will be forfeited in the event of 
default. Forfeiture is undesirable and would presumably 
deter the borrower from undertaking projects with more risk 
than desired by the lender at the contracted interest rate. 
Second, in the event of default the lender acquires the 
collateral. If the lender has a lower valuation of 
collateral than the borrower, then deadweight losses will be 
incurred by the lender in the event of default. The lender 
will require an interest rate premium for secured loans based 
on deadweight costs and the probability of default for the 
borrower. The increased costs incurred by shareholders 
reduce equity value. Unsecured loans do not increase 
interest costs and thus have no effect on equity value.
Smith and Warner (1979) suggest that collateral is a 
lender requirement used for two purposes. First, secured 
debt solves wealth expropriation problems for lenders through 
the prohibition of asset substitution. Secured debt prevents 
shareholders from substituting riskier negative net present 
value projects that increase shareholder wealth but reduce 
lender wealth and the total value of the firm. The value of 
equity increases through the reduction of wealth 
expropriation costs. Second, secured debt is a cost 
effective device used by lenders to protect themselves in the
15
event of bankruptcy and liquidation by the borrower. If the 
borrower has high default risk, secured debt is the most cost 
effective monitoring device that can be employed. The 
interest rate may increase due to increased default risk by 
the firm, but it would be even higher with other forms of 
financial contracting. The value of equity increases due to 
the cheaper monitoring costs of secured debt. Unsecured debt 
does not increase shareholder wealth since there is no 
reduction in monitoring costs. In Smith and Warner's view 
small firms have high default risk and are the most likely 
candidates for secured debt.
Stulz and Johnson (1985) note the secured debt reduces 
moral hazard problems and decreases the lenders monitoring 
costs for three reasons. First, the firm cannot sell 
collateral and pay a dividend. Second, collateral cannot be 
swapped for a riskier asset. Third, secured creditors are 
less likely to restrict the activities of the firm. Secured 
debt has a lower interest rate than unsecured debt because it 
lowers the monitoring and contracting costs imposed on the 
borrower. Stulz and Johnson suggest that the gains from 
reduced monitoring costs (lower interest rates) for secured 
loans increase shareholder wealth.
The use of secured debt to solve moral hazard problems 
in the models of Barro, Smith and Warner, and Stulz and 
Johnson assumes that the firm's managers act in the 
shareholders' interests. Stiglitz (1985) develops a model of
corporate control in which the interests of the firm's 
managers are not necessarily aligned with those of
shareholders. He suggests that to protect their interests, 
lenders desire that the firm's managers undertake investment 
projects with miminal risk. Projects funded by bank loans 
have less risk and return than projects funded by other
sources. Collateral, along with the interest rate, terms of 
the loan contract and conditions under which loans are
renewed are devices used by lenders to ensure that firms 
undertake low risk projects1. Collateral reduces the risk 
borne by the lender as well as the control exerted by the 
lender over the activities of the firm's managers. Two views 
of the effect of collateral on shareholder wealth can be 
derived from Stiglitz' model. First, projects financed by 
bank loans (with or without collateral) have reduced risk and 
return relative to projects financed by other sources and 
entail a decrease in shareholder wealth. Second, the
interests of bankers are not aligned with those of 
shareholders. Consequently the granting of a loan does not 
have an impact on shareholder wealth.
The arguments put forth for the use of secured debt by 
Chan and Kanatas in section 2.1.1 assume that moral hazard 
does not exist between lenders and borrowers. Igawa and 
Kanatas (1990) note that in the presence of moral hazard,
’secured bank loans are not less risky than unsecured bank loans. 
Collateral is one of the mechanisms used by lenders as part of the terms 
and conditions of a loan.
secured debt is an incentive compatible device that reduces 
monitoring and contracting costs. They note that collateral 
can be used to solve moral hazard problems where moral hazard 
is defined as lack of due care by the firm for the asset 
being collateralized. In the private negotiations between 
lender and borrower, firms with high quality projects offer 
collateral in order to avoid being pooled with low project 
quality firms and paying higher interest rates. 
Collateralized loans have reduced risk. The use of 
collateral by a firm in this model is a signal that the firm 
is pursuing high quality projects that increase shareholders 
wealth. Unsecured loans do not affect shareholder wealth 
since they denote the firm as average.
Secured debt decreases the loan rate and increases the 
value of equity according to the views of Smith and Warner, 
Stulz and Johnson and Igawa and Kanatas. The risk premium 
for secured loans found by Berger and Udell and Booth does 
not support the contention that secured loans have reduced 
interest rates. The lack of a significant relationship 
between market returns and security found by Lummer and 
McConnell and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock does not support 
the view that secured debt increases shareholder equity. The 
findings of Berger and Udell and Booth support Barro's view 
that secured debt increases loan rates. The findings of 
Lummer and McConnell and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock support
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the insignificant relationship of market returns and secured 
debt implication of Stiglitz' model.
Smith and Warner suggest that size is a firm 
characteristic indicative of distress and the attendant need 
for collateral. Recent empirical evidence by Chan and Chen
(1991) and Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield (1993) 
suggests that the exchange that a firm is listed on is also 
indicative of potential financial distress.
Chan and Chen contend that abnornal returns for small 
firms are risk premiums for distress. They note that 32 
percent of firms in the smallest quintile on NYSE are 
formerly larger firms that have suffered recent (within 2 
years) reversals of fortunes. Only 3 percent of the firms in 
this quintile are newly listed firms. Chan and Chen create 
portfolios of distressed NYSE listed firms that have dividend 
reductions and high leverage (measured by the total assets 
less common equity to the market value of equity), and 
compare the returns of these portfolios to a control 
portfolio of small firms without these characteristics. They 
find that the distressed portfolios exhibit the abnornal 
returns and January effect associated with the well known 
small firm effect, but the control portfolio of small firms 
do not. They note that while the majority of distressed 
firms are small firms, distress is not limited to small 
firms.
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Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield find that NYSE 
listed firms have higher returns than similar sized NASDAQ 
firms. They find that NYSE firms in the second, third and 
fifth size-sorted quintiles have higher returns and higher 
book-to-market equity ratios than similar sized NASDAQ firms. 
After controlling for size and book-to-market, the difference 
in market adjusted returns vanishes. Consistent with the 
findings of Chan and Chen, they attribute these higher 
returns to higher risks associated with distress for NYSE 
listed firms.
The above evidence suggests that NYSE exchange listed 
firms should be the primary recipients of secured loans since 
they have higher levels of financial distress (and higher 
probabilities of bankruptcy) than similar sized NASDAQ firms. 
2.1.4. Bankruptcy
A security provision in a loan contract gives the holder 
the highest creditor repayment priority in the event that the 
borrower files for bankruptcy under the United States 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19782. One objective of the Act is 
to preserve the firm as an operating concern while financial 
claims are restructured. Under Chapter 5 of the Act absolute 
priority rules for financial claimants exist. The first 
priority is secured creditors, second the transactions costs
2A more correct phraaing would recognize that secured debt is 
entitled to "adequate protection." All priority for other debt comes 
after this.
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of bankruptcy, third wages, taxes and rent, fourth unsecured 
creditors and last equity. In the event of liquidation, 
secured creditors are entitled to reclaim assets before any 
other creditors are paid. If the priority of secured loans 
is upheld by the courts, then a secured loan is desirable if 
the lender anticipates a high probability of bankruptcy for 
the borrower. Empirical results support the absolute 
priority status of secured loans.
Franks and Torous (1989), Weiss (1990) and Slovin, 
Sushka and Waller (1992) all find pervasive violations of 
absolute priority in bankruptcy proceedings for unsecured 
creditors. However, in these studies secured creditors' 
contracts are upheld. Slovin, Sushka and Waller further 
disaggregate firms by whether they reorganize or liquidate 
pursuant to filing for Chapter 11 and find that in either 
outcome the priority of secured claims is upheld.
The retention of absolute priority status of secured 
loans under bankruptcy suggests that lenders may require 
security if they anticipate greater probability of bankruptcy 
for the borrower. Under asymmetric information, a secured 
loan would signal to the market that the firm is a bankruptcy 
candidate. Empirical evidence supports the view that the 
market is aware of the deteriorating status of firms that 
become bankrupt.
Aharony, Jones and Swary (1980) create a portfolio of 
firms that filed for bankruptcy and a matching portfolio of
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firms that did not over the period 1970-1978. They find that 
the difference in weekly returns between the portfolios 
becomes significantly negative approximately four years 
before the filing. They interpret this result as indicative 
that the market anticipates bankruptcy filings. However, the 
largest negative differentials between the portfolios occur 
in the weeks immediately preceeding the announcement. 
Therefore the actual filing is not totally anticipated by the 
market.
Recent research also supports the contention that 
bankruptcy announcements are largely unanticipated by the 
market. Lang and Stulz (1992) and Slovin, Sushka and Waller 
(1992) find share price losses ranging from 21 percent to 56 
percent upon the announcement of bankruptcy filings by firms. 
These findings coupled with the lack of significance of a 
security provision, as found by Lummer and McConnell and 
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock, provide evidence that a 
security provision is not a signal of imminent bankruptcy for 
the firm.
The asset substitution and bankruptcy arguments for the 
use of collateral can be considered parts of a single 
phenomenon. As the projects of the firm deteriorate 
(probability of bankruptcy increases) the value of the firm 
decreases. The firm may desire to pursue risky projects in 
order to increase its value. The requirement of collateral
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by the lender would simultaneously solve asset substitution 
and bankruptcy priority problems.
2.1.5 Summary - collateral
Managers of a firm may increase shareholder wealth by 
employing secured debt to resolve adverse selection and 
underinvestment problems. Under these views, secured debt 
has less risk than unsecured debt. In the process of 
monitoring borrowers, lenders may require collateral to solve 
incentive contracting and bankruptcy related problems. 
Shareholder wealth may increase, decrease or remain unchanged 
when collateral is imposed by the lender. When used to solve 
incentive contracting and bankruptcy related problems, 
secured debt may have either less or more risk than unsecured 
debt.
One of the implications for the use of secured debt to 
solve incentive contracting and bankruptcy problems is that 
the firm is financially distressed. Small firms have been 
identified as the most likely users of secured debt. Recent 
empirical evidence suggests that the exchange that a firm is 
listed on may also delineate firms that require secured debt.
2.2 External monitors
The empirical evidence against the use of collateral to 
solve adverse selection and underinvestment problems suggests 
that the main function of collateral in a loan contract is to 
solve moral hazard and increased default risk (probability of 
bankruptcy) problems between the firm and its lenders. The
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certification/monitoring by external agents such as 
investment and commercial banks also resolves moral hazard 
problems. An analysis of the importance of a security 
provision to firm share price increases associated with loan 
announcements must incorporate the already established 
certifying/monitoring roles that lenders (primarily banks) 
and other external agents have as a consequence of analyzing 
inside information held by the firm.
2.2.1 Commercial banks
Leland and Pyle (1977) note that because inside 
information is held by a firm's owners, outsiders have 
difficulty valuing share price. Inside shareholders can 
obtain financing by one of two methods. First, they can 
signal firm quality by the proportion of shares that they 
retain, inducing investment by outsiders. Second, the firm 
may sell securities to financial intermediaries. The use of 
financial intermediaries is feasible for two reasons. First, 
intermediaries enjoy an informational gathering cost savings 
compared to individual investors. Second, although the 
intermediary faces the same moral hazard problem as the firm, 
the signalling cost of the intermediary is lower than that of 
the firm due to risk diversification.
Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) note that firms 
have a prefered hierarchy of issuing securities (a "pecking 
order"). The managers of the firm possess information not 
held by market participants and act in behalf of passive
24
existing shareholders. These shareholders benefit when 
overvalued equity securities are issued to other investors. 
Market participants are cognizant of this and devalue the 
price of the firm's stock if there is a security offering by 
the firm. This devaluation is monotonically increasing in 
the riskiness of the security being offered. Managers 
develop a priority structure for funding projects in which 
internal funding is preferred to debt issuance, which is 
preferred to stock issuance.
When the firm's managers have a profitable net present 
value project they will refrain from undertaking the project 
if the decrease in stock price associated with the public 
financing announcement is more than the net present value of 
the project. Bank financing serves as a form of internal 
financing since it avoids the informational asymmetries 
associated with public security offerings. The announcement 
of a bank loan agreement should induce a non-negative market 
response.
Diamond (1984) develops a rationale for the existence of 
commercial banks based upon their function as delegated 
monitors between lenders and firms in a private information 
environment. Lenders have a moral hazard problem because 
only entrepreneurs know the outcome of the firm's projects 
and they may not sufficiently compensate lenders for the 
riskiness of the project undertaken. Lenders resolve this 
problem through monitoring. By delegating monitoring
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activities to a representative group (banks), duplication of 
information gathering and free rider (no lender monitors 
because his share of the benefit is small) problems of 
lenders are eliminated. Shareholders benefit since the 
monitoring activities of lenders induce the firm's managers 
to maximize firm value.
One implication of Diamond's model is that secured loans 
should not affect shareholder wealth. In Diamond's model 
lenders monitor the activities of the firm's managers to 
insure that adequate compensation is received for the amount 
of risk involved in a project. In this model, lenders impose 
non-pecuniary penalties on borrowers in the event of default. 
Thus a collateral requirement by a lender as protection 
against bankruptcy does not affect firm value. Furthermore, 
a collateral requirement in a loan is not indicative of any 
change in the default risk of the firm. If a lender has 
collateral as a source of repayment, the lender is less 
concerned with evaluating the projects of the firm 
(monitoring). The firm's shareholders lose the benefit of 
the monitoring efforts of the lender.
Diamond (1991) suggests that the monitoring by banks 
assists the firm in establishing a reputation in the market. 
Once the firm's reputation is well established it is able to 
receive public financing (and monitoring). This implies that 
bank monitoring is not a significant source of information
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for firms that are monitored by other sources such as 
investment banks and bond rating agencies.
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) develop a model of 
financial intermediation similar to Diamond's (1984) model. 
Banks are formed because of informational asymmerties in the 
lending process and attendant moral hazard problems. Lenders 
(information processors) form coalitions in order to reduce 
the expected cost of screening borrowers. The screening 
process forces managers to maximize firm value.
Fama (1985) notes that bank loans avoid duplication of 
information costs. Bank loans are last in priority among 
fixed payment contracts. The short term nature of bank debt 
requires banks to frequently reevaluate the borrower's 
ability to repay bank loans. Positive renewals of bank loans 
reduces or eliminates monitoring by other agents with higher 
priority fixed payoff claims. The knowldege of their 
customers gained by banks over time gives banks a comparative 
advantage over other suppliers of funds when a loan is 
renewed. The renewal of a bank loan sends a positive signal 
to the market.
Empirical evidence is mixed but generally is supportive 
of the positive market reaction to the monitoring services 
provided by banks. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find a 
significant positive response to credit agreement 
announcements for NYSE/AMEX firms for the period 1972-1982, 
but normal returns (no significant response) for funded bank
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loans (funds advanced at inception of contract). These 
results suggest that bank monitoring is beneficial for credit 
agreements. Mikkelson and Partch interpret the positive 
results for credit announcements as not supportive Myers and 
Majluf's "pecking order" theory. The positive response for 
credit announcements is supportive of Diamond's (1984) 
monitoring services view of bank lending, however, a positive 
response should also exist for term loans since bank 
monitoring also occurs for them.
In a longitudinal study of 300 NYSE/AMEX firms covering 
the period 1974-1983, James (1987) finds significant positive 
responses for bank loan agreement announcements when funds 
are advanced and a marginally significant positive response 
when funds aren't advanced. Furthermore, negative share 
price responses occur for private placement financing and 
bond financing used to repay bank debt. James interprets 
these results as not fully consistent with the "pecking 
order" explanation for bank debt.
James examines market response as a function of loan 
maturity, the riskiness of the firm's debt and firm size. 
The rationale for studying maturity is based on Flannery's 
(1986) argument that a firm's choice of maturity signals 
management's assessment of earnings prospects. Managers who 
believe their firm is undervalued select short term debt in 
order to reveal the firm's true value at maturity. When the 
firm's prospects are revealed, investors are willing to
refund debt with a lower default risk premium. Overvalued 
firms issue long term debt since they do not want their 
prospects revealed to investors. The use of short term debt 
by overvalued firms would result in higher default risk 
premiums. James also includes the presence or absence of 
publicly rated debt in the firm's captital structure as an 
indicator of the default risk of the borrower. Firm size is 
included based on the observation that small firms are 
primarily funded by banks whereas large firms are able to 
place public debt. James uses the ratio of loan amount to 
the market value of equity as an indicator of the relative 
importance of the loan to the firm. He finds that market 
response to bank loan announcements cannot be differentiated 
by the characteristics of maturity, rated debt, firm size or 
relative importance of the loan (loan/market value of 
equity).
Flannery's analysis of the interrelation of loan rate 
and maturity indicates that information on both variables is 
important for market participants to determine whether a firm 
is undervalued or overvalued. Although the presence of rated 
debt also may proxy for default risk, as noted by James, many 
small firms do not have rated bonds.
Lummer and McConnell (1989) also find a significant 
positive response for Wall Street Journal announcements of 
loans for NYSE/Amex firms for the years 1976-1986. They find 
this response is concentrated in loans that are favorably
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revised in at least one aspect (maturity, rate, dollar amount 
or protective covenants). Unfavorably revised loans have a 
significant negative response. Normal returns are found for 
loan initiations. They find no differential in the excess 
returns of new and favorably revised loans based on the 
characteristics of relative size, maturity, security 
provision and structure (revolving or term loan). Lummer and 
McConnell interpret their results as consistent with Fama's 
view that bank monitoring is effective predominantly for the 
continuation as opposed to initiation of a relationship 
between a borrower and lender.
Although Lummer and McConnell find the information 
provided to market participants by lenders beneficial for 
firms that have ongoing banking relationships, their results 
indicate that the knowledge that a loan is secured does not 
convey new information to market participants. They find 
insignificant excess returns for favorably renewed secured 
loans, but positive and significant excess returns for 
favorably renewed loans that are unsecured and those where 
the security status is unknown.
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992) question the 
inconsistency of Lummer and McConnell's findings with 
Diamond's (1984) model. They note that Diamond's model 
predicts that bank monitoring announcement effects should be 
positive for both new and renewed bank financing. They also 
suggest that smaller firms should be the primary
beneficiaries of share price increases associated with 
lending announcements since banks are their primary external 
monitors. In order to have a more representative sample of 
small firms, Slovin, Johnson and Glascock include both 
NYSE/Amex and NASDAQ firms. They find significant positive 
responses for both new and favorably renewed loan 
announcements, supporting the prediction of Diamond's model. 
They also find positive market responses concentrated in loan 
announcements for small firms as well as firms with 
significant negative information disseminated to the market 
in the month beginning six weeks and ending two weeks prior 
to the loan announcement. No effects on market response are 
found for information on maturity, type of loan, relative 
loan size or collateral.
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock's finding of no effect of 
collateral on the excess returns found for bank loan 
announcements for small firms is consistent with the results 
of Lummer and McConnell. Both findings suggest that the 
market is aware of the conditions that require a 
collateralized loan for firms that benefit from bank 
monitoring. Slovin, Johnson and Glascock's result is not 
consistent with Smith and Warner's prediction that the 
cheaper monitoring costs of secured debt should positively 
affect the share price of small firms.
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock's finding that information 
on a security provision is not a significant component of the
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excess returns for small firms is not consistent with the 
implication of Diamond's (1984) model that secured debt 
reduces the monitoring effectiveness of lenders. The model 
implies that an insignificant relation exists between secured 
loans and excess returns, but a positive relation exists 
between unsecured loans and excess returns.
Reinganum (1990) presages the importance of bank 
monitoring for small firms found by Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock. He finds that small NYSE listed stocks have higher 
returns than similar size NASDAQ listed stocks. He 
attributes this difference to the liquidity of the NASDAQ 
market. Due to high transactions costs for small NYSE listed 
firms, small firms trading on NASDAQ are more liquid than 
similar sized NYSE listed firms. The higher returns for NYSE 
listed small firms are compensation for the higher trading 
costs3.
One possible implication of Reinganum's findings is that 
bank monitoring is important for NASDAQ firms. Since these 
firms are small, the flotation costs of public debt financing 
denies access to public debt markets for these firms. The 
monitoring provided by banks is likely to be a major source 
of investor information.
3The higher returns for NYSE firms found by Reinganum are also found 
by Chan and Chen, and Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield, who attribute 
them to greater firm distress on NYSE rather than to transactions costs 
(liquidity). These results are not inconsistent if transactions costs 
include a premium for distress.
Central to the studies of Lummer and McConnell and 
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock is the measurement of share 
price response to loan announcements for firms that are 
publicly traded. The insignificant response to a security 
provision found in their studies can be attributed to the 
fact that the market is already cognizant of the 
circumstances that caused collateral to be included in the 
firm's loan. This information may not be available to 
investors for firms that are privately held or for firms that 
are publicly traded but lightly monitored. Thus, in addition 
to bank monitoring, the monitoring roles of other external 
agents may have a significant role in determining the impact 
upon share price of information contained in loan 
announcements.
2.2.2 Non-bank monitors and cross-monitoring
Titman and Trueman (1986) suggest that entrepreneurs 
with favorable private information about firm value will 
select higher quality external accounting auditors and other 
external agents such as investment and commercial bankers to 
certify this information to market participants. Theoretical 
studies and empirical evidence support this hypothesis.
Booth and Smith (1986) demonstrate that firms lease the 
reputation of underwriters when offering public securities in 
order to certify that the issue price is consistent with 
inside information. Beatty and Ritter (1986) find that 
investment bankers will not indiscriminately underprice
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initial public offerings because they have non-salvagable 
reputational capital at stake. Carter and Manaster (1990) 
demonstrate that initial public offering underwriters with 
high reputations select firms with low risk. Whited (1992) 
finds that the scrutiny of firms— by rmrestment BankersT 
reduces information asymmetry and increases their
accesibility to the capital markets. Hansen and Torregrosa
(1992) find evidence that in addition to certification 
services, investment banks also monitor client f irms, 
discipline managers and improve firm performance (and share 
price).
Booth's (1992) cross-monitoring hypothesis suggests that 
bank monitoring should be analyzed jointly with the 
certification/monitoring associated with publicly traded 
securities. He notes that public equity monitoring through 
security analysts, audits, and SEC filings lowers the 
monitoring costs of banks, as does public debt monitoring 
(Moody's and Standard and Poor's). Using data provided by 
the Loan Pricing Corporation for the years 1987-1989, he 
finds a positive and significant relationship between bank 
loan rates and the fact that a firm is privately held. This 
result supports the view that monitoring by investment banks 
for publicly traded firms reduces the costs of bank 
monitoring. Booth finds an inverse and significant 
relationship between bank loan rates and the presence of 
outstanding rated publicly traded debt by the firm. This
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result supports the view that monitoring by bond rating 
agencies reduces bank monitoring costs. Booth also finds a 
significant positive relation between loan spreads and the 
existence of a security provision in a loan contract. This 
supports the view that bank monitoring costs are higher for 
secured loans. Approximately half of the 642 loans in his 
sample are secured, but only 6 have a security provision and 
outstanding public debt, providing evidence that secured 
lending is confined to firms are predominantly monitored by 
banks.
2.2.3 Summary - external monitoring
The external monitoring of the firm provided by banks 
increases the wealth of the firm's shareholders. No 
conclusive view exists of the types of loans or firms that 
benefit most from bank monitoring. Small firms as well as 
firms that receive credit lines, funded loans and credit 
lines, and favorably renewed loans have all been variously 
espoused as major beneficiaries of bank monitoring. 
Empirical evidence indicates that attaching a security 
provision to a loan contract does not benefit shareholders of 
firms that have been shown to be the primary beneficiaries of 
bank monitoring (firms that receive favorably renewed loans 
and small firms). Empirical evidence also indicates that the 
exchange that a firm is listed on is an important indicator 
of the amount of monitoring received by the firm as well as 
its level of financial distress, and should be included in
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tests of the importance of a security provision to share 
price returns.
In addition to commercial banks, empirical evidence 
supports the view that investment banks and bond rating 
agencies also function as external monitors and provide 
valuable information certification services to investors. 
Empirical evidence indicates that the monitoring services of 
investment banks and bond rating agencies reduces bank 
monitoring costs. Empirical evidence also supports a view 
that a security provision in a loan contract increases bank 
monitoring costs. No empirical tests have been specifically 
designed to determine if the borrower's shareholders benefit 
from the increased monitoring cost of collateral or the 
reduction in bank monitoring costs provided by other agents.
2.3 Summary
Various explanations have been advanced for the 
existence of a security provision in a loan contract. The 
adverse selection and underinvestment explanations for 
collateral predict that firm share price is increased through 
the use of collateral. The incentive contracting and 
bankruptcy explanations for collateral variously predict a 
positive, negative or neutral share price effect caused by 
collateral. Collateral is potentially a mechanism that 
reduces the monitoring effectiveness of lenders. The 
assessment of the impact of a security provision on firm 
share price must address the confounding effects on share
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price caused by the monitoring services of commercial banks, 
investment banks and bond rating agencies.
The external monitoring by commercial banks increases 
shareholder wealth. The studies of Berger and Udell and 
Booth indicate that a security provision is a significant 
component bank monitoring costs. However the results of 
Lummer and McConnell and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 
indicate that shareholders of firms that benefit most from 
bank monitoring do not gain from the inclusion of a security 
provision in a loan contract. Shareholders pay the extra 
costs of collateral, b\it do not benefit from its presence. 
These results provide evidence against the adverse selection 
and underinvestment problem explanations for secured debt. 
However, these studies do not address the effect on share 
price of the monitoring by agents other than commercial 
banks.
Booth provides evidence that the external monitoring by 
investment bankers and bond rating agencies reduces bank 
monitoring effectiveness. Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 
provide evidence that secured debt reduces the effectiveness 
of bank monitoring for shareholders of small firms, however 
their study does include the combined effects on share price 
of non-bank monitors and security. The small firms that are 
the major beneficiaries of bank monitoring in the view of 
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock are targeted by Smith and Warner 
as the primary candidates for secured debt. Recent empirical
evidence by Reinganum and Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield 
suggests that financially distressed firms can also be 
categorized exchange listing . These results imply that the 
importance of bank monitoring for a firm is related to the 
exchange that it belongs to in addition to size. The firm 
characteristics of size and exchange listing are indicative 
of those firms most likely to benefit from the monitoring 
services of commercial banks as well as a security provision.
Chapter 3: The Significance of a
Collateral Provision in a Bank Loan
The previous chapter outlined the literature on bank 
loan announcements, both with and without consideration of 
the role of collateral. The positive stock price reaction to 
a bank loan announcement in general is usually attributed to 
the monitoring capabilities of the lender. Loan
characteristics, borrower characteristics, pre-announcement 
information, and the presence of non-bank monitoring are all 
found to be relevant in describing the market's response, and 
thus in determining the extent to which borrowers benefit 
from the monitoring services of lenders. Secured loans are 
a subset of bank loans. Prior studies, however, fail to 
consider the combined effects of all of these factors in 
evaluating the effects of a collateral provision on the 
market's response. Consequently, several conflicting 
explanations for the presence of a collateral provision have 
been offered. This chapter derives hypotheses to resolve 
these conflicts and isolate the effects of a collateral 
provision in a bank loan.
In section 3.1, hypotheses regarding the market's 
reaction to a collateral provision in bank loans are set 
forth. The possible relations between collateral and default 
risk are considered. In section 3.2, hypotheses are 
developed concerning the relation between the market's
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reaction and measures of loan characteristics, pre­
announcement information, and the presence of non-bank 
monitoring. In section 3.3, hypotheses are derived involving 
the relation between collateral and the variables. The 
relevant variables are described in the appropriate sections, 
but detailed definitions are deferred to Chapter 4. Appendix 
B summarizes the competing hypotheses on secured debt.
3.1 Market reaction and collateral
From the literature, five different explanations for the 
use of security in a loan can be identified: 1) to signal
firms with high quality projects, as proposed by Chan and 
Kanatas (1985) and Igawa and Kanatas (1990); 2) to reduce the 
underinvestment problem, as proposed by Stulz and Johnson 
(1985); 3) to resolve incentive contracting problems, as
proposed by Barro (1976), Smith and Warner (1979), Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981), Stiglitz (1985) and Stulz and Johnson 
(1985); 4) to preserve repayment priority in bankruptcy, as 
proposed by Franks and Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), and 
Slovin, Sushka, and Waller (1992); 5) secured debt is
advocated as a device within Diamond's (1984) model that 
reduces the level of monitoring that lenders perform for the 
benefit of the borrowing firm's shareholders. These five 
theories can be separated by their predictions concerning 
market reaction to bank loan announcements and the difference 
in default risk between secured and unsecured loans.
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For the first two explanations, secured debt has less 
default risk than does unsecured debt. These theories 
predict a positive market response for secured loans and a 
neutral market response to unsecured loans. Secured debt 
indicates that the firm is high quality (Chan and Kanatas, 
Igawa and Kanatas) or that it is pursuing a positive net 
present value project unfeasible with unsecured debt (Stulz 
and Johnson).
For incentive contracting explanations where collateral 
is employed to resolve moral hazard problems for lenders, 
collateral indicates more default risk than for unsecured 
debt. Two different market reactions are possible depending 
on the effect on monitoring costs of collateral. First, if 
collateral is a cost effective monitoring mechanism and 
borrowers retain the cost savings, shareholders benefit 
through the reduced rate (Smith and Warner, Stulz and 
Johnson). Second, the firm bears the increased deadweight 
costs associated with collateral, and the borrower's share 
price is reduced (Barro). In either case, shareholders do 
not benefit from unsecured loans.
Bankruptcy based explanations of collateral also imply 
that the firm has increased default risk. Three different 
market reactions are possible. First, if the use of 
collateral reveals a larger than expected probability of 
bankruptcy, then a negative response is expected. Second, 
for a firm in distress, the granting of the loan itself can
41
produce a positive market response if the announcement 
indicates that the lender's assessment of the probability of 
the borrower defaulting is less than had been the market's 
assessment. Third, the news of bankruptcy offsets the 
granting of credit with no resulting change in market value. 
For all of these explanations, unsecured loans should have a 
normal market reaction except for the case when the market 
anticipated that the firm is to receive a secured loan due to 
impending bankruptcy. The granting of an unsecured loan 
under these circumstances would be positively received since 
the lender has indicated that the firm's prospects of 
bankruptcy are greatly diminished.
Sitglitz' corporate control explanation of bank lending 
is based on the assumption that bank loans have reduced risk 
relative to other forms of financing, but no default risk 
differences exist between secured and unsecured bank loans. 
Collateral is a device that lenders use to decrease their 
risk and monitoring efforts. Two market reactions are 
possible. First, share price is unchanged since lenders are 
concerned with repayment, not increasing shareholder wealth 
of the borrowing firm. Second, share price is reduced for 
both secured and unsecured bank loans since lenders require 
the firm's managers to undertake low payoff (low default 
risk) projects.
A negative or neutral effect on shareholder wealth for 
secured loans is also consistent with the the bank monitoring
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model of Diamond (1984) . Lenders observe the actions of 
borrowers to insure that they are adequately compensated for 
the riskiness of the project. Shareholders benefit from the 
monitoring efforts of lenders. However, when a lender takes 
collateral, the benefits derived by shareholders are 
diminished. The lender now monitors an asset instead of the 
actions of the firm’s managers. Share price is unaffected or 
negatively impacted by the announcement of a secured loan 
since less lender monitoring is performed. A security 
provision in a loan contract is not indicative of default
risk changes for the firm.
The empirical tests of Diamond's (1984) bank monitoring 
model by Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992) suggest that the 
measurement of market reaction to secured debt is applicable
primarily for small firms. Secured debt is one of the
devices used in the monitoring activities of banks. Bank 
monitoring is an important source of information for market 
participants for small firms. The market is cognizant of the 
financial status of large firms, the granting of collateral 
for loans to them has been anticipated by the market.
Although Slovin, Johnson and Glascock find shareholders 
of small firms to be the primary beneficiaries of bank 
monitoring, the empirical results of Rienganum (1990), and 
Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield (1993) suggest that the 
monitoring associated with the exchange that a firm is listed 
on is likely to be an important determinant of market
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reaction to secured debt. Booth's (1992) results indicate 
that bank monitoring is important for firms not monitored by 
bond rating agencies. These studies further strengthen the 
argument that interpretation of market reaction to secured 
debt announcements is relevant only for firms that do not 
receive other forms of market monitoring.
Three hypotheses separating the various explanations for 
secured debt are derived based on two criteria: 1) market 
reactions to secured debt announcements and 2) the difference 
in default risk between secured and unsecured loans. Since 
a security provision in a loan is a component of bank 
monitoring, these hypotheses are subject to the caveat that 
market reaction is likely to be insignificant for a firm that 
has other sources of monitoring, and not because of the 
existence of a security provision.
Hj: Collateralized loans have a positive market
response.
Hla: The positive reaction to collateralized loans is a
result of decreased default risk. The presence of 
collateral indicates reduced default risk of the 
borrower when solving adverse selection, (Chan and 
Kanatas, 1985), or moral hazard (Igawa and 
Kanatas, 1990) problems. Riskless collateralized 
loans solve the underinvestment problem (Stulz and 
Johnson, 1985). A positive market reaction for 
secured loans is expected due to high borrower
quality (Chan and Kanatas, Igawa and Kanatas) or 
project feasibility (Stulz and Johnson). No 
change in share price is expected for unsecured 
loans since the firms are average or do not have 
reduced interest rates.
Collateralized loans have a positive market 
reaction through increased default risk indicative 
of moral hazard problems within the firm or 
increased bankruptcy probability. Collateral 
decreases the monitoring costs of resolving moral 
hazard problems for lenders, the borrower's 
shareholder value increases due to decreased 
monitoring costs (Smith and Warner, 1979, Stulz 
and Johnson, 1985). Shareholder wealth is 
unaffected by unsecured loans since monitoring 
costs are not decreased. Collateral is used to 
give adequate protection to the lender when the 
borrower declares bankruptcy (Franks and Torous, 
1989, Weiss, 1990, Slovin, Sushka and Waller, 
1992) . The share price of the firm increases 
because the receiving or renewal of credit (which 
the market did not wholly anticipate) gives the 
firm an option to continue operating and increase 
shareholder wealth. Unsecured loans receive 
either neutral or positive market reactions
depending on the market's assessment of the 
probability of bankruptcy for the firm. 
Collateralized loans have a negative market 
response.
The negative market reaction of collateralized 
loans is a result of increased default risk. The 
increased monitoring cost of collateral to resolve 
moral hazard problems are borne by the borrower, 
whose share price decreases (Barro, 1976). 
Unsecured loans do not affect share price since 
monitoring costs are unaffected. Collateral is 
used to give adequate protection to the lender 
when the borrower declares bankruptcy (Franks and 
Torous, 1989, Weiss, 1990, Slovin, Sushka and 
Waller, 1992). The share price of the firm 
decreases because the high probability of 
bankruptcy restricts credit availability (and the 
ability to pursue positive net present value 
growth opportunities) for the firm. Unsecured 
loans receive either neutral or positive market 
reactions depending on the market's assessment of 
the probability of bankruptcy for the firm. 
Although a negative market reaction exists for 
collateralized loans no default risk differential 
exists for them. Share price for both secured and 
unsecured loans is negative since lenders provide
loans for projects with low risk and low return 
(Stiglitz, 1985). The borrower's share price is 
reduced for collateralized loans since lenders 
monitor an asset (collateral) instead of the 
activities of firm's managers (interpretation of 
Diamond, 1984). Unsecured loan announcement 
effects should be positive since shareholders 
receive the benefit of bank monitoring. 
Collateralized loans have a neutral market 
response and no default risk differential exists 
between secured and unsecured loans. Share price 
for both secured and unsecured loans is unaffected 
since lenders interests are not aligned with 
shareholders (Stiglitz, 1985). The borrower's
share price is unaffected for collateralized loans 
since lenders monitor an asset (collateral) 
instead of the activities of firm's managers 
(interpretation of Diamond, 1984). Unsecured loan 
announcement should be positive since shareholders 
receive the benefit of bank monitoring. 
Shareholder wealth may not be affected for either 
secured or unsecured loan announcements if the 
firm receives monitoring from other agents that 
reduces the importance of bank monitoring (Booth, 
1992) .
The first testable hypothesis then, is simply the 
direction of the market's reaction to the presence of a 
collateral provision. Since increased default risk is a 
possible explanation for both positive and negative market 
reaction to secured loan announcements, further tests using 
financial ratios indicative of financial distress are 
necessary to separate the competing hypotheses. Further 
separation of the data by monitoring sources may also be 
required to validate any initial interpretation of market 
reaction to secured debt announcements.
3.2 Market reaction, default risk, and monitoring
The hypotheses separating various explanations for 
secured debt outlined in section 3.1 are based on market 
reaction to secured loan announcements. However, previous 
empirical studies show that the importance of bank loan 
announcements to market participants is a function of several 
variables. The contribution of a security provision to 
market reaction surrounding a bank loan loan announcement 
must be jointly analyzed with other explanatory factors. The 
only two empirical studies of the market reaction to loan 
announcements that explicitly consider the collateral 
provision are Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Slovin, 
Johnson, and Glascock (1992). The lack of significance in 
both studies for the security provision is inconclusive 
because neither of these empirical studies consider the 
connection between collateral and the full range of factors
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identified in the literature. Furthermore, both studies 
exclude unfavorably revised loans although increased default 
risk explanations for collateral suggest that secured bank 
loans may be unfavorably revised.
Variables that have been identified as indicative of 
firms that benefit from secured debt and the asset monitoring 
services of lenders can be classified into three categories: 
levels of non-bank monitoring, information prior to 
announcement and loan characteristics. Relevant variables 
for each of these categories together with their expected 
relation to the market's response are discussed below.
3.2.1 Non-bank monitoring
The results of Slovin, Johnson and Glascock indicate 
that small firms are the primary beneficiaries of the 
monitoring associated with bank loans. These firms receive 
little or no monitoring from other sources. Firm size is 
expected to be significant and inversely related to the 
market's response.
Reinganum (1990) notes that small firms are
predominantly found on NASDAQ. He finds that small NASDAQ 
firms have more liquidity than small NYSE firms. This
indicates that small NASDAQ firms have significant investor 
interest and suggests a positive market response for NASDAQ 
firms.
Chan and Chen (1991) find that small NYSE listed firms 
are marginal firms with high default risk. Fama, French,
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Booth and Sinquefield likewise find that NYSE firms have more 
default risk than similar size NASDAQ listed firms. Smith 
and Warner indicate firms with higher default risks should be 
the primary users of secured debt. These suggest that if a 
security provision is significant it should be so for a 
subset of firms listed on NYSE. A security provision should 
also be significant for Amex firms since they have the same 
market structure as NYSE firms and equity and net income 
characteristics that are more restrictive than NASDAQ firms4.
The studies of Chan and Chen and Fama, French, Booth and 
Sinquefield use information from COMPUSTAT to measure 
financial distress. The COMPUSTAT survival bias is well 
known and presents another selection bias. Firms found on 
COMPUSTAT presumably have more investor interest and thus 
more non-bank monitoring than firms not on COMPUSTAT. 
Therefore a negative relationship is expected between the 
availability of COMPUSTAT data for a firm and the market's 
response to the loan announcement.
Booth's cross-monitoring hypothesis suggests that the 
monitoring by bond rating agencies reduces the importance of 
bank monitoring. The presence of outstanding investment 
grade bonds should be inversely related to market response.
“'NYSE and Amex have a monopolist specalist market structure, NASDAQ 
has a competitive bid market structure. As of January 1986, listing 
requirements include a size provision of $16,000,000 in market value of 
equity for NYSE, and $1,000,000 for NASDAQ.
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3.2.2 Pre-announcement information available to the market
Because the issue of asymmetric information is critical 
to the role of both collateral and bank monitoring, it is 
important to know the nature of information available for use 
in pricing the borrower's stock prior to the loan 
announcement. Market participants are continually processing 
whatever information is available. Information available to 
the market significant enough to influence the borrower's 
stock price would presumably also be known to the lender.
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock find market response 
positively related to a significant negative runup for the 
month ending two weeks before the announcement date. They 
interpret their result as indicative of prior information 
that the firm is in distress (the negative runup) being 
offset by the announcement's implication that the lender's 
assessment of the probability of the borrower defaulting is 
not as great as expected. A similar result would be expected 
here.
The information available before the announcement can be 
favorable as well. This pre-announcement information could 
include specifics about the loan leaked to the market. In 
that case, however, assuming reasonably efficient markets, 
there would be no market reaction on the announcement date. 
The finding of announcement effects by prior studies implies 
either markets are not "reasonably efficient" or such leakage 
is not usual. Another possibility is that the firm has
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favorable pre-announcement news not related to bank lending. 
In this case a positive market response to a loan 
announcement is expected.
3.2.3 Loan characteristics
A. Security
As discussed in section 3.1, a positive and significant 
relation between the inclusion of a security provision in a 
loan contract and market returns supports both the positive 
market response, increased default risk and positive market 
response, decreased default risk hypotheses. An inverse and 
significant relation supports both the negative market 
response, increased default risk and negative market 
response, no differential default risk hypotheses. Further 
tests using financial ratios indicative of distress 
(increased default risk) are necessary to separate these 
competing explanations and are discussed in section 3.3.2. 
The finding of no significant relation between information on 
a security provision and price changes supports the neutral 
market response and no default risk differential hypothesis 
and indicates that a collateral provision in a loan contract 
does not benefit shareholders of the borrowing firm.
Only the positive market response, reduced default risk 
explanation for secured debt unambiguously predicts a neutral 
market reaction for unsecured loan announcements. The 
finding of positive or neutral market reactions for unsecured 
debt is consistent with the remaining hypotheses. Unsecured
52
loans may have positive announcement effects according to 
bankruptcy and reduced monitoring explanations for secured 
debt. Should a positive market reaction be found for 
unsecured debt announcements, the financial ratio tests 
indicative of distress to be discussed in section 3.3.2. will 
be helpful in separating the market effects of unsecured loan 
announcements implied by bankruptcy (increased default risk) 
and bank monitoring (no change in default risk) explanations 
for secured debt.
B. Loan type
Mikkelson and Partch find a positive relationship 
between market response and lines of credit, but no 
significant relationship for term loans. James finds a 
significant positive relationship for term loans. Neither 
Lummer and McConnell nor Slovin, Johnson and Glascock find a 
significant relationship between market response to loan 
announcements and type of loan. The results of this study 
are expected to confirm the latter findings.
C. Loan status (new, renewal, transfer)
The major difference between the studies of Lummer and 
McConnell and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock is that the former 
study finds a positive and significant market response to 
renewed loans indicating that the continuation of a banking 
relationship signals information to the market whereas the 
latter study found neither new nor renewed loans to be 
significant, indicating that the monitoring associated with
the formation of a banking relationship is as important as 
the monitoring associated with the continuation of a 
relationship. Two major differences exist between their 
studies. First, Slovin, Johnson and Glascock include NASDAQ 
firms in their study whereas Lummer and McConnell do not. 
Second, Lummer and McConnell treat loans transferred from one 
bank to another as renewals whereas Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock categorize them as new loans. However, loans that 
are transferred from one bank to another are neither new nor 
renewed. The transfer of a loan may indicate a change in the 
default risk of the firm and/or amount of credit it requires. 
A positive market response for loan transfers indicates an 
decrease in default risk. It may indicate an increase in 
default risk with the effect of credit granting by a new 
lender overriding the increase in default risk. It may also 
indicate that the firm has been denied credit by its current 
lender but has found another source of funding. Finally, a 
positive reaction can indicate that the funding requirements 
of the firm have changed and the firm needs another bank to 
handle its larger credit requirements. A negative 
relationship indicates an increase in the default risk of the 
firm.
D. Maturity and rate
Flannery suggests that undervalued firms issue short 
term debt to decrease the default risk premium whereas 
overvalued firms prefer longer term loans in order to avoid
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this disclosure and attendent interest rate increases. This 
suggests overvalued firms would avoid disclosure of maturity 
and interest rate information. A positive market response 
for the disclosure of maturity information as well as rate 
information would be supportive of the view that undervalued 
firms choose to disclose this information.
E. Loan/Equity ratio
Arguments for borrower share price increases associated 
with bank loan announcements are based on the monitoring 
abilities of lenders. Another possible reason for a positive 
share price reaction is that the initiation or renewal of a 
credit request by a lender gives the firm the ability to 
pursue a positive net present value project. Under this view 
larger loan amounts as a percentage of the firm's equity 
induce larger positive market responses due to increased 
leverage effects. James, Lummer and McConnell, and Slovin, 
Johnson and Glascock do not find this variable significant.
3.3 Collateral and the variables
3.3.1 Collateral and loan and market characteristics
Regardless of whether a security provision is 
significant in explaining market reaction to loan 
announcements, the sheer number of secured loans found by 
Berger and Udell and Booth indicate that lenders and 
borrowers have some purpose for employing collateral. Firm 
characteristics or market information may induce bankers to 
include a security provision in a loan. A security provision
55
cab be included in a loan in tandem with other loan 
characteristics (e.g. found predominantly in conjunction with 
renewed loans). An unordered multinomial logit regression 
with the variables mentioned in section 3.2 will be used to 
determine if the profile of an announced secured loan is 
significantly different from an announced unsecured loan and 
loans where information on collateral is not disclosed. Even 
if the logit regression is significant, the identification of 
specific variables is difficult due to multinomial logit 
model limitations for multiple choice dependent variables 
(discussed further in Chapter 4).
3.3.2 Collateral and borrower characteristics
To understand the role of security in a loan, it is also 
necessary to relate the presence of a collateral provision to 
various characteristics of the borrower. If the lender uses 
readily available information about the borrower to determine 
whether to require collateral, then the market should be able 
to predict that requirement. If the collateral provision is 
not a function of known borrower characteristics, then the 
collateral provision is potentially a conduit to the market 
of hidden information about the borrower.
Incentive contracting and bankruptcy based explanations 
for the use of secured debt are based on the assumption that 
the firm has increased its default risk. The findings of 
Chan and Chen and Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield 
indicate that financial distress is not necessarily limited
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to small firms. An examination of cash flow, leverage, 
liquidity and profitability ratios for firms with sufficient 
data availability on COMPUSTAT may provide evidence of firm 
financial characteristics associated with secured loans.
Discriminant analysis using variables indicated by 
Altman (1968) as predictors of bankruptcy may indicate 
whether a high probability of bankruptcy by the borrowing 
firm induces a lender to include a security provision in the 
loan. Five variables have been suggested by Altman as 
predictive of bankruptcy. Working capital to total assets 
measures net liquid assets of the firm relative to total 
capitalization. This ratio should be smaller for firms 
experiencing reduced operating earnings. Retained earnings 
to total assets discloses the earned surplus of the firm over 
time. This ratio should be smaller for small firms as well 
as firms with deteriorating earnings. Earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets indicates the productivity 
of the firm’s assets. This ratio should be low for firms 
with relatively unproductive assets. The market value of 
equity to book value of total liabilities measures how much 
the firm's assets can decline in value before the firm 
becomes insolvent, and should be low for firms with a high 
probability of default. Sales to total assets indicates 
management’s capacity to deal with competitive conditions. 
Although this ratio varies by industry, it is related to the
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other variables in the model and contributes to the overall 
discriminating ability of the model.
A logit regression based upon more general conditions of 
financial distress explanations for secured debt is also 
employed. Chan and Chen (1991) find high leverage to be 
indicative of financial distress. Whited (1991) finds that 
high interest coverage ratios (interest expense as a 
percentage of cash flows) are associated with poorly 
performing firms. Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield find 
that firms with poor earnings have high book to market equity 
ratios. Altman notes that the firm's liquidity (working 
capital to total assets) should be smaller for firms 
experiencing poorer earnings.
Chapter 4: Sample Selection, Data,
and Methods of Analysis
This chapter describes the data and the empirical 
procedures employed to test the hypotheses established in the 
previous chapter. The sample selection process is described 
in section 4.1. In section 4.2, the relevant variables are 
defined, with their respective sources. The methods of 
analysis to test the various hypotheses are discussed in 
section 4.3. A list of the variables employed in this thesis 
is contained in Appendix C.
4.1 Sample selection
The primary sample consists of bank loan announcements 
that appear in the Wall Street Journal (hereafter, simply the 
Journal) during the period 1980-1991. These dates are chosen 
due to data availability and changes in the legislative 
environment.
The risk of default (i.e., bankruptcy) has been 
identified as a reason for collateral to be offered or 
required on a loan. Over time, however, there have been 
changes in the laws governing bankruptcy. A major change, 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, became effective in 
October 1979, making 1980 the first full calendar year under 
that legislation. To avoid any possibility that the change 
in legislation could affect the results of this study, no 
announcements prior to 1980 are included in the sample. The
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sample ends in 1991 simply because that was the most recent 
available year of accounting and market data at the time of 
the analysis.
To be included in the sample, a report of a bank loan 
could not include any other corporate news such as dividends, 
earnings, management changes, operational changes, other 
financing, acquisitions, divestitures, or litigation. These 
other events have the potential to affect stock prices and 
thus are a confounding factor. In addition, loan 
announcements are excluded from the sample if any other news 
concerning the borrower appears in the Journal the day 
preceeding, the day of or the day following the loan 
announcement. A final selection criterion is that stock 
market returns are available for at least half of the 
estimation period of the market model regression (discussed 
more fully in section 4.3). The final uncontaminated sample 
consists of 452 loan announcements.
For the period from January 1, 1980 through September 
30, 1987, bank loan announcements appear in the Financing
Business column(s) of the Journal. Financing activity 
reported in other parts of the Journal is found to be of a 
secondary nature and frequently is combined with other 
announcements. The sample includes 410 loan announcements 
from this period.
On October 1, 1987, the Journal changed its format to 
the present three sections. From that date to December 31,
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1991 (the terminus of the sample) bank loan announcements 
appear in the Money and Investing section. As with the 
earlier announcements, financing activity reported elsewhere 
in the Journal almost always includes other corporate events. 
The sample includes 42 loan announcements from this period.
4.2 Variables of interest
This study examines the market's reaction to the 
announcement of a bank loan agreement as a key to 
understanding the role of collateral in such loans. As 
described in the previous chapter, this examination requires 
data covering market returns, the nature of the information 
flowing to the market about the borrower prior to the loan 
announcement, the characteristics of the loan, the presence 
of alternative (i.e., non-bank) monitors of the borrower, and 
various characteristics of the borrower. Multivariate 
regressions (described in section 4.3) are used to measure 
the joint effects of these variables on the market's 
reaction. Discriminant analysis and logit regressions 
(described in section 4.3) are used to analyze the role of 
financial distress for firms with secured loans. Each of the 
variables of interest are defined in the following 
paragraphs.
4.2.1 Market returns
The market's reaction to a bank loan announcement is 
defined as the average daily risk-adjusted stock return for 
a borrower on the day before and the day of the announcement.
(The single-index market model procedure for calculating this 
measure is described in section 4.4.) Data for deriving 
share price changes are obtained from the University of 
Chicago Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) data 
files. This database contains daily share price information 
for firms listed on the New York (NYSE) and American (Amex) 
stock exchanges and for firms traded on the National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation 
(NASDAQ) system. Firms not included in these files and those 
with insufficient information to estimate paramaters for the 
market model are discarded.
4.2.2 Prior information
To determine whether the information available for use 
in pricing the borrower's stock prior to the loan 
announcement is generally positive or negative, for each 
borrower, the cumulative average daily risk-adjusted stock 
returns for the 20 trading days from 30 days before through 
11 days before the announcement are calculated (see section 
4.3). A standardized residual z-statistic (see section
4.3, equation 1) is calculated for each observation. If the 
returns are negative and significant at the 10 percent level 
(one-tailed test), the binary variable NEGRUN is coded with 
a value of 1; otherwise the variable is coded with a value of 
0. If the returns are positive and significant at the 10 
percent level, the binary variable POSRUN is coded with a 
value of 1; otherwise the variable has a value of 0. Any
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announcement that does not have significant negative 
(positive) pre-announcement rundown (runup) is coded with a 
value of 0 for both NEGRUN and POSRUN.
4.2.3 Characteristics of the loan
A. Security information
In order to determine if share price is affected by the 
existence of a security provision in a loan contract, loan 
announcements are separated by secured, unsecured and unknown 
security status. The binary variable SECURE is coded with a 
1 for loans identified as such in the article or the 
collateral provided for the loan is described in the article. 
Otherwise the binary variable SECURE is coded with a 0. The 
binary variable UNSECURE is used in the same fashion as 
SECURE for loans denoted as unsecured in the announcement. 
Any announcement that does not indicate information on the 
security status of the loan contract contains a value of 0 
for SECURE and UNSECURE.
B. Status (new, renewal or transfer)
In order to determine the importance to share price of 
new, existing and changed banking relationships, loan 
announcements are categorized as new, renewals and transfers. 
The binary variable NEW is coded as 1 if loans are identified 
as new in the article and it is apparent from the article 
that the loan is not a renewal of an existing loan. Any loan 
not classified as new contains a 0 for NEW. The binary 
variable RENEW is coded with a 1 for loans that are noted as
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such in the article. Also identified as renewals are loans 
that are classified as new but are obviously renewals. Any 
loan not classified as a renewal contains a 0 for RENEW. The 
binary variable TRANSFER is coded with a 1 for loans that are 
transferred from one bank or group of banks to another. In 
those circumstances where some members of a lending group 
change but others do not, the loan is denoted as a transfer 
if the lead lender changes, otherwise it is classified as a 
renewal. Any loan not classified as a transfer receives a 0 
for TRANSFER. Any loan for which the article does not 
contain information necessary for the above classifications 
contains a 0 for all three classification codes.
D. Type (line of credit, term loan, revolving credit)
The granting of credit that can be drawn upon at a later 
date and the advancing of the agreed upon contract amount at 
loan closing are different methods of bank loan contracting 
that could have different levels of bank monitoring and 
different share price reaction. Loans are coded with 1 for 
the binary variable LINE if the loan is identified as a line 
of credit or revolving line of credit in the article. All 
other loans contain a value of 0 for LINE. The binary 
variable TERM contains 1 if the loan is identified as a term 
loan or combination of a revolving line and a term loan. All 
other loans contain the value of 0 for TERM. (Any loan types 
that are not identified and contain a value of 0 for both 
TERM and LINE.)
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E. Maturity and rate
Information on the maturity and rate of a financial 
contract can indicate whether the firm is over-valued or 
under-valued and affect share price. The binary variable 
MATURE is coded as 1 if the term of the loan or the maturity 
date is found in the article. If this information is not 
given, MATURE contains a value of 0. The binary variable 
RATE is coded as 1 if information on the interest rate is 
provided in the article; otherwise RATE contains a value of 
0.
F. Loan amount/market value of equity
Information on the amount of credit being granted is 
present on virtually all loan announcements. This 
information is retained since the importance of the loan to 
the firm (loan amount/market value of equity) has been 
suggested as a component of announcement effects. The 
variable LOANMKT contains the ratio of the amount of the loan 
to the market value of the firm one week before the 
announcement.
4.2.4 Alternative monitors of the borrower
A. Firm size
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock find the monitoring 
services of banks to affect share price of small firms but 
not large firms. Firm size is calculated for each firm as 
the share price one week before the event date multiplied by 
the number of outstanding ordinary common shares at that
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time. The continuous variable LOGSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of firm size. These data are from CRSP. Firms are 
categorized as small if the market value of equity is below 
the CRSP NYSE/Amex median year-end market value during the 
sample period; otherwise they are categorized as large.
B. Bond rating agencies
In order to determine the importance of bond rating 
agencies as assessors of default risk (James, 1986) and 
external monitors (Booth, 1992), bond ratings from Moody1s 
Bond Record and Standard and Poor’s Bond Guide in the month 
preceeding the announcement are collected for the firms in 
the sample. The public debt of a firm is classified as 
investment grade and the binary variable INVGRAD is coded as 
1 if the lowest Moody rating of its bonds is Baa. Similarly 
the firm's public debt is classified investment grade if its 
lowest Standard and Poor bond rating is BBB. In those cases 
where both agencies have a bond rating, both of the above 
criteria must be satisfied for the public debt of the firm to 
receive an investment grade rating. Firms are classified as 
non-investment grade (INVGRAD coded as 0) if they have rated 
bonds outstanding that do not meet this criteria or if they 
have no public rated bonds outstanding.
C. Exchange listing
Bankruptcy explanations of the default risk increase 
hypothesis are based on the premise that secured debt is 
employed because the firm is engaged in risky projects with
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a high probability of default (financial distress). Fama, 
French, Booth and Sinquefield (1993) suggest that on average 
NYSE firms are more distressed than similar sized NASDAQ 
firms. Therefore, the market's reaction to secured loan 
announcements should be significant for NYSE firms. The 
similarity of market structure for NYSE and Amex firms 
suggests that firms listed on either exchange would have 
similar share price responses to loan announcements5.
Reinganum suggests that significant investor interest 
exists for NASDAQ firms. Since these firms are smaller than 
NYSE firms, bank monitoring for these firms should be an 
important source of investor information. Loan announcements 
should be positive for NASDAQ firms. In order to determine 
the importance of exchange listing for share price response, 
the binary variable EXCHANGE is coded as 1 for NASDAQ firms 
and 0 for NYSE/Amex firms.
D. COMPUSTAT bias
A firm with accounting information on COMPUSTAT has 
significant investor interest in the opinion of Standard and 
Poor's6. The inclusion of a firm on COMPUSTAT is a form of 
non-bank monitoring similar to the bond rating services 
performed by Standard and Poor's. This suggests that firms
5Separate analyses separating the data by NYSE and Amex listed firms 
did not alter the final results of this study.
'The COMPUSTAT limited coverage file contains NYSE and Amex listed 
firms as well as some NASDAQ firms that have the largest market following 
in the opinion of Standard and Poor's.
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that are not listed on COMPUSTAT should be the primary 
beneficiaries of bank monitoring. The binary variable 
COMPUSTAT is coded as 1 if a firm is listed on COMPUSTAT,
otherwise it is coded as 0.
4.2.5 Financial distress
Several of the explanations of the market's response to 
secured debt announcements are based on the supposition that 
a security provision is present due to increased financial 
distress for the firm. To determine if financial distress is 
a condition for providing collateral, discriminant analysis 
and logit regressions (described in section 4.4) are 
conducted. Accounting financial ratios indicative of 
financial distress are calculated from Standard and Poor's 
COMPUSTAT database. Variables indicative of financial 
distress are described below.
A. Altman's bankruptcy ratios
Altman (1968) provides a predictive model of bankruptcy
using discriminant analysis. Since a security provision has
been suggested as beneficial for the lender in the event of 
the firm's bankruptcy, a modification of Altman's model to 
predict the use of security provision may provide evidence 
for the role of security for financially distressed firms 
that are bankruptcy candidates. This model contains a 
dependent variable with three possible values: 1) secured
loans, 2) unsecured loans and 3) loans where information on 
security is not announced. The independent variables have
been suggested by Altman as indicative of increased 
bankruptcy potential. The working capital to total assets 
ratio (WCTA) measures net liquid assets of the firm relative 
to total capitalization and should be smaller for firms 
experiencing reduced operating earnings. The retained 
earnings to total assets ratio (RETA) discloses the earned 
surplus of the firm over time and should be smaller for small 
firms as well as firms with deteriorating earnings. The 
earnings before interest and taxes to total assets ratio 
(EBITTA) indicates the productivity of the firm's assets and 
should be low for firms with relatively unproductive assets. 
The market value of equity to book value of total liabilities 
ratio (MVEBTL) measures how much the firm's assets can 
decline in value before the firm becomes insolvent and should 
be low for firms with a high probability of default. The 
sales to total assets ratio (SLSTA) indicates management's 
capacity to deal with competitive conditions. Although this 
ratio varies by industry, it is related to the other 
variables in the model and contributes to the overall 
discriminating ability of the model.
In addition to discriminant analysis, which maximizes 
the squared distance between the populations of secured, 
unsecured and unknown security status loans based upon linear 
combinations of Altman's financial ratios, logit regressions 
using these same variables is performed. Logit regression 
assesses the probability that a loan is secured, unsecured or
6 9
unknown with respect to security status based upon the the 
independent variables. Since the dependent variables in this 
analysis are discrete, logit regression has three advantages 
over discriminant analysis: 1) logit regression adjusts for 
non-normal error terms, 2) logit regression adjusts for non­
constant error variance and 3) logit regression constrains 
the response function to have a probability between 0 and 1 
(see Neter, Wasserman and Kunter, Applied Linear Regression 
Models, 1989, pp. 580-581).
B. Other ratios indicative of financial distress
Logit procedures using alternative financial ratios may 
also be used to confirm financial distress explanations for 
secured debt. Consistent with the work of Altman, the 
working capital to total assets ratio (WCTA) measures the 
liquidity of the firm and should be smaller for firms with 
secured loans. The results of Chan and Chen (1991), indicate 
that the debt to market value of equity ratio (LEVERAGE) 
should be higher for firms with secured loans. Whited's
(1990) finding that distressed firms have high interest 
expense to cash flow ratios (INTCOVER) should also be 
applicable for firms with secured loans. Fama, French, Booth 
and Sinquefield's (1993) finding of high book to market 
equity ratios (BKEQMKEQ) for poor performing firms should 
also be applicable to the distressed firms that use secured 
debt.
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4.3 Method of Analysis 
4.3.1 Event study
The event study method is appropriate for this study 
since the competing hypotheses described in section 3.1 
predict changes in the market value of the firm at the 
announcement of a secured loan. The most commonly used event 
study procedure is the standardized residual test method of 
Patell (1976) and Brown and Warner (1985). This procedure is 
well specified if there is no change in the variance of a 
security's return during the event period. However, Brown 
and Warner (1985) point out that if changes in a security's 
variance accompany an event, "using a time series of non- 
event period data to estimate the variance of the mean excess 
return will result in too many rejections of the null 
hypothesis that the mean excess return is equal to zero." (p. 
23) Empirical evidence indicates that event induced variance 
is present and significant for various financial activities. 
Event induced variance is found for earnings announcements 
(Beaver, 1968), common stock repurchases (Dann, 1981), 
convertible security calls (Mikkelson, 1981) , earnings 
forecasts (Penman, 1982) and directorship announcements 
(Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen
(1991) propose a modification of the Brown and Warner test 
statistic that allows for cross-sectional event period 
variances. Using simulation they demonstrate that in the 
presence of event induced variance their standardized cross
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sectional test is much more powerful than the standardized 
residual method in detecting no abnormal returns when in fact 
no abnormal returns are present. If loan announcements are 
not accompanied by changes in cross-sectional variation, both 
tests produce identical results.
The simulations of Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen 
demonstrate that the standardized cross-sectional test loses 
its advantage over the standardized residual test when event 
induced changes in variance exists and abnormal returns are 
1 to 2 percent. Previous loan announcement studies have 
found some sets of loan announcements that fit this category. 
Thus neither event study test has a clear advantage over the 
other. The results of both tests are provided in this study. 
The final results of this study are independent of the method 
chosen since the standardized cumulative prediction errors of 
the market model estimation period (used in the multiple 
regression models discussed in section 4.3.3) are the same 
for both methods.
The ordinary least squares market model is employed for 
a 120 day estimation period beginning 240 days prior to the 
announcement. This period is chosen to avoid contamination 
caused by information leakage in loan recontracting7. The
7The vast majority of those instances where the lender(s) is (are) 
identified indicate that loans are provided by a syndicate of lenders. 
Since loan recontracting involves the transfer of information between 
lenders prior to the maturity of the existing loan, a 120 day interval 
between the end of the estimation period and the event day avoids any 
information leakage affecting the. predicted returns.
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equally weighted index provided by CRSP is used as a measure 
of market returns8. Cumulative prediction errors are
measured for the day preceeding the announcement and the day
of the announcement.
Under the null hypothesis that the event window
cumulative prediction errors are not significantly different 
from zero, the standardized residual test statistic is
derived as follows:
Si-1 SRis/ (2?.! (Tr 2) / ( T-4) )1/2 (1)
where:
SRiE AiE/ si
\
i +_ L +. {R"*-R")2 (2)
where:
N = number of firms in sample.
AiE = security i's abnormal return on the event day.
Ait = security i's abnormal return on day t.
T; = number of days in security i's estimation period. 
R,,,, = market return on day t.
Rm = average market return during estimation period.
sThe equally weighted index is used in the event study simulation 
models of Brown and Warner and Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen as well as 
the research of Mikkelson and Partch, James and Lummer and McConnell.
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S; = security i 's estimated standard deviation of abnormal 
returns during the estimation period.
S R ^  security i's standardized residual on the event day.
The purpose of standardizing residuals before forming 
portfolios is to adjust for heteroskedastic event day 
residuals and prevent securities with large variances from 
dominating the test.
The Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen test statistic is a 
simple cross-sectional t-statistic of the aggregation of the 
individual test statistics of equation 1 and is given by:
1 (nr? S R iE\2 13)
4.3.2. Analysis of variance and test of difference in means 
Event study methodology is performed on the data sample 
partitioned by variables of interest in order to determine if 
sub-categorizations of loan announcements are the prime 
beneficiaries of secured debt. To augment this procedure, an 
analysis of variance is performed to determine if significant 
difference of means exists between the partitioned data sets. 
Since some of the data categorizations include more than two 
partitions, pairwise least squares differences of means tests 
are performed.
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4.3.3 Multivariate regression
As discussed in chapter 3, variables representative of 
loan characteristics, pre-announcement information and 
various levels of non-bank monitoring have the potential to 
affect the market value of a firm at a loan announcement. A 
regression on cumulative market model prediction errors can 
indicate the significance of a security provision in the 
presence of these test and control variables. In order to 
adjust for heteroskedasticity in stock returns, all variables 
are weighted by the inverse of the standard deviation of the 
prediction error derived from the market model estimation. 
The general form of this model is described by equation 4.
CPE1 / Sj =B0 / Sj+S fi1x1 /s1+ui/si (4)
where:
CPEf= cumulative event window prediction error.
xt = variable of interest (described in section 4.2).
u, = mean zero white noise.
s, = standard deviation of the prediction error derived from 
market model estimation.
4.3.4 Altman's discriminant analysis
The findings of positive, negative or insignificant 
coefficients for a security provision in equation 4 are all 
consistent with a distressed firm explanation for secured 
debt. In order to establish the plausibility of this
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explanation, Altman's (1968) discriminant analysis procedure 
for predicting bankrupcy is used for those observations for 
which sufficient accounting data is available. Instead of 
predicting bankruptcy, Altman's model is modified to predict 
the existence of a security provision in a loan. This model 
is described in equation 5.
sec=B1wc/ ta+B2re/ ta+B^ebi t/ ta+BAmve/btl+B5sls/ ta+u (5) 
where:
sec = variable indicating whether the announcement indicated 
that the loan is secured, unsecured or not disclosed. 
wc = working capital, 
ta = total assets, 
re = retained earnings.
ebit = earnings before interest and taxes. 
mve = market value of equity. 
btl = book value of liabilities. 
sis = sales.
u = mean zero white noise.
4.2.5 Logit regression
The binary and unordered multinomial logit models based 
on the logistic probability distribution are used to 
determine circumstances under which secured debt is chosen 
based on whether or not the announcement contains information 
that the loan is secured. The binary model is employed to 
determine the probabilities of choosing secured versus
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unsecured debt and the multinomial model is employed when not 
disclosing the security status of a loan is also an 
alternative choice. Equation 6 describes the general form of 
the estimation of the paramaters of model employed.
s e c i =B0+EiBix i +ui (6)
where:
sec, = variable indicating whether the announcement indicated
that the loan is secured, unsecured or not disclosed,
x, = variable of interest.
Uj = mean zero white noise.
Equation 7 describes the probability of a particular choice.
Prob(Y=j) =eBjXi/ (l+Ej^e8*^ ) <7)
for j = 1,2,...,J. The model is normalized by setting the 
paramaters of one of the choices to 0 (Greene, Econometric 
Analysis, 1990, pp. 695-706).
Chapter 5: Descriptive Statistics and Event Studies
5.1 Full data sample
The full data sample of Wall Street Journal loan 
announcements for the period 1980-1991 with sufficient data 
on CRSP contains 739 observations. Of this total, 120 
announcements (16.2 percent) specifically identify a security 
provision in the loan agreement (Table 5-1). Forty-nine of 
the secured loan announcements (41 percent) contain other 
pertinent information or have concurrent announcements. The 
predominant reasons for contamination of secured loan 
announcements roughly parallel those for the full data set: 
earnings announcements, other forms of financing and 
announcements within the event window. The majority of the 
contaminated secured loan announcements indicate that the 
firm is under financial distress and support the increased 
default risk hypotheses. With the exception of the purchase 
of airplanes by People Express, secured loan announcements 
contaminated by earnings statements indicate that expected or 
actual earnings are either negative or below prior 
expectations. Announcements contaminated by other forms of 
financing indicate that the firm is in violation of loan 
covenants, agrees to more restrictive loan covenants, has 
received loans from major shareholders, or is considering 
bankruptcy. Four hundred and fifty two of the announcements 
are uncontaminated.
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Table 5-1
Wall Street Journal loan announcements by reason for 
contamination. Percentage of total observations in 
parentheses.
Reason for 
Contamination Secured Unsecured Unknown Total
Uncontaminated
Acquisition
Divestiture
Earnings
Other
Financing
Litigation
Operational
Changes
Event window 
announcement
Event window 
+1 announcement
Total
71
(9.61)
0
(0.00)
0
(0.00)
11
(1.49)
14 
(1.89)
1
(0.14)
6
(0.81)
15 
(2.03)
2
(0.27)
120
(16.24)
48
(6.50)
0
(0.00)
0
(0 .00)
0
(0.00)
1
(0.14)
0
(0.00)
2
(0.27)
4
(0.54) 
3
(0.41)
58
(7.85)
333
(45.06)
3
(0.41)
5
(0.68)
24
(3.25)
70
(9.47)
1
(0.14)
31
(4.19)
74 
(10.01)
20
(2.71)
561
(75.91)
452
(61.16)
3
(0.41)
5
(0.68)
35
(4.74)
85
(11.50)
2
(0.27)
39
(5.28)
93
(12.58)
25 
(3.38)
739 
(100.00)
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The standardized residual event study methodology of 
Patell (1976) and Brown and Warner (1985) as well as the 
standardized cross-sectional event study methodology of 
Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) are employed in this 
study. The function of the latter methodology is to adjust 
the z-statistic for event induced variance. Event induced 
variance is present in the data in Table 5-2 but does not 
change any levels of significance. For the contaminated 
events all standardized cross-sectional z-statistics are 
larger in absolute value than the counterpart standardized 
residual z-statistics (Table 5-2 Panel C). For the full data 
sample as well as the uncontaminated subset (Table 5-2 Panels 
A and B) event induced variance increases the overall 
variance and reduces the z-statistic. Since both
methodologies indicate the presence of significant APEs, the 
standardized residual z-statistic is referenced throughout 
this study. The simulations of Boehmer, Musmuci and Poulsen 
indicate that this statistic is more reliable than the 
standardized cross-sectional z-statistic in the presence of 
abnormal returns. Both statistics are reported, however.
The average prediction error (APE) during the event 
window (-1,0) for the full data sample is positive (0.95) and 
significant at the 1 percent level (4.80 z-statistic) (Table 
5-2, Panel A). This result stems primarily from the clean
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data sample (0.96 APE, 3.84 z-statistic) (Table 5-2, Panel 
B)9. The contaminated announcements have an APE (0.93) that 
is not statistically significant (0.49 z-statistic). The 
significant positive APE found for the full data sample as 
well as the insignificance of the APE for the contaminated 
data sample is consistent with the findings Slovin, Johnson 
and Glascock (1992) and demonstrate that contaminating events 
do not affect the outcome of this study10 .
Although the clean announcements have overall positive 
and significant returns, APEs are insignificant for those 
announcements that contain information on a security 
provision. Secured loan announcements are numerically 
positive (1.27 APE), however statistically insignificant 
(1.29 z-statistic) (Table 5-2, Panel B) . Unsecured loan 
announcements are also positive (0.38 APE) and insignificant 
(0.66 z-statistic). Loan announcements where information on 
collateral is not disclosed are positive (0.98 APE) and 
significant (3.63 z-statistic). There is no difference in 
the means of the APEs of the three groups. The
insignificance of both secured and unsecured loan
9An observation for Omnidentrix, a dental HMO, is omitted from the 
clean data sample although this announcement fulfilled the filter 
criteria described in chapter 4. This firm has a 44% APE and a 
studentized residual larger than 6 for the subsequent multiple 
regressions, imparting a significant bias to results for negative runup. 
The observation with the largest studentized residual for the remaining 
clean observations is lower than 5 and does not significantly affect the 
final results.
l0The research of Mikkelson and Partch, James and Lummer and 
McConnell did not report share price announcement effects for 
contaminated events. Neither did these studies include NASDAQ firms.
Table 5-2
Average two day prediction error of all observations grouped 
by contamination and security provision.
Group
pet.
APE
Standardized 
cross­
residual sectional 
z-stat. z-stat. N
pet.
pos.
Panel A: Full sample.
All observations 0.95*'* 4.80 2.95 739 53.3
Secured 0.83 0.52 0.34 120 56.7
Unsecured 0.36 0.87 0.75 58 48.3
Unknown 1.04”* 4.98 2.95 561 53.1
Panel B: Clean Observations
All observations 0.96*” 3 .84 3.04 452 52.2
Secured 1.27 1.29 0.99 71 56.3
Unsecured 0.38 0.66 0.55 48 47.9
Unknown 0.98”* 3.63 2.85 333 52.0
Panel C: Contaminated Observations
All observations 0.93 0.49 1.38 287 55.1
Secured 0.19 -0.38 -0.41 49 57.1
Unsecured 0.29 0.54 0.66 10 50.0
Unknown 1.11 0.57 1.58 228 54.8
significant at 1 percent.
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announcements supports the neutral market response, no 
default risk differential hypothesis and supports the view 
that secured debt reduces the monitoring efforts of lenders. 
As noted in section 3.1, bank loan announcements is likely to 
be significant for subsets of firms. Small firms, firms 
listed on NYSE/Amex, and firms that do not have investment 
grade bonds are identified as primary candidates for secured 
debt. Disaggregation by these criteria may provide evidence 
supportive of the positive market response or negative market 
response hypotheses and is deferred until section 5.3.4.
The lack of a significant, positive APE for loans
identified as unsecured for the full sample is not consistent
with the view that borrower's share price should benefit from
the monitoring services of banks. Disaggregation of the data
by the sources of monitoring available for a firm may be
necessary to determine the significance of unsecured loan
announcements and is deferred until section 5.3.4. An
insignificant APE is expected for unsecured loan
announcements of firms that are monitored by non-bank
sources, but not for firms for whom bank monitoring is the
primary source of market information.
5.2 Descriptive statistics for clean announcements
5.2.1 Clean data sample disaggregated by status of security 
provision in loan announcements
Over half (51.5 percent) of the clean announcements 
occur in the first three years of the sample (Table 5-3). By 
contrast less than 5 percent of the clean announcements occur
in the last three years of the sample. At least two 
explanations for the skewness of the observations are 
possible. First, the early part of the decade coincides with 
the increasing popularity of leverage buyouts and attendant 
financing requirements. This trend diminished in popularity 
in the second half of the decade. Second, for unknown 
reasons (perhaps the change of format of the Wall Street 
Journal in October of 1987 coupled with increased coverage of 
international firms) less column space became available for 
financing announcements in the latter part of the decade. 
Interpretation of the final results is subject to the caveat 
that a large proportion of events occur at the beginning of 
the 1980's.
Secured loans are made to firms that are smaller than 
firms receiving unsecured loans as well as firms who receive 
loans where the security status is not disclosed. The median 
market value of firms receiving secured loans ($37.3mm, Table 
5-4, Panel B) is approximately one third that of firms who 
receive unsecured loans ($139.3mm, Table 5-4, Panel C) as 
well as firms with undisclosed security status in the loan 
announcement ($111.9mm, Table 5-4, Panel D). An analysis of 
variance indicates a difference in means of the value of 
equity of secured, unsecured and undisclosed security status 
loan announcements at the 5 percent level. Least squared 
differences of means tests indicate that the value of equity 
of unsecured loans differs from both secured loans and loans
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with undisclosed security status at the 1 percent level. The 
difference in the mean value of equity for firms that receive 
secured loans and those that receive unsecured loans suggests 
that the small firms that have been identified by Slovin, 
Johnson and Glascock as the primary beneficiaries of bank 
monitoring are also the primary recipients of secured loans. 
The data also supports the contention of Smith and Warner 
(1979) that small firms are the most frequent users of 
secured debt.
Although firms that receive secured loans are
approximately one third the size of other firms, the median
value of secured loans ($33mm) is approximately two thirds 
the size of unsecured loans ($5Omm) and unknown security 
status loans ($54.3mm). The resultant median loan to market 
value of equity ratio for secured loans (1.02) is
approximately double that of unsecured loans (0.44) and
unknown security status loans (0.49). Even though secured 
loans are made to small firms, the relative importance of the 
amount financed is significantly higher than for other firms. 
Secured bank lending is a significant source of financing for 
small firms.
For loans for which maturity information is available, 
secured loans have shorter median maturities (3.5 years) than 
do unsecured loans (5 years) or loans whose security status 
is unknown (7 years). According to Flannery's maturity 
hypothesis this suggests that firms that receive secured
Table 5-3
Uncontaminated loan announcements by year. Percentage 
total observations in parentheses.
it year Secured Unsecured Unknown Total
80 10 6 68 84
(2.21) (1.33) (15.04) (18.58)
81 5 13 66 84
(1.11) (2.88) (14.60) (18.58)
82 12 2 51 65
(2.65) (0.44) (11.28) (14.38)
83 10 3 36 49
(2.21) (0.66) (7.96) (10.84)
84 11 10 36 57
(2.43) (2.21) (7.96) (12.61)
85 5 6 25 36
(1.11) (1.33) (5.53) (7.96)
86 8 0 16 24
(1.77) (0.00) (3.54) (5.31)
87 4 2 9 15
(0.88) (0.44) (1.99) (3.32)
88 0 3 13 16
(0.00) (0.66) (2.88) (3.54)
89 2 2 4 8
(0.44) (0.44) (0.88) (1.77)
90 2 1 5 8
(0.44) (0.22) (1.11) (1.77)
91 2 0 4 6
(0.44) (0.00) (0.88) (1.33)
Total 71 48 333 452
(15.71) (10.62) (73.67) (100.00)
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Table 5-4
Descriptive statistics of clean announcements.
Variable N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Panel A: All observations
Loan amount® 452 141.94 50.00 1.40 2500.00
Equity valueb 452 351.65 101.00 2.06 7218.13
Loan/Equity 452 0.99 0.53 0. 02 38.70
Loan term0 261 5.89 6.21 0.16 31.00
Listing termd 452 11.85 11.42 0.75 29.25
NASDAQ pet.e 452 25. 00 - - -
Panel B: Secured loans
Loan amount 71 132.54 33.00 1.40 2000.00
Equity valuef 71 182.06 37.29 2.06 2813.85
Loan/Equity 71 2.03 1.02 0.02 38.70
Loan term 34 4 .19 3 . 50 0.16 10.00
Listing term 71 11.59 11.08 0.75 29.25
NASDAQ pet. 71 31. 00 - - -
Panel C: Unsecured loans
Loan amount 48 94.16 50.00 5.00 700.00
Equity valuef,g 48 246.36 139.28 10.74 1403.70
Loan/Equity 48 0.53 0.44 0. 02 2.51
Loan term 29 4.97 5. 00 1.83 8.58
Listing Term 48 10.74 8.92 0.75 25.25
NASDAQ pet. 48 27.00 - - -
Variable
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Table 5-4 cont’d.
N Mean Median Minimum Maximum
Panel D: Unknown security status
Loan amount 333 150.83
Equity value® 333 402.99
Loan/Equity 333 0.83
Loan term 198 6.32
Listing term 333 12.06
NASDAQ pet. 333 23.00
54.30 3 . 00 2500.00
111.92 2.77 7218.13
0.49 0.02 7.45
7.00 0.50 31.00
11.83 0.75 27.91
Amount of loan disclosed in announcement in millions. 
Common equity multiplied by share price one week before 
announcement in millions.
Loan term disclosed in announcement in years.
Period between initial listing on exchange and event 
date in years.
Percentage of firms listed on NASDAQ.
Difference in means significant at 1 percent.
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loans are undervalued. However, maturity information must by 
jointly interpreted with interest rate information.
Firms that receive secured loans are not newcomers to 
public stock exchanges. The median exchange listing time for 
firms that receive secured loans (11.1 years) is 
approximately the same as for firms that have not disclosed 
security status (11.8 years) and slightly longer than for 
firms with unsecured loans (8.9 years).
5.2.2 Announcement bias
Loans that are disclosed as secured comprise 15.7 
percent of the announcements (Table 5-3). Disclosure that a 
loan is unsecured occurs in 10.6 percent of the loan 
announcements. For a large majority (73.7 percent) of the 
loan announcements information is not disclosed on security 
status. The large percentage of firms that do not indicate 
whether a loan is secured or unsecured has two implications. 
First, some firms or lenders prefer not to disclose that a 
loan is secured or unsecured, either because the information 
is immaterial or because it will be negatively received by 
the market. Second, the contracting parties view a security 
provision as material information that should be disclosed, 
however the loan is unsecured and no disclosure on security 
status is made. The proportion of disclosed secured loans in 
the sample is far less than the 57.5 percent of secured loans 
in the samples of Berger and Udell (1990) and the 51 percent 
of Booth (1992) . However, Berger and Udell derive their data
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from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Bank Lending 
which includes loans to firms that are not listed on any 
exchange. Booth's sample is provided by the Loan Pricing 
Corporation for firms with publicly traded equity and 
privately held firms. The discrepancy between the proportion 
of announced secured loans in this study and the percentage 
of secured loans obtained by public corporations in Booth's 
study indicates that either some firms receive secured loans 
but do not disclose this information in the announcement or 
that a reporting bias exists in the Wall Street Journal 
against firms that receive secured debt.
One possible reason for reporting bias may be that 
information is reported in the Wall Street Journal 
predominantly for large firms or firms that are listed on 
NYSE/Amex. Scott (1986) suggests that large firms
customarily receive unsecured loans. He cites Federal 
Reserve data in which 18 percent of the loans made to firms 
with assets of $100,000,000 are secured and 78 percent of 
loans to firms with assets of less than $250,000 are secured. 
The listed firms noted by Booth that receive secured debt may 
be predominantly small firms.
The data does not support an announcement bias in the 
sample based on firm size or exchange listing. Over 44 
percent of the reported loans are to firms that are above the 
NYSE/Amex median firm size for the sample period. One 
quarter of the sample consists of NASDAQ listed firms. The
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percentage of reported secured loan announcements in this 
data sample is less than what is expected based on Booth's 
study. This suggests that some secured loans are not 
announced as such. Information on the inclusion of a 
security provision in the announcement of the terms and 
conditions surrounding private contracting between lender and 
borrower is an item that is voluntarily disclosed and may be 
interpreted as a deliberate decision by the lender and/or 
borrower to convey (or not to convey) information to market 
participants.
5.2.3 Security provision information and external monitors 
The hypotheses for which secured debt is an indication 
of increased default risk for the firm (section 3.1) suggest 
that the level of external monitoring received by a firm is 
indicative of the propensity of a firm to obtain secured 
debt. Smith and Warner suggest that small firms are the 
primary candidates for secured debt. Chan and Chen (1991) 
and Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield (1993) suggest that 
NYSE firms are more distressed than similar sized NASDAQ 
firms. Given the adequate protection afforded by security in 
bankruptcy, NYSE and Amex firms should be the predominant 
users of secured debt. The studies of Chan and Chen and 
Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield are limited to NYSE 
listed firms that are also on COMPUSTAT. Their studies have 
a COMPUSTAT selection bias and may not have contained a 
representative sample of firms that receive secured loans.
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A partitioning of announcements by the availibility of 
COMPUSTAT information will indicate the extent of this bias. 
Booth finds evidence that monitoring by bond rating agencies 
decreases the need for secured debt by a firm. This section 
disaggregates the inclusion of a security provision in a loan 
by the type of external monitoring that the firm receives.
When separated by size, secured loans represent 20.5 
percent of all loan announcements of small firms (Table 5-5, 
Panel A) and 9.6 percent of all announced loans of large 
firms (Table 5-5, Panel B). A Chi-square test based on a 2 
by 2 contingency table rejects at at least the 0.005 percent 
level the hypothesis security and firm size are independent 
(9.91 Chi-square with 1 degree of freedom). Similarly, the 
hypothesis that the proportion of secured loans in small 
firms (52/254) is equal to the proportion among large firms 
(19/198) is rejected (3.317 z-statistic). These results 
further support Smith and Warner's contention that small 
firms are the primary candidates for secured loans.
Only 2 Amex and 3 NASDAQ large firms have secured loan 
announcements. However secured loan announcements for NYSE 
firms are equally divided (14) between large and small firms 
(Table 5-5, Panel's A & B). This supports Chan and Chen and 
Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield's contention that NYSE 
firms are distressed. Some of these firms face higher 
probabilities of bankruptcy and are candidates for secured 
debt.
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Table 5-5
Distribution of the sample by firm size, exchange and 
security information in announcement. Small firms have 
equity value below NYSE/Amex median value for years 1980 
1991; large firms are at or above median value 
($125,406,000). Percentage of total observations in 
parentheses.
Firm size Secured Unsecured Unknown Total
Panel A: Small firms by exchange
NYSE 14 9 65 88
(5.51) (3.54) (25.59) (34.65)
Amex 19 6 50 75
(7.48) (2.36) (19.69) (29.53)
NASDAQ 19 7 65 91
(7.48) (2.76) (25.59) (35.83)
Total 52 22 180 254
(20.47) (8.66) (70.87) (100.00)
Panel B: Large firms by exchange
NYSE 14 10 131 155
(7.07) (5.05) (66.16) (78.28)
Amex 2 10 9 21
(1.01) (5.05) (4.55 ) (10.61)
NASDAQ 3 6 13 22
(1.52) (3.03) (6.57) (11.11)
Total 19 26 153 198
(9.60) (13.13) (77.27) (.100.00)
Panel C: Total
Total 71 48 333 452
(15.71) (10.62) (73.67) (100.00)
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Although observations on firms on COMPUSTAT with full 
balance sheet and income statement information comprise 52.6 
percent of all observations, they contain only 29.6 percent 
of all secured loan observations (Table 5-6, Panels A and B) . 
This indicates that over 70 percent of the firms that receive 
secured debt lack significant investor interest in the view 
of Standard and Poor's. Furthermore, only 18 percent (4/22) 
of secured loans to NASDAQ firms are in the COMPUSTAT sub 
sample. The disproportionate lack of COMPUSTAT coverage for 
firms that receive secured loans indicates that bank 
monitoring is a significant source of investor information 
for the majority of firms that receive secured loans. 
Approximately 10 percent of the observations in the sample 
are for firms that have outstanding investment grade 
bonds (Table 5-7). Only 4 (5.6 percent) of these firms have 
secured loan announcements. However, both unsecured and 
unknown security status loan announcements also contain low 
percentages of firms with outstanding investment grade bonds, 
suggesting that little information is to be derived when 
separating share price effects of loan announcements by this 
variable.
5.3 Event study results
The focus of this section is on disaggregating 
announcement effects by the various loan characteristic, pre 
announcement information and monitoring variables described 
in section 3.2. The purpose of this separation is twofold.
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Table 5-6
COMPUSTAT listing disaggregated by exchange and security 
information in announcement. Percentage of total
observations in parentheses.
Status Secured Unsecured Unknown Total
Panel A; Non-COMPUSTAT by exchange
NYSE 16 8 68 92
(7.48) (3.74) (31.78) (42.99)
Amex 16 3 21 40
(7.48) (1.40) (9.81) (18.69)
NASDAQ 18 7 57 82
(8.41) (3.27) (26.64) (38.32)
Total 50 18 146 214
(23.36) (8.41) (68.22) (100.00)
Panel B: COMPUSTAT by exchange
NYSE 12 11 128 151
(5.04) (4.62) (53.78) (63.45)
Amex 5 13 38 56
(2.10) (5.46) (15.97) (23.53)
NASDAQ 4 6 21 31
(1.68) (2.52) (8.82) (13.03)
Total 21 30 187 238
(8.82) (12.61) (78.57) (100.00)
Panel C: Total
Total 71 48 333 452
(15.71) (10.62) (73.67) (100.00)
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Table 5-7
Investment grade rated outstanding public bonds disaggregated 
by security information in announcement. Firms with Baa or 
better Moody rating or BBB or better Standard and Poor rating 
are considered as having investment grade bonds. Percentage 
of total observations in parentheses.
Status Secured Unsecured Unknown Total
Investment 4 1 43 48
Grade (0.88) (0.22) (9.51) (10.62)
Non-Investment 67 47 290 404
Grade (14.82) (10.40) (64.16) (89.38)
Total 71 48 333 452
(15.71) (10.62) (73.67) (100.00)
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The first is to compare the results of this study with 
previous studies that have documented the subsets of firms 
that benefit most from the monitoring services of banks. The 
second is to isolate the effect of a security provision in a 
loan announcement from these previously identified firm 
characteristics as well as additional characteristics 
described in section 3.2 as potential indicators of the 
existence of collateral in a loan contract.
5.3.1 Event study by loan characteristics
A. Security provision
The two day APE for the uncontaminated sample is 0.96 
percent with a z-statistic of 3.84 which is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level and consistent the view 
that the monitoring services provided by lenders is a 
valuable service for borrowers (Table 5-8, Panel A). 
Announcements which indicate that a security provision is 
present in the loan contract comprise 15.7 percent of the 
clean observations (Table 5-8, Panel A). For secured loan 
announcements the APE is positive (1.27) but not significant 
at traditional confidence levels (1.29 z-statistic). The APE 
for unsecured loan announcements is positive (0.38) and 
insignificant (0.66). Loans that have not disclosed 
information on a security provision have a positive (.98 
percent) and significant (3.63 z-statistic) APE. An analysis 
of variance as well as least squared differences pairwise 
tests of means reveals no significant difference in means
97
Table 5-8
Average two day prediction error of all clean observations 
grouped by loan characteristics.
Group
pet.
APE
Standardized
cross­
residual sectional 
z-stat. z-stat. N
pet. 
pos.
Panel A: Security status.
All observations 0.96**’ 3.84 3 . 04 452 52.2
Secured 1.27 1.29 0.99 71 56.3
Unsecured 0.38 0.66 0. 55 48 47.9
Unknown 0.98**’ 3.63 2.85 333 52.0
Panel B: Loan purpose.
Acquisition 0.74* 1.79 0.85 16 37.5
General corporate 0. 05 0.03 0. 03 85 43.5
Project 1.38*** 2 . 61 1.99 65 56.9
Repay debt 2 .12* 1.70 1.14 37 51.4
Working capital 1.10 1.50 1.27 74 54.1
Unknown 0.97** 2.26 1.80 175 55.4
Panel C: New, renewal, transfer status •
New -0.14 0.42 0.28 14 28.6
Renewal 1.94“ 2 .18 1. 63 90 57.8
Transfer 2.53*“ 4.23 1.84 25 60.0
Unknown 0. 62 2 .13 1.92 323 51.1
Table 5-8 cont'd.
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Group
pet.
APE
Standardized
cross­
residual sectional 
z-stat. z-stat. N
pet. 
pos.
Panel D: Loan type •
Credit line „ _ _ •** 1.32 2.61 2.01 145 51.7
Term _ _ _ *«* 0.80 2.46 2.10 205 52.2
Unknown 0.79 1.49 1.05 102 52.9
Panel E: Maturity.
Known 0.49“ 1.55 1.40 261 49.8
Unknown 1. 60***a 4.09 2.82 191 55.5
Panel F: Rate.
Known
Unknown
1.36
0.78
4.41 
1. 66
3.43
1.32
142
310
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
difference in means significant at 5 percent.
60. 6 
48.4
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between secured, unsecured and unknown security status loan 
announcements at the 10 percent level. As indicated in 
section 5.1, these results support the neutral market 
response, no default risk differential hypothesis for secured 
debt.
The lack of significant APEs for secured and unsecured 
loans can be interpreted in three different manners. First, 
a security provision in a loan is of no benefit to the 
borrower’s shareholders. Second, firms for whom market 
participants rely on bank monitoring for significant 
information choose not to disclose the security status of the 
loan contract. Third, the information contained in bank 
loans is significant mainly for those firms that benefit from 
the monitoring services of banks. For these firms disclosure 
of the security status of a loan may reveal relevant 
information to the market. Further disaggregation of the 
data based on the forms of monitoring received by the firm is 
deferred until section 5.3.4.
B . Purpose
Information on the purpose of the loan is available on 
61 percent of all loan announcements (Table 5-8, Panel B). 
APEs are positive and significant at the 10 percent level or 
greater for all categories except general corporate purposes 
and working capital. Consistent with the results of James 
(1987) and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992), loans that 
are used to repay debt have a positive APE (2.12 percent)
100
that is significant (1.70 z-statistic) indicating that the 
positive share price effects of bank loans are not solely 
generated by leverage increasing effects. No significant 
differences in means across purposes are found.
C. Status (New, renewal, transfer)
Before addressing the controversy of the importance of 
bank monitoring for new versus renewed loans studied by 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock, 
it must be noted that two classification differences exist 
between this study and theirs. Both of these classification 
differences arise because of the focus of this study on 
secured loans. First, a separate category is established for 
loans that are transferred from one group of banks to 
another. As noted in section 3.2.3, these loans may signify 
a change in the default risk of the borrower and as such 
indicate the need for a security provision in a loan 
contract. Second, loans are classified as new, renewals or 
transfers solely based on information contained in the loan 
announcement. The studies of Lummer and McConnell and 
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock use annual corporate reports for 
the years ending before and after the announcement to 
classify loan status when this information is not in the 
announcement. Evidence described in section 5-4 indicates 
that some loans in this study are secured but not announced 
as such. Classifying loan status by post event information 
would distort announcement effects and is not employed.
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Only 29 percent of the loan announcements identify loans 
as new, renewed or transferred (Table 5-8, Panel C). Renewed 
loans have a positive (1.94) and significant (2.18 z-stat) 
APE, consistent with the event study findings of Lummer and 
McConnell (1989) and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock. New loans 
have a negative APE (-0.14) that is insignificant with a 0.42 
z-statistic. This is consistent with the results of Lummer 
and McConnell, but not those of Slovin, Johnson and Glascock. 
However, transferred loans (which Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock categorize as new and Lummer and McConnell 
categorize as renewals) have a positive (2.53 percent) and 
significant (4.23 z-statistic) APE. The results of this 
study are consistent with the studies of Lummer and McConnell 
and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock when the same 
categorizations of loan status are used. Furthermore, the 
results of this study suggest that their event study results 
would obtain even without using post event sources of 
categorization. Although transferred loans comprise only 5.5 
percent of the sample, their large positive and significant 
APEs indicate that either the default risk of the borrower 
has decreased or that the firm's current lender has curtailed 
or denied credit and the firm has found a replacement lender.
D. Type (Line of credit, term loan)
One hundred and forty five announcements are categorized 
as lines of credit because the loan agreement is identified 
as a line of credit or credit line or revolving line of
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credit (Table 5-8, Panel D). Two hundred five announcements 
are classified as term loans because loans are identified in 
the announcement as term loans or a combination revolving 
line/term loan. The remaining one hundred two announcements 
are classified as unknown. Different levels of monitoring 
may exist for lines of credit which are contingent promises 
by lenders to fund, and term loans which are funded loans. 
The major difference between lines of credit and term loans 
is that for lines of credit the lender has the option to deny 
funding if the borrower defaults on the covenants of the loan 
contract whereas for term loans the lender can demand 
repayment with borrower default, but the borrower may decline 
to do so. Lines of credit are typically used by firms for 
seasonal working capital needs or serve as a backstop source 
of funding. Term loans are typically used for project 
financing.
Shareholders benefit from the monitoring capabilities of 
banks for both lines of credit and term loans. Lines of 
credit announcements have a positive (1.32 percent) and 
significant (2.61 z-statistic) APE (Table 5-8, Panel D) . 
Term loans also have a positive (0.80 percent) and 
significant (2.46 z-statistic) APE. The APE is positive 
(0.79 percent) but not significant (1.49 z-statistic) for 
loan announcements for which neither of the above 
categorizations is possible. No significant differences in 
means are found between the APEs.
103
E. Maturity
Flannery's maturity hypothesis implies that undervalued 
firms desire to disclose maturity information and interest 
rates, but overvalued firms do not. The results of this 
study are not supportive of the implications of Flannery's 
maturity hypothesis. Information on the maturity status of 
a loan is known for 57.7 percent of the sample (Table 5-8, 
Panel E). The APE for announcements where maturity 
information is known is positive (0.49 percent) but 
insignificant. When maturity information is not disclosed 
the APE is positive (1.60 percent) and significant with a 
4.09 z-statistic. A significant difference in means exists 
for these groups at 5 percent. The lack of significance for 
maturity information is consistent with the findings of 
Lummer and McConnell and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock. These 
results do not support the view undervalued firms disclose 
maturity information.
F. Interest rate
Interest rate information is provided for 31.4 percent 
of the sample (Table 5-8, Panel F). Loans that contain this 
information have a positive (1.36) and significant APE (4.41 
z-statistic). Loans that do not disclose interest rate 
information have a positive (0.78) but insignificant APE 
(1.66 z-statistic). No significant difference in the means 
of the APE's exists between loans whose interest rate is 
disclosed and those where the rate is not disclosed. The
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positive market reaction to interest rate disclosure is 
consistent with Flannery's maturity hypothesis, but does 
necessarily support it. The negative market reaction for 
loans with maturity information is inconsistent with 
Flannery's maturity hypothesis. Thus the overall results 
offer evidence against Flannery's maturity hypothesis.11
G. Summary
For four of the six categorizations of information 
provided in the loan announcement for the full sample, APEs 
for firms that chose not to disclose information are positive 
and significant (security, purpose, status and maturity). 
Furthermore, for the categorizations of purpose, status and 
type, multiple positive significant APEs exist. This 
suggests that further categorization by factors such as pre­
announcement information and levels of external monitoring 
may be necessary in order to separate the effects of share 
price response to a security provision from those 
attributable to the monitoring associated with lending 
announcements.
5.3.2 Event study results for pre-announcement information
One possible cause for positive share price reaction to 
loan announcements is significant negative information 
dissemination about a firm in the time period immediately
’’Ninety two loans disclosed both maturity and interest rates. The 
APE for these loans is 1.23 percent which is significant at the 1% level 
for the standardized residual (2.67 z-statiaitic) and standardized cross- 
sectional (2.32 z-statistic) event studies. This joint result is 
consistent with Flannery's maturity hypothesis.
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preceeding an event. Market participants may learn that the 
firm is negotiating with creditors and infer that the firm is 
troubled. The granting of credit for a firm would be 
positively viewed. Another possibility is that market 
participants may have surmised that the firm and its 
creditor(s) have or will successfully negotiate a loan. The 
granting of credit for a firm under these circumstances is 
not particularly newsworthy.
In order to determine the importance of pre-announcement 
information to share price response, share price runup is 
measured for a period beginning 30 days before the event and 
ending 11 days before the event. This period is chosen 
because loan negotiations between a group of lenders and a 
firm typically span this period, increasing the possibility 
of information leakage.
A positive (0.66) but insignificant (1.35 z-statistic) 
APE is found for 19 firms that have significant negative 
share price runup (Table 5-9). A positive (2.17 pet.) and 
significant (3.40 z-statistic) APE is found for 32 firms that 
have significant positive share price runup. These results 
are the opposite of prior expectations. One possible
explanation is that significant share price runup is caused 
by factors other than anticipated bank financing. The vast 
majority of observations (88.7) have no significant prior 
runup at the 10 percent level. These firms have a positive
Table 5-9
Average two day prediction error of all clean observations 
grouped by significant (10 percent, one tailed) pre 
announcement information from days -30 to -11.
Standardized
cross­
Group
pet.
APE
residual
z-stat.
sectional
z-stat. N
pet.
pos.
Negative 0.66 1.35 1.33 19 57.9
Positive 2 .17*** 3.40 2.44 32 62.5
Not significant 0.88*** 2 .82 2.24 401 51.1
significant at 1 percent.
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(0.88) and significant (2.82 z-statistic) APE at the loan 
announcement.
5.3.3 Event studies categorized by external monitoring
A. Firm size
The results of this study suppport Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock's finding that bank loan announcements constitute a 
primary information source for market participants for small 
firms. Small firms (categorized as such by being below the 
NYSE/Amex median firm size for the time horizon under study) 
constitute 56.2 percent (254/452) of the sample (Table 5-10, 
Panel A). They have a positive APE (1.89) that is 
significant (5.64 z-statistic) at the 1 percent level. Large 
firms have a negative (-0.23) and statistically insignificant 
(-0.59 z-statistic) APE. The means of the APEs are 
significantly different at the 1 percent level.
B. Exchange listing
NYSE/Amex firms have an APE of 0.65 which is significant 
at 10 percent (Table 5-10, Panel B) . This is consistent with 
the fact that 64.2 percent of the small firms in the sample 
are listed on NYSE/Amex. NASDAQ firms have an APE of 1.90 
which is significant at 1 percent (Table 5-10, Panel A). A 
significant difference in means of APEs exists at the 5 
percent level and supports the view developed in section
3.2.1 that the structural differences between NYSE/Amex and 
NASDAQ are a prime source of variation in market reaction to
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Table 5-10
Average two day prediction error of all clean observations 
grouped by monitoring variables and security provision.
Group
pet.
APE
Standardized
cross­
residual sectional 
z-stat. z-stat. N
pet.
pos.
Panel A: Firm size •
Large firms -0.23“ -0.59 -0.53 198 43.9
Small firms 1.89***“ 5.64 4.17 254 58.7
Panel B: Exchange.
NYSE/Amex 0. 65*b 1.92 1.57 339 49.6
NASDAQ 1.90***b 4.36 3.17 113 60.2
Panel C: Investment grade bonds.
Investment grade 0.87 1.40 1.27 48 54.2
Below grade _ _ _ «*« 0.97 3.58 2 .78 404 52.0
Panel D: COMPUSTAT
COMPUSTAT 0.91*** 2.81 2.13 238 48.3
Non-COMPUSTAT 1.02*** 2.62 2.17 214 56.5
significant at 1 pet., 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
difference in means significant at 1 percent, 
difference in means significant at 5 percent.
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information about a firm. These results also support the 
view that NYSE/Amex listed firms are more distressed than 
NASDAQ traded firms.
C. Investment grade bonds
The APE for firms that have investment grade bonds is 
positive (0.87) but insignificant (Table 5-10, Panel C). For 
firms with below investment grade bonds the APE is positive 
(0.97) and significant (3.58 z-statistic). These results 
support Booth's view that firms that receive monitoring 
provided by bond rating agencies have reduced need for the 
monitoring services of banks. However, no difference in 
means exists between investment grade and below investment 
grade bonds.
D . COMPUSTAT
APEs are positive and significant for firms listed on 
COMPUSTAT (0.91, 2.81 z-statistic) as well as firms that are 
not listed on COMPUSTAT (1.02, 2.62 z-stat). There is no 
difference in means for the APEs of the groups. The 
facilitation of monitoring with accounting information from 
COMPUSTAT does not diminish the effect of bank monitoring.
E. Summary
The difference in means of APEs for small and large firms 
as well as NYSE/Amex and NASDAQ firms indicates that exchange 
listing may be as significant as size in determining the 
importance to firms of the monitoring provided by lenders. 
This distinction is also important for determining the
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significance of a security provision. Smith and Warner 
suggest that small firms are the major users of secured debt. 
The different levels of distress for NYSE and NASDAQ firms 
found by Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield imply that 
secured loans may primarily benefit NYSE/Amex firms. Section
5.3.4 investigates this hypothesis.
5.3.4 Secured loans disaggregated by external monitor
In this section event study results are analyzed for 
secured loans disaggregated by the level of external 
monitoring received by the borrower. Due to the difference 
in means for APEs found in section 5.3.3 for firm size and 
exchange, analysis of the importance of information on a 
security provision in a loan announcement focuses on these 
subsets.
The only group for which secured loans have a negative 
APE (-0.08) is large firms (Table 5-11, Panel A), however it 
is insignificant (-0.55 z-statistic). Unsecured loan 
announcements and announcements for which security 
information is unknown are also insignificant for large 
firms. For small firms unsecured loan announcements are 
insignificant (0.93 z-statistic, Table 5-11, Panel B). The 
APE of secured loans is positive (2.04) and significant at 
the 10 percent level (1.83 z-stat) Loans with unknown 
security status have the same APE as secured loans at a 
higher significance level (2.04, 5.39 z-statistic). The
positive and significant APE for secured loans for small
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Table 5-11
Average two day prediction error of all clean observations 
grouped by security provision within monitoring variables.
Group
pet.
APE
Standardized
cross­
residual sectional 
z-stat. z-stat. N
pet. 
pos.
Panel A: Large firms.
Secured -0.08 -0.55 -0.52 19 47.4
Unsecured 0. 39 0.04 0.03 26 50.0
Unknown -0.25 -0.49 -0.45 153 42.5
Panel B: Small Firms
Secured 2 .04“ 1.83 1.34 52 59. 6
Unsecured 0.37 0.93 0.77 22 45.5
Unknown _  _  . *+«2 . 04 5.39 3.94 180 60. 0
Panel C: NYSE/Amex
Secured 1.23 1.54 1.15 49 55.1
Unsecured 0.24 -0.15 -0.14 35 51.4
Unknown 0.60 1.59 1.29 255 48.2
Panel D: NASDAQ
Secured 1.36 0. 02 0.01 22 59.1
Unsecured 0.76 1.52 0.90 13 38.5
Unknown 2.24*** 4.62 3.39 78 64 .1
Table 5-11 cont'd.
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Group
Standardized
cross-
pet. residual sectional 
APE z-stat. z-stat. N
pet. 
pos.
Panel E: Investment grade
Secured 7.06 0.55 0.48 4 50.0
Unsecured 0.46 - - 1 100.0
Unknown 0.30 1.29 1. 15 43 53.5
Panel F: Below investment grade
Secured 0.93 1.19 0.91 67 56.7
Unsecured 0.38 0. 65 0.53 47 46.8
Unknown 1.08*** 3.39 2.62 290 51.7
Panel G: COMPUSTAT
Secured 2 .69 0. 62 1.01 21 52.4
Unsecured 0.02 0.17 0.09 30 50.0
Unknown _ _ _ *** 0.85 2.69 2.01 187 47.6
Panel H: Non-COMPUSTAT
Secured 0. 67 0.71 0.54 50 58.0
Unsecured 0.97 0.93 0.80 18 44.4
Unknown 1.15 4.62 2.06 146 57.5
significant at 
significant at 
significant at
1 percent.
5 percent. 
10 percent.
113
firms supports the positive market response, decreased 
default risk and the positive market response, increased 
default risk hypotheses for secured debt. The positive and 
significant market reaction for secured loan announcements 
for small firms contrasts with the finding of insignificant 
secured loan announcements for large firms as well as the 
full data sample discussed in section 5.3.
Although a security provision in a loan announcement is 
significant when firms are categorized by size, the event 
study results of this thesis as well as prior studies 
outlined in Chapter 3 indicate that other variables also 
impact market reaction to bank loan announcements. In order 
to confirm the positive market reaction to secured debt found 
for small firms in the presence of other variables that 
impact share price, the importance of a security provision 
for market reaction to bank loan announcements must be 
analyzed jointly with the loan characteristics, pre­
announcement information disclosure and external monitoring 
factors surrounding a loan announcement. This analysis is 
performed using multivariate regressions in Chapter 6.
The positive market reaction results found for small 
firms supports Slovin, Johnson and Glascock's hypothesis that 
bank loan announcements contain significant information on 
firms that are not highly monitored by non-bank sources. The 
insignificance of a security provision in a loan announcement 
for large firms as well as the full data sample in this study
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can be attributed to the higher level monitoring received by 
large firms, secured loan announcements do not convey 
information to the market for large firms (whose results are 
predominant for the full sample). Consequently, an analysis 
of financial ratios indicative of financial distress may 
indicate whether the positive market reaction found for small 
firms is supportive of the increased default risk or 
decreased default risk sub-hypotheses for positive market 
reaction. This study is deferred until Chapter 7.
Although NYSE/Amex firms have positive (0.65 APE) and 
significant (1.92 z-statistic) returns (Table 5.3.3, Panel 
B) , secured, unsecured and unknown security status loan 
announcements all yield positive but insignificant returns 
(Table 5-11, Panel C) . Loans made to NASDAQ firms where 
information on a security provision is not provided have a 
positive (2.24) and significant (4.62 z-statistic) APE (Table 
5-11, Panel D) . When information is provided on security 
status for these firms returns are positive but 
insignificant.
The insignificant response for secured loans for NASDAQ 
listed firms contrasts with the positive and significant 
reaction found for small firms. One possible reason is that 
the categorizations are not synonomous. Only 3 6 percent of 
the small firms in the data sample are listed on NASDAQ 
(Table 5-5, Panel A). Exchange listing may be as important 
as firm size in determining the effectiveness of bank
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monitoring for a firm as well as determining the importance 
of a security provision in a loan contract. The interaction 
of firm size, exchange listing and security provision is 
further analyzed with multivariate regressions in Chapter 6.
APEs are insignificant for investment grade bonds 
regardless of security provision status (Table 5-11, Panel 
E) . The APE is also insignificant for below investment grade 
bonds when security status is known (Table 5-11, Panel F). 
The APE is positive (1.38) and significant (3.39 z-statistic) 
when security status is unknown. This evidence also supports 
a view that a security provision does not benefit the 
shareholders of firms that do not have outstanding investment 
grade bonds.
APEs are positive (0.85) and significant (2.69 z-stat) 
for firms with COMPUSTAT information (Table 5-10, Panel B). 
APEs are also positive (1.15) and significant (4.62 z-stat) 
when COMPUSTAT information is not available for the firm. 
APEs are insignificant when information on the security 
status of a loan is provided for firms with COMPUSTAT data as 
well as firms without COMPUSTAT data (Table 5-11, Panels G 
and H) . This evidence also supports a view that the 
inclusion of a security provision in a loan is of no benefit 
to the firm's shareholders.
5.4 Summary
In summary the APE is insignificant when information on 
the existence (or lack thereof) of a security provision is
provided in a loan announcement for the full sample of 452 
observations. In contrast, the APE is positive and 
significant when information is not provided on the existence 
of collateral. This suggests that the information disclosed 
on collateral (or lack of collateral) through the monitoring 
services of banks diminishes the importance of any other 
information that may have been contained in the loan 
announcement. Furthermore, firms monitored by non-bank 
sources benefit neither from bank monitoring nor from the 
disclosure of information on the inclusion of a security 
provision in loan contract. Large firms, NYSE/Amex listed 
firms, and firms with investment grade bonds do not have 
significant abnormal returns. The firms that benefit from 
the monitoring services of banks are sub-categories of firms 
that have limited or non-existent non-bank monitoring. When 
categorized by size, small firms are the primary 
beneficiaries of the monitoring services of banks. When 
classified by exchange listing, NASDAQ firms are the major 
beneficiaries. When categorized by outstanding rated bonds, 
firms with below investment grade outstanding bonds are the 
recipients. For all three categorizations, unsecured loans 
do not have significant APEs. Loan announcements where no 
information on security is provided have positive and 
significant APEs. Within these three different monitoring 
level classifications, secured loan announcements are 
positive and significant only for small firms. Thus weak
support is found for the positive market response hypotheses. 
However, as noted in section 3.1, the effect upon share price 
of a security provision must be jointly analyzed other loan 
characteristics, pre-announcement information available to 
the market and the effects of non-bank monitoring. These 
joint effects are analyzed in Chapter 6 using multivariate 
regression techniques. Furthermore, the non-response to 
secured loan announcements for large firms, firms listed on 
NYSE/Amex and firms with outstanding investment grade bonds 
may be due to the high level of non-bank monitoring received 
by these firms, and not because a loan is secured. In order 
to differentiate the increased default risk and decreased 
default risk explanations for the positive market response to 
secured debt found for small firms in this study, an analysis 
financial ratios indicative of financial distress (increased 
default risk) is performed in Chapter 7.
Chapter 6: Multivariate and Logit Regressions
The event study results of Chapter 5 provide evidence 
that for the full data sample information on a security 
provision in a loan contract does not generate significant 
share price changes. The results indicate that shareholders 
of small firms benefit when the firm receives a secured loan. 
Small firms have also been identified by Slovin, Johnson and 
Glascock (1992) as the primary beneficiaries of bank 
monitoring since bank loan announcements are a source of 
information for the shareholders of these firms. Thus the 
event study results of Chapter 5 support the view that the 
information in bank loan announcements (which includes 
information about security) is important primarily for small 
firms. Positive share price effects are also found for firms 
that are listed on NASDAQ and firms that do not have 
investment grade bonds. (These categorizations are not 
mutually exclusive.) To determine the joint effects on share 
price of the various forms of non-bank monitoring and those 
of a security provision, multivariate regressions of market 
model cumulative event window prediction errors against a 
security provision and variables potentially related to the 
positive effects of bank monitoring are performed. Section
6.1 analyses the relation between prediction errors and 
secured loans in the presence of variables that describe loan 
characteristics, pre-announcement share price movement and
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forms of non-bank monitoring. Section 6.2 contains multiple 
regressions based on the exchange that a firm is listed on 
and firm size. Section 6.3 sumarizes the results of this 
chapter.
6.1 Multivariate regressions
Multivariate regressions are used to analyze the 
contribution of the inclusion of a security provision in a 
loan contract to the cumulative event window prediction 
errors associated with commercial bank monitoring. The 
dependent variable in each regression is the two day 
cumulative prediction error (CPE) of the market model 
regression of the sample of 452 loan announcements. To 
correct for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity among stock 
returns, dependent and independent variables are divided by 
the standard deviation of the prediction errors of the market 
model. The explanatory variables are qualitative and
quantative variables relating to the existence of a security 
provision as well as firm size, relative loan size, 
characteristics of the firm and loan and share price movement 
prior to the announcement. The following independent 
variables are used:
Announcement date information:
SECURE Binary variable indicating whether the loan is
disclosed in the announcement as secured (1) or 
not (0).
1 2 0
UNSECURE Binary variable indicating whether the loan is
disclosed as unsecured (1) or not (0).
NEW Binary variable indicating whether the loan is
disclosed as new (1) or not (0).
RENEW Binary variable indicating whether the loan is
disclosed as renewed (1) or not (0).
TRANSFER Binary variable indicating whether the
announcement denotes that the loan has been 
transferred from one bank or group of banks to 
another (l) or not (0).
LINE Binary variable indicating whether the loan is
disclosed as a line of credit or revolving line 
(1) or not (0).
TERM Binary variable indicating whether the loan is
disclosed as a term loan or revolving line and 
term loan (1) or not (0).
MATURE Binary variable indicating whether maturity
information is disclosed (1), or not (0).
RATE Binary variable indicating whether rate
information is disclosed (1) or not (0).
LOANMKT Loan value divided by the market value of equity
of the firm one week prior to event.
Pre-announcement information variables:
NEGRUN Binary variable indicating negative-valued
information prior to the announcement. It is 
coded as 1 if the firm has significant (10
1 2 1
percent, one-tailed test of significance) share 
price rundown starting 30 and ending 11 days 
before the event, 0 otherwise.
POSRUN Binary variable indicating positive-valued 
information prior to the announcement. It is 
coded as 1 if the firm has significant (10 
percent, one-tailed test of significance) share 
price runup starting 3 0 and ending 11 days before 
the event, 0 otherwise.
Non-bank monitoring level:
LOGSIZE Natural logarithm of firm size measured as the 
market value of equity one week prior to event. 
EXCHANGE Binary variable indicating the exchange that the 
firm is listed on (0 for NYSE/Amex, 1 for NASDAQ). 
INVGRAD Binary variable indicating the existence of 
investment grade bonds (1, 0 otherwise).
COMPUSTAT Binary variable with a value of 1 if sufficient 
COMPUSTAT information is available on the firm to 
construct the balance sheet and income statement.
Several of the variables have a statistically 
significant correlation with information on security in a 
loan announcement. The largest correlations of SECURE 
include negative correlations with LOGSIZE (-0.23) and 
COMPUSTAT (-0.20) and positive correlations with RENEW (0.19) 
and LOANMKT (0.21) (Table 6-1). None of these correlations 
indicate that these variables are proxies for one another.
1 2 2
Table 6-1
Pearson correlation coefficients for various loan 
characteristic, prior information and monitoring variables 
for 452 clean observations. The probability of the 
correlation coefficient being significantly different from 
zero is listed below the associated correlation.
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Variable SECURE UNSECURE NEW RENEW TRANSFER LINE
SECURE 1.000
0.0
UNSECURE -0.148 
0.00
1. 000 
0.0
NEW -0.006
0.88
0. 104 
0. 02
1.000
0.0
RENEW 0.195
0.00
-0.028
0.55
-0.089
0.05
1.000
0.0
TRANSFER 0.055
0.24
-0.020
0.66
-0.043
0.35
-0.120 
0.01
1.000
0.0
LINE 0. 094 
0.04
-0.006 
0.89
0. 041 
0.38
-0.045 
0.32
0.061 
0.18
1. 000 
0.0
TERM -0.051 
0.27
-0.039 
0. 39
-0.008 
0.84
0.024
0.60
-0.045 
0.33
-0.626 
0.00
MATURE -0.073 
0.11
0. 018 
0.69
-0.002
0.96
0.045
0.33
-0.047 
0.31
-0.141 
0.00
RATE -0.017
0.71
0.045
0.33
0.071 
0.12
0.032
0.49
0.065 
0.16
-0.128 
0. 00
LOANMKT 0.211
0.00
-0.074 
0.11
-0.043 
0.36
0. Ill 
0.01
-0.016 
0.72
-0.045 
0.33
NEGRUN -0.090
0.05
-0.036
0.43
0.026
0.57
0.005
0.89
-0.002 
0.95
-0.025 
0.58
POSRUN 0.117 
0.01
-0.Oil 
0.81
-0.049
0.29
-0.008
0.86
0. 121 
0.00
0. 069 
0.14
LOGSIZE -0.233
0.00
0.054
0.24
0.012
0.79
-0.158 
0. 00
-0.124 
0.00
0.018 
0. 69
EXCHANGE 0.059
0.20
0.016
0.72
0.014
0.75
-0.006
0.89
0. 061 
0.19
-0.024 
0. 60
INVGRAD -0.069 
0.13
-0.095
0.04
0.021
0.65
-0.099 
0.03
-0.083 
0.07
0. 040 
0.39
COMPUSTAT -0.199 
0.00
0. 067 
0.14
0. 041 
0.37
-0.015
0.74
-0.003 
0.94
-0.022 
0. 63
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Table 6-1 cont'd.
Variable TERM MATURE RATE LOANMKT NEGRUN POSRUN
TERM 1.000
0.0
MATURE 0.428
0.00
1.000
0.0
RATE 0.149
0.00
0.096
0.04
1.000
0.0
LOANMKT -0.054
0.25
-0.082 
0. 08
-0.045
0.33
1.000
0.0
NEGRUN 0. 030 
0.51
0. 000 
0.98
-0.046
0.32
0.005
0.90
1.000
0.0
POSRUN 0.008
0.85
0.061 
0. 19
-0.019
0.67
0.029
0.53
-0.057
0.21
1.000
0.0
LOGSIZE 0. 016 
0.72
0.132 
0.00
-0.046 
0.32
-0.342 
0.00
-0.020
0.66
-0.087 
0. 06
EXCHANGE -0.033
0.47
-0.126 
0.00
0.060 
0.19
0.101 
0. 03
0. 082 
0. 07
0.019
0.67
INVGRAD -0.054
0.24
0.047
0.31
-0.094
0.04
0. 026 
0.57
-0.036
0.43
-0.011
0.81
COMPUSTAT 0. 045 
0.33
0.103
0.02
-0.016 
0.72
-0.006
0.89
-0.022 
0. 63
-0.066 
0.15
Variable LOGSIZE EXCHANGE INVGRAD COMPUSTAT
LOGSIZE 1.000
0.0
EXCHANGE -0.334 
0. 00
1. 000 
0.0
INVGRAD 0.481
0.00
-0.132 
0.00
1.000
0.0
COMPUSTAT 0.201 -0.291
0.00 0.00
0.111 1.000
0.01 0.0
125
The correlations of the remaining independent variables with 
SECURE are below 0.15 in absolute value. All of the 
independent variables have a correlation coefficient smaller 
than 0.15 in absolute value with UNSECURE.
Although the independent variables are not highly 
correlated with either SECURE or UNSECURE, several 
significant correlations are found. Loan type is correlated 
with maturity: TERM has a negative (-0.63) correlation with 
LINE and a positive (0.43) correlation with MATURE. The 
correlation between TERM and MATURE, plus a lack of a large 
correlation between LINE and MATURE suggests that information 
on maturity is provided primarily for term loans. LOGSIZE 
has a positive correlation (0.48) with INVGRAD, a negative 
correlation (-0.34) with LOANMKT, and a negative correlation 
(-0.33) with EXCHANGE, indicating that small firms tend not 
to have investment grade bonds, have higher relative loan 
amounts and are listed on NASDAQ. COMPUSTAT has a negative 
(-0.29) correlation with EXCHANGE, indicating that COMPUSTAT 
firms are primarily listed on NYSE/Amex. All of the
remaining correlations of the independent variables are below 
0.15 in absolute value.
Four regressions are performed. The first (equation 1, 
Table 6-2) contains all announcement, prior information and 
monitoring variables. The second (equation 2) retains only 
LOGSIZE and EXCHANGE as monitoring variables. The results of
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Table 6-2
Weighted ordinary least squares regression of cumulative 
prediction errors of market model regression against various 
loan characteristic, prior information and monitoring 
variables. All variables weighted by the inverse of the 
standard deviation of the prediction error of the market 
model regression. T-statistics are in parentheses below the 
paramater estimates. Chi-square test statistics are for
White's (1980) general test for homoskedasticity.
Equation (1) (2) (3) (4)
All Size and
Variable variables exchange Size Exchange
INTERCEPT 0.1916 0.1512 0.1910 0.0800
(1.05) (0.87) (1.11) (0.49)
SECURE -0.0032 -0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0029
(-0.47) (-0.57) (-0.55) (-0.44)
UNSECURE -0.0004 -0.0016 -0.0010 -0.0016
(-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.16) (-0.26)
NEW 0.0018 0.0024 0.0028 0.0018
(0.22) (0.29) (0.34) (0.22)
RENEW -0.0037 -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0025
(-0.75) (-0.59) (-0.47) (-0.50)
TRANSFER 0.0272*’* 0.0287*” 0.0308*” 0.0294***
(3.05) (3.26) (3.54) (3.35)
LINE 0.0055 0.0065 0.0065 0.0042
(1.12) (1.33) (1.31) (0.94)
TERM 0.0051 0.0053 0.0056 0.0035
(1.06) (1.10) 1.17 (0.77)
MATURE -0.0075’ -0.0076* -0.0075* -0.0086”
(-1.80) (-1.84) (-1.80) (-2.13)
RATE 0.0091” 0.0090” 0. 0099*’* 0.0083”
(2.30) (2.27) (2.53) (2.12)
LOANMKT 0.0015 0.0009 0.0011 0.0005
(1.07) (0.65) (0.81) (0.41)
NEGRUN 0.0070 0.0060 0.0086 0.0055
(0.89) (0.77) (1.12) (0.71)
POSRUN 0.0084 0.0079 0.0089 0.0078
(1.33) (1.26) (1.43) (1.24)
LOGSIZE -0.0018" -0.0008 -0.0009 -
(-2.08) (-1.13) (-1.20) -
EXCHANGE 0.0079* 0.0070 - 0.0075*
(1.74) (1.58) - (1.70)
INVGRAD 0.0085 - - -
(1.61) - - -
COMPUSTAT 0.0045 - - -
(1.21) — —
F-value 2.68*” 2.76’” 2.77*** 2.87*”
Adjusted R2 0.056 0. 052 0.048 0.051
Chi-square 129.71 108.26 91.24 91.42
Observations 452 452 452 452
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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Chapter 5 indicate that significant differences in means for 
APEs exist for these two monitoring variables, but not for 
INVGRAD or COMPUSTAT. Equation 3 retains only LOGSIZE as an 
external monitoring variable and equation 4 retains only 
EXCHANGE.
All regressions are significant at the 1 percent level 
with adjusted R2s ranging from 0.048 to 0.056 (Table 6-2). 
Furthermore, adjusting the data by the inverse of the 
standard deviation of the market model prediction error 
reduces heteroskedasticity problems. In none of the 
regressions is White's (1980) general test for 
homoskedasticity rejected at the 10 percent level or less, 
with Chi-square test statistics ranging from 91.2 to 129.712. 
The highest condition index of the regressions is 4.34, well 
below 30, the value considered indicative of 
multicollinearity (SAS System for Regressions, 1986 Edition,
p. 81).
In each regression the coefficient on SECURE, the 
disclosure of a security provision in a loan, is negatively 
related to CPEs (-0.0029 to -0.0039 coefficients) but not
1=In addition to White's general test for homoskedasticity, five 
additional tests for specific forms of heteroskedasticity are performed 
on Equation 2. Two of the tests reject homoskedasticity and three do 
not. Regressions of the squared residual on the predicted dependent 
variable squared and the logarithm of the predicted dependent variable 
squared do not reject homoskedasticity, whereas regression on the 
predicted dependent variable does. Regression of the logarithm of the 
squared residual on the independent variables does not reject 
homoskedasticity, whereas regression of the absolute value of the 
residual on the independent variables does reject homoskedasticity.
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significant (-0.44 to -0.57 t-statistics) . This result is 
consistent with the insignificance in the event study of the 
security provision (Table 5-2, Panel B). The coefficients on 
UNSECURE, the disclosure that a loan is unsecured, are also 
negative but statistically insignificant. The insignificance 
of the relation between unsecured loans and market response 
is also consistent with event study results.
Overall the results of the multivariate regression are 
consistent with those of the event study and indicate that 
for the full data sample the specific disclosure that a loan 
is secured or unsecured is not a significant component of the 
positive market response found for loan announcements. In 
general, shareholders of borrowing firms do not benefit by 
providing collateral to lenders.
Consistent with event study results, transferred loans 
have a positive effect on CPEs (0.027 to 0.031 coefficient 
for TRANSFER) that is significant at 1 percent regardless of 
the model employed (3.05 to 3.54 t-statistic). In contrast, 
new and renewed loans have no effect on CPEs. These results 
support a view that the change of a banking relationship 
reveals more information than the initiation or renewal of a 
relationship.
Information on the maturity status of a loan is 
negatively related to CPEs for all equations as indicated by 
-0.0075 to -0.0086 coefficients for MATURE and statistically 
significant at least at the 10 percent level (-1.80 to -2.13
1 3 0
t-statistics) . This result is consistent with event study 
results. Information on interest rates is positively related 
to CPEs (0.0083 to 0.0099 coefficients for RATE) and 
statistically significant at least at the 5 percent level 
(2.12 to 2.53 t-statistics) and also consistent with event 
study results. These results indicate that the market 
garners information from the disclosure of both maturity and 
interest rate information.13
Consistent with the event study findings of Chapter 5, 
the most important external monitoring variables are LOGSIZE 
(the natural logarithm of firm size) and EXCHANGE (exchange, 
listing). In the presence of all external monitoring 
variables (equation 1) LOGSIZE is negatively related to CPEs 
with a coefficient of -0.0018 and significant at the 5 
percent level (-2.08 t-statistic). In the same regression 
firms trading on NASDAQ have a positive relation with CPEs 
(0.0079 coefficient for EXCHANGE) that is significant at the 
10 percent level (1.74 t-statistic). The external monitoring 
variables of INVGRAD, investment grade bonds, and COMPUSTAT, 
inclusion on COMPUSTAT, are not significant and are deleted 
in subsequent regressions14.
13The negative coefficient for MATURE is a puzzle since it suggests 
that providing information on maturity significantly lowers the market's 
reaction to a loan announcement. This issue is further examined in 
section 6.2, but remains unresolved.
UA significant coefficient for COMPUSTAT or INVGRAD is not found 
when either is the sole monitoring variable in the regression. These 
results further confirm the importance of LOGSIZE and EXCHANGE as 
representative monitoring variables.
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When both firm size and exchange listing are included 
in the same regression (equation 2), neither variable is 
significant at the 10 percent level. Firm size is also not 
significant when it is the sole monitoring variable in the 
regression (equation 3) . Equation 4 indicates the importance 
of exchange listing as the representative monitoring 
variable. In this equation membership in NASDAQ is 
positively related to CPEs (0.0075 coefficient) and is 
significant at the 10 percent level (1.70 t-statistic). 
These results indicate that exchange listing is more powerful 
than firm size as an indication of the importance of bank 
monitoring for a firm. Although these results suggest that 
EXCHANGE should be retained as the sole monitoring variable 
in the multiple regressions, LOGSIZE is also retained as a 
control variable due to the importance of this variable found 
by Slovin, Johnson and Glascock. These are not substitute 
variables. As indicated in Table 5-5, only 3 6 percent of the 
small firms in this sample are traded on NASDAQ.
The greater market response to a loan announcement for 
NASDAQ traded firms suggests a different interpretation of 
the findings of Slovin, Johnson and Glascock. They argue 
that small firms are the primary beneficiaries of bank 
monitoring. They, however, use only firm size in their 
regressions to indicate the level of external monitoring of 
a borrowing firm. While supporting their general hypothesis
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that lightly monitored firms benefit from bank monitoring, 
this study finds that size alone is not a sufficient 
indicator of the degree of external monitoring received by a 
firm. Among the measures of non-bank monitoring examined 
here, EXCHANGE is also important.
One of the implications of both the positive market 
response, increased default risk and negative market 
reaction, increased default risk hypotheses is that NYSE/Amex 
listed firms should be the primary users of secured debt. 
Over 69 percent of the secured loans in this sample are made 
to NYSE/Amex firms (Table 5-4, Panel B). The significance of 
a NASDAQ exchange listing in equation 4 suggests that loan 
announcements for NYSE/Amex listed firms contain less 
positive information for market participants than do 
announcements for NASDAQ firms. Separate regressions by 
exchange listing v/ill empirically separate the importance of 
a security provision in a loan announcement for NYSE/Amex 
versus NASDAQ firms.
The difference in the means of equity for secured loans 
when compared to unsecured loans (Table 5-4) supports Smith 
and Warner's (1979) view that small firms are the primary 
users of secured debt. In addition, loans to small firms are 
the only sub-category for which a security provision is 
statistically significant in the event studies of Chapter 5. 
These combined results suggest that regressions separated by
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firm size are necessary to determine the importance of a 
security provision in a loan announcement.
6.2 Multiple regressions separated by firm size and
exchange.
The multiple regression for small firms is significant 
at the 1 percent level (2.35 F-value, Table 6-3, equation 3) 
with an adjusted R2 of 0.06, however White's general test for 
homoskedasticity is rejected at the 1 percent level (162.97 
Chi-square), indicating that standard errors may biased and 
tests of paramater significance unreliable. The positive and 
significant market reaction to a security provision for small 
firms found in event study results (Table 5-11, Panel B) is 
not found in the multiple regression. The coefficient for 
secure is negative (-0.0065) but insignificant (-0.64). This 
result may be due to heteroskedasticity. The multiple 
regression for large firms is significant at the 10 percent 
level (1.69 F-value, equation 4) with an adjusted R2 of 0.04, 
and White's general test for homoskedasticity is not rejected 
at the 10 percent level (86.7 Chi-square). Consistent with 
the event study results of Chapter 5 (Table 5-11, Panel A) no 
significant relation exists between CPE's and the fact that 
a loan is secured or unsecured. A negative (-0.0403) and 
significant (-2.20 t-statistic) relation exists between CPE's 
and transferred loans, a result opposite that of the 
regression of the full data sample.
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Table 6-3
Weighted ordinary least squares regression of cumulative 
prediction errors of market model regression against various 
loan characteristic, prior information and monitoring 
variables separated by exchange listing and firm size. All 
variables weighted by the inverse of the standard deviation 
of the prediction error of the market model regression. T- 
statistics are in parentheses below the paramater estimates. 
Chi-square test statistics are for White's (1980) general 
test for homoskedasticity.
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Equation (1) (2) (3)
Variable NASDAQ
INTERCEPT 0.3564
(1.04)
SECURE -0.0278
(-1.90)
UNSECURE 0.0251
(1.87)
NEW -0.0094
(-0.46)
RENEW 0.0011
(0.11)
TRANSFER 0.0309
(2.26)
LINE 0.0053
(0.44)
TERM 0.0127
(1.05)
MATURE -0.0225
(-1.88)
RATE 0.0131
(1.44)
LOANMKT 0.0059
(1.70)
NEGRUN 0.0154
(1.21)
POSRUN 0.0178
(1.46)
LOGSIZE -0.0015
(-0.65)
EXCHANGE -
F-value
_ _ _ •** 2 .68
Adj R2 0.16
Chi-square 89.10
Observations 113
NYSE/Amex Small
0.0763 0.3976
(0.36) (1.63)
0.0037 -0.0065
(0.48) (-0.64)
-0.0100 -0.0016
(-1.32) (-0.16)
0.0069 -0.0020
(0.77) (-0.16)
-0.0009 -0.0001
(-0.15) (-0.01)
0.0228*’ 0.0453
(1.78) (4.18)
0.0067 -0.0032
(1.21) (-0.39)
0.0050 0.0030
(0.94) (0.40)
-0.0037 -0.0071
(-0.82) (-1.02)
0.0090** 0.0065
(1.99) (1.00)
-0.0001 -0.0007
(-0.05) (-0.37)
0.0016 0.0096
(0.15) (0.72)
0.0080 0.0030
(1.07) (0.29)
-0.0008 0.0002
(-1.02) (0.12)
- 0.0041
(0.65)
1.14 2.35***
0.00 0.06
117.74*** 162.97***
339 254
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
(4)
Large
-0.4630
(-1.51)
0.0048
(0.54)
0.0020
(0.24)
0.0066
(0.62)
-0.0060
(-0.98)
-0.0403**
(-2 .20)
0.0127**
(2.07) 
0.0055
(0.93) 
-0.0070 
(-1.47) 
0.0097’*
(2.07) 
0.0017
(0.37)
0.0035
(0.39)
0.0113 
(1.49)
0.0002 
(0.23) 
0.0043 
(0.71)
1.69*
0.04
86.68
198
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The multiple regression for NYSE/Amex listed firms is 
insignificant (1.14 F-value, equation 2) . Although NYSE/Amex 
firms are the majority users of secured debt in this sample, 
the lack of significance for security for NYSE/Amex firms can 
be attributed to the fact that bank loan announcements are 
not a significant source of information disclosure for these 
f irms.
The multiple regression for NASDAQ listed firms is 
significant at the 1 percent level (2.68 F-value, equation 1) 
with an adjusted R2 of 0.16. The data does not reject 
White's general test for homoskedasticity (89.1 Chi-square). 
Information on a security provision in a loan contract is 
negativly related to CPEs (-0.028 coefficient for SECURE) and 
significant at the 10 percent level (-1.90 t-statistic). 
Furthermore for unsecured loans a positive (0.025 coefficient 
for UNSECURE) and significant (1.87 t-statistic) relationship 
exists with CPEs. These results support a view that the 
information disclosed about a security provision in a bank 
loan is significant primarily for firms that do not have 
other sources of external monitoring. These findings are 
consistent with the negative market response, increased 
default risk and the negative market response, no default 
differential explanations for secured debt, and support the 
view that bank monitoring provides valuable information to 
the market for NASDAQ listed firms.
The negative and significant response for secured loan 
announcements found in the multiple regression for NASDAQ 
firms is not consistent with the positive but insignificant 
results found for a security provision for NASDAQ firms in 
the event study (Table 5-11, Panel D) . Furthermore, a 
positive and significant relation between market returns and 
a security provision is found in the event study for small 
firms (Table 5-11, Panel B), but no significant relation is 
found in multiple regression results. The only hypothesis 
supported by both the positive market reaction for small firm 
secured loan announcements and the negative relation between 
market response and security for NASDAQ listed firms is the 
increased default risk hypothesis. However, the majority (69 
percent, Table 5-4, Panel B) of secured loans are made to 
NYSE/Amex firms, and for these firms neither event study 
results nor multiple regression results demonstrate a 
significant relationship between a security provision and 
market returns. These results indicate that the share price 
implications of the various theories of secured debt may not 
be resolved through market reaction based empirical 
procedures.
Equation 1 indicates that NASDAQ listed firms have a 
positive (0.03 coefficient) and significant (2.26 t 
statistic) share price increase when loans are transferred 
from one group of banks to another. This result is 
consistent with the event study results and the multiple
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regression results for the full sample, and further supports 
the view that changes in banking relationships convey more 
information to market participants than the establishment or 
renewal of a banking relationship.
Disclosure of maturity information is negative (-0.02 
coefficient for MATURE) and significant (1.88 t-statistic) 
for NASDAQ firms. This result is consistent with the 
multiple regression results for the full data sample, but is 
not consistent with the event study result of a positive but 
insignificant relation (Table 5-8, Panel E) . The negative 
relation between maturity information and share price returns 
is puzzling since it suggests that information disclosure of 
maturity information is detrimental to the borrowing firm9s 
shareholders.
LOANMKT, the relative amount of the loan financing, has 
a positive (0.0059) coefficient and is significant at the 10 
percent level (1.70 t-statistic). This indicates that a 
leverage effect exists for NASDAQ firms.
6.3 Summary
Multiple regression of the market response against 
variables indicative of loan characteristics, pre 
announcement information and levels of non-bank monitoring 
provide results that conflict with the event study results of 
Chapter 5. Event study results indicate a positive relation 
between a security market response to a security provision 
for small firms. Multiple regression, however, is unable to
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confirm this result for small firms. Multiple regression 
reveals a negative relation between security and market 
response for NASDAQ listed firms, while event study results 
produce no significant relation. The increased default risk 
hypothesis is the only explanation consistent with both 
positive and negative market reaction to secured debt loan 
announcements. However, the majority (69 percent) of 
announced secured loans are made to NYSE/Amex firms. For 
these firms neither the monitoring services of banks nor the 
inclusion of a security provision in a loan contract conveys 
new information to market participants. To resolve the 
conflict in results between Chapter 5 and this Chapter, and 
to incorporate the information contained for NYSE/Amex firms, 
an alternative method of separating the various explanations 
of secured debt is employed. To separate the various 
hypotheses for secured debt, the difference in default risk 
between secured and unsecured loans must be determined. One 
method of resolving whether secured loans have more default 
risk than unsecured loans is to examine firms that have 
secured debt for signs of financial distress. The finding of 
this characteristic for secured loans announcements would 
offer further evidence for the increased default risk premium 
hypotheses, regardless of market reaction. Chapter 7 
examines this issue using discriminant analysis and logit 
regressions for those firms in the sample with sufficient 
accounting data.
Chapter 7: Financial Distress and Security
The use of the market reaction to discriminate between 
adverse selection, underinvestment problem resolution, 
incentive contracting, bankruptcy and bank monitoring 
explanations for collateral contains two deficiencies. 
First, over seventy-three percent of the loan announcements 
in the sample do not disclose whether a loan is secured or 
unsecured, eliminating the major portion of the data sample 
from testing market reactions based on differences between 
secured and unsecured loans. The large percentage of unknown 
security status loans suggests that characteristics of loans 
for firms that do not disclose this information may differ 
from those of firms with announced secured loans and loans to 
firms with announced unsecured loans. Second, no consensus 
exists for the expected market reaction to secured loan 
announcements. A security provision in a loan contract has 
a positive effect on the share price of small firms according 
to the event study results of Chapter 5. The multiple 
regression results of Chapter 6 find no significant relation 
between market responses and secured loan announcements for 
small firms. Event study results do not find significant 
market reaction for NASDAQ listed firms with secured loans, 
whereas a significant negative relation is found using 
multiple regression. Both the event study results of Chapter 
5 and the multiple regressions of Chapter 6 fail to find a
140
141
significant relation between market response and a security 
provision for NYSE/Amex firms, which contain 69 percent of 
the secured loans in the sample. These results indicate that 
secured bank loan announcements may not convey significant 
information to the market because of other forms of 
monitoring received by the majority of the firms that obtain 
secured loans.
An alternative to using the market reaction to separate 
the various explanations for secured debt is measuring the 
amount of default risk of a firm. The purpose of this 
Chapter is to determine which hypotheses can be supported by 
the data through the use of financial ratios indicative of 
financial distress (as proxies for increased default risk). 
The sample is reduced to those firms in the full data sample 
with the necessary information on COMPUSTAT. Section 7.1 
analyzes the relation between information on a security 
provision in a loan contract and various loan 
characteristics, pre-announcement information and forms of 
monitoring of the firm to determine if information available 
on loan announcements for secured loans differs from that 
available for unsecured loans and unknown security status 
loans. Section 7.2 characterizes the firms with sufficient 
accounting data on COMPUSTAT to calculate financial ratios 
indicative of financial distress. Section 7.3 describes the 
results for Altman's (1968) predictive model of financially 
distressed firms. Section 7.4 uses logit regression with
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various other financial ratios that are indicative of
financial distress. Section 7.5 analyzes the relation
between market returns and the ratios in order to determine
if the market's response is affected by known indicators of
financial distress. Section 7.6 is a summary.
7.1 Relation of information on a security provision and 
loan characteristics, pre-announcement information and 
forms of external monitoring
The event study results of Chapter 5 and the multiple 
regression results of Chapter 6 indicate that for some firms 
the information disclosed for secured and unsecured loans 
affects share price. However, over seventy-three percent of 
the sample contains loans with no information on a security 
provision (Table 5-4). There are two possible explanations 
for the lack of information on security. First, the loans 
are actually unsecured and the contracting parties only 
consider a security provision in a loan to be material 
information that should be disclosed. Second, the loan 
contracting parties do not consider the issue of security to 
be material information. Under either of these views, some 
firms disclose less information than those that identify 
their loans as secured or unsecured. The use of logit 
regression can indicate whether the information available for 
secured loan announcements differs from that of unsecured 
loan announcements and that of loan announcements that are 
silent with respect to security.
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The unordered multinomial logit regression model 
described in Chapter 4 is employed to determine if the 
variables identified in section 3.2 can consistently predict 
whether a loan is secured, unsecured or of unknown security 
status. The independent variables are the same ones employed 
in equation 2 of Table 6-2.
The use of information available at loan announcement 
has little power to separate secured loan announcements, 
unsecured loan announcements and announcements that disclose 
neither. The likelihood ratio test statistic is 72.2 (Table 
7-1) , which is significant at the 1 percent level and 
indicates that some of the paramaters are significantly 
different from zero. However, the model correctly predicts 
only 10 of the 71 secured loan announcements and none of the 
unsecured loan announcements. As noted by Greene (1990), 
unbalanced sample sizes commonly cause weak predictive 
results in multinomial logit models. This suggests that the 
lack of separation of secured and unsecured loans on the 
basis of announcement information for the model is caused 
primarily by the large number of loans with unknown security 
status.
Elimination of loan announcements with unknown security 
status improves the classification ability of the model. For 
the 119 observations where security status is disclosed the 
model correctly classifies 78.9 percent of the secured loans 
and 70.8 percent of the unsecured loans (Table 7-2). For
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Table 7-1
Unordered Multinomial Logit regression of information on a 
security provision in a loan announcement against variables 
indicative of loan announcement information, pre-announcement 
information and various forms of external monitoring for 452 
clean observations. T-statistics reported in parentheses.
Secured Unsecured
Parameter Parameter
Variable Estimate Estimate
INTERCEPT -1.296* -1.151
(-1.90) (-1.36)
NEW 0.682 1.248*
(0.80) (1.90)
RENEW 0.081*** 0.205
(3.36) (0.47)
TRANSFER 0.483 -0.212
(0.87) (-0.27)
LINE 0.809** -0.332
(1.96) (-0.79)
TERM 0.032 -0.665
(0.72) (-1.53)
MATURE -0.381 0. 238
(-1.15) (0.65)
RATE -0.028 0.177
(-0.08) (0.53)
LOANMKT 0.223** -0. 600*
(1.99) (-1.94)
POSRUN 0.709 0.147
(1.51) (0.22)
NEGRUN -11.513 -1.013
(-0.07) (-0.94)
LOGSIZE -0.254*** -0.064
(-2.33) (-0.51)
EXCHANGE 0.121 0.216
(0.37) (0.56)
2 LOG Likelihood Ratio 72.196***
Pseudo R2 0.105
Predicted
Actual Unknown Secured Unsecured Total
Unknown 324 9 0 333
Secured 61 10 0 71
Unsecured 48 0 0 48
Total 433 19 0 452
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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Table 7-2
Binomial logit regression of secured versus unsecured loan 
announcements against variables indicative of loan 
announcement information, pre-announcement information and 
various forms of external monitoring for 119 clean 
observations. T-statistics reported in parentheses.
Variable
Parameter
Estimate
Odds
Ratio
INTERCEPT 0.149 
(0.12)
1.161
NEW -0.359
(-0.35)
0.698
RENEW 0.892
(1.54)
2.440
TRANSFER 1.131
(1.01)
3.099
LINE 2.061*"
(2.93)
7.854
TERM 1.605"
(2.10)
4.978
MATURE -1.121"
(-1.99)
0.326
RATE -0.842
(-1.54)
0.431
LOANMKT 0.937"
(2.48)
2.552
POSRUN -0.391
(-0.40)
0.676
NEGRUN -8.839
(-0.05)
0.000
LOGSIZE -0.312 
(-1.64)
0.732
EXCHANGE 0.079
(0.14)
1.082
-2 LOG Likelihood Ratio 43.
Pseudo R2 0.
Predicted
Actual Unsecured Secured Total
Unsecured 34 14 48
Secured 15 56 71
Total 49 70 119
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent.
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secured loans, LINE and LOANMKT have positive coefficients 
(and odds ratios) in this model as well as the full model 
containing unknown loan announcements, indicating that 
secured loans are provided to firms that receive lines of 
credit and have high loan to market value of equity ratios.
7.2 Characteristics of firms with COMPUSTAT data
As indicated in Table 5-5, 238 observations or 52.7
percent of the total sample, contain sufficient accounting 
information on COMPUSTAT to reconstruct balance sheets and 
income statements. However, only 21 or 29.6 percent of the 
71 total secured observations are on COMPUSTAT, indicating 
that secured loan observations are under-represented in the 
COMPUSTAT sample. Furthermore, of the 21 secured
observations, only 4 or 18.2 percent of the 22 total NASDAQ 
secured observations are on COMPUSTAT, indicating that the 
secured loan announcements that have a significant negative 
relation to market response are severely under-represented in 
the COMPUSTAT sample. The 17 NYSE/Amex secured observations 
on COMPUSTAT represent 34.7 percent of the full sample 
NYSE/Amex secured observations and provide evidence of the 
low frequency of secured loans among firms that are of 
sufficient importance to warrant monitoring by Standard and 
Poor's .
The inclusion of a firm on COMPUSTAT does not displace 
the importance of bank monitoring. As shown in Table 5-10, 
Panel D, COMPUSTAT firms have a 0.91 percent APE, significant
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at the .01 level (2.81 z-statistic). Non-COMPUSTAT firms 
have similar returns (1.02 percent APE, 2.62 z-statistic). 
There is no significant difference in means between the APE1 s 
of the two samples. The positive APE's for firms with 
COMPUSTAT information suggest that bank loan announcements 
are an important source of information for market 
participants even though accounting information on the firm 
is available through COMPUSTAT.
Although both COMPUSTAT and non-COMPUSTAT firms have 
overall significant APE's, this result is not attributable to 
the fact security status is known. Both secured and 
unsecured loan announcements have insignificant APE's for the 
subset of firms with COMPUSTAT information (Table 5-11, Panel 
G) and those not included on COMPUSTAT (Table 5-11, Panel H). 
For both of these groups only loan announcements where no 
disclosure on security status is made have positive and 
significant APE'S, a result consistent with event study 
results of the full data sample.
When COMPUSTAT firms are disaggregated by size, small 
firms have positive APE's (2.35) that are significant at the 
1 percent level (4.98 z-statistic, Table 7-3, Panel B) . 
Furthermore, APE's are positive and significant at least at 
the 5 percent level regardless of security classification. 
Loan announcements for large COMPUSTAT firms do not generate 
significant APE's (Table 7-3, Panel A). When firms with 
COMPUSTAT information are classified by exchange, NASDAQ
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Table 7-3
Average two day prediction error of all clean observations 
for firms with information on COMPUSTAT separated by size and 
exchange and grouped by security provision.
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Group
pet.
APE
Standardized
cross­
residual sectional 
z-stat. z-stat. N
pet. 
pos.
Panel A: Large firms.
Secured -1.45 -0.96 -0.95 7 28.6
Unsecured -1.12 -1.66 -1.69 17 41.2
Unknown -0. 32 -0.13 -0.14 96 38.5
Total -0.50 -0.98 -0.92 120 38.3
Panel B: Small Firms
Secured 4.76" 2.23 1.74 14 64. 3
Unsecured 1.53" 2.08 1.50 13 61.5
Unknown 2 .10"* 4.01 2 . 61 91 57.1
Total 2.35"* 4.98 3.36 118 58.5
Panel C: NYSE/Amex
Secured 1.13 0.87 0.70 17 52.9
Unsecured -0.07 -0.49 -0.50 24 54 .2
Unknown 0.73* 1.92 1.53 166 46.4
Total 0. 67* 1.80 1.47 207 47.8
Panel D: NASDAQ
Secured 9.29 1.10 0.76 4 50. 0
Unsecured 0.42 1.27 0. 61 6 33.3
Unknown 1.78*** 2 . 63 1.40 21 57.1
Total 2.48"* 3.12 1.72 31 51. 6
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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Table 7-4
Average two day prediction error of all clean observations 
for firms without information on COMPUSTAT separated by size 
and exchange and grouped by security provision.
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Group
Standardized
cross-
pct. residual sectional 
APE z-stat. z-stat. N
pet. 
pos.
Panel A: Large firms •
Secured -0.49 -0.04 -0. 04 12 58.3
Unsecured 3 o 26*** 2.36 1.80 9 66.7
Unknown -0.13 -0.61 -0.54 57 49.1
Total 0.20 0.28 0.24 78 52.6
Panel B: Small Firms
Secured 1.04 0.78 0.56 38 57.9
Unsecured -1.31 -1.04 -1. 65 9 22.2
Unknown 1.96*” 3 . 60 3 . 05 89 62.9
Total 1.49”* 3.06 2.49 136 58.8
Panel C: NYSE/Amex
Secured 1.27 1.26 0.90 32 56.3
Unsecured 0.92 0.47 0.48 11 45.5
Unknown 0.33 0. 08 0.05 89 51.7
Total 0.61 0.81 0. 67 132 52.3
Panel D: NASDAQ
Secured -0.39 -0.50 -0.43 18 61.1
Unsecured 1.04 0.89 0. 61 7 42.9
Unknown 2 .40*” 3.80 3.34 57 66.7
Total 1.67*” 3 .19 2.70 82 63.4
significant
significant
significant
at
at
at
1 percent.
5 percent. 
10 percent.
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Table 7-5
Weighted ordinary least squares regression of cumulative 
prediction errors of market model regression against various 
loan characteristic, pre-announcement information and 
monitoring variables for firms with and without COMPUSTAT 
information. All variables weighted by the inverse of the 
standard deviation of the prediction error of the market 
model regression.
Equation (1) (2)
Variable
All
COMPUSTAT
INTERCEPT -0.0494
SECURE
(-0.19)
-0.0087
UNSECURE
(-0.73)
-0.0044
NEW
(-0.51)
0.0011
RENEW
(0.12)
0.0032
TRANSFER
(0.42)
0. 0454***
LINE
(3.96) 
0.0040
TERM
(0.57)
-0.0013
MATURE
(-0.19)
-0.0066
RATE
(-1.19)
0.0078
LOANMKT
(1.47) 
0.0036
NEGRUN
(1.28)
-0.0051
POSRUN
(-0.45)
0.0112
LOGSIZE
(1.17)
0.0002
EXCHANGE
(0.28)
0.0118
F-value
(1.41)
3.468**’
Adj R2 0.1272
Chi-square 97.1305
Observations 238
All
Non-COMPUSTAT
0.3437
(1.44)
-0.0014
(-0.17)
0.0004
(0.04)
-0.0056
(-0.32)
-0.0092
(-1.35)
-0.0159
(-1.08)
0.0037
(0.51)
0.0123*
(1.79)
-0.0088 
(-1.33) 
0.0090 
(1.47)
-0.0008 
(-0.46) 
0.0138 
(1.26) 
0.0119 
(1.33) 
-0.0013 
(-1.18) 
0.0038 
-(0 .66)
0.999
- 0.0001
98.4077
214
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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listed firms have an overall positive (2.48 APE) response 
that is significant at the 1 percent level (3.12 z-statistic, 
Table 7-3, Panel D), however neither secured nor unsecured 
loan announcements have significant APEs. NYSE/Amex firms 
also have a positive response (0.67 APE) that is significant 
at the 10 percent level, but no significant response exists 
for secured or unsecured loan announcements (Table 7-3, Panel 
C) . No categorization of non-COMPUSTAT firms produces a 
significant APE for secured loans (Table 7-4, Panels A 
through D). The significant APEs for a security provision 
only for small COMPUSTAT firms provides further evidence that 
financial ratio analysis is necessary to separate the various 
theories of secured debt.
Multiple regressions of prediction errors against the 
variables identified in Chapter 4 and analyzed in Chapter 6 
are performed with the data sample divided by information 
availability on COMPUSTAT, and also further subdivided by 
exchange listing and firm size. The regression for firms 
with information on COMPUSTAT contain an F-value of 3.468, 
and indicate a goodness of fit at the 1 percent level (Table 
7-5, equation 1). A security provision is not a significant 
component of CPE's, a result consistent with the full data 
sample (Table 6-2, equation 2). Furthermore, no significant 
relation exists between CPE's and knowledge that a loan is 
unsecured for COMPUSTAT firms, a result that is also 
consistent with that of the full sample. Transferred loans
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have a positive (0.04) and significant (3.96 t-statistic) 
relationship to CPE's, consistent with the full data sample. 
However, information on maturity and the interest rate is not 
significantly related to CPE * s for COMPUSTAT firms, contrary 
to the results for the full data sample.
When the full data sample is divided by exchange, the 
regression for NYSE/Amex listed firms is insignificant, 
whereas the regression for the NASDAQ listed firms is 
significant (Table 6-3). When firms with information on 
COMPUSTAT are divided by exchange listing, both regressions 
are significant, with that for NASDAQ listed firms at the 10 
percent level (2.28 F-value, Table 7-6, equation 1) and for 
NYSE/Amex firms at the 5 percent level (1.97 F-value, Table 
7-6, equation 2).
A negative but insignificant (-1.13 t-statistic) relation 
exists between CPE's and a security provision for COMPUSTAT 
firms listed on NASDAQ (Table 7-6, equation 1), in contrast 
to the negative and significant relation found for the NASDAQ 
subset of the full data sample (Table 6-3, equation 1). Thus 
the only significant relation between security and CPE's 
found for multiple regression within subsamples of the full 
data set (for NASDAQ firms) is not supported for the subset 
of these firms with accounting information on COMPUSTAT. The 
positive (0.08 coefficient) and significant (2.52 t-stat) 
relation between CPE's and the fact that a loan is unsecured 
for COMPUSTAT firms that are listed on NASDAQ is consistent
158
Table 7-6
Weighted ordinary least squares regression of cumulative 
prediction errors of market model regression against various 
loan characteristic, pre-announcement information and 
monitoring variables for firms with COMPUSTAT information. 
All variables weighted by the inverse of the standard 
deviation of the prediction error of the market model 
regression.
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Equation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable NASDAQ NYSE/Amex Small Large
INTERCEPT 1.7190 0.0943 0.4368 -0.7606
(1.48) (0.32) (1.04) (-1.99)
SECURE -0.0601 -0.0019 -0.0103 -0.0079
(-1.13) (-0.15) (-0.48) (-0.57)
UNSECURE 0.0813*'* -0.0186* 0.0143 -0.0118
(2.52) (-1.86) (0.98) (-1.06)
NEW -0.0771 0.0035 0.0028 0.0153
(-1.21) (0.36) (0.16) (1.21)
RENEW 0.0263 0.0083 0.0146 -0.0003
(0.67) (1.08) (1.09) (-0.03)
TRANSFER 0.1124*** 0.0465*** 0.0688*** -0.0049
(2.67) (3.21) (4.28) (-0.20)
LINE 0.0372 0.0038 0.0012 0.0029
(1.02) (0.51) (0.09) (0.37)
TERM 0.0267 -0.0030 -0.0099 -0.0020
(0.74) (-0.40) (-0.74) (-0.26)
MATURE -0.0182 -0.0072 0.0100 -0.0089
(-0.53) (-1.29) (0.80) (-1.54)
RATE -0.0144 0.0093* -0.0039 0.0064
(-0.45) (1.70) (-0.39) (1.09)
LOANMKT 0.0065 0.0005 0.0015 0.0061
(0.89) (0.15) (0.41) (0.88)
NEGRUN -0.0011 -0.0066 0.0117 -0.0077
(-0.02) (-0.55) (0.48) (-0.65)
POSRUN 0.0315 0.0162 -0.0053 0.0150
(0.57) (1.63) (-0.02) (1.53)
LOGSIZE -0.0182** 0.0002 -0.0027 0.0022
(-2.05) (0.19) (-0.73) (1.76)
EXCHANGE - - 0.0102 0.0011
— — (0.97) (0.05)
F-value 2.279* 1.975** 2.52*’* 1.746*
Adj R2 0.3565 0.0579 0.1539 0.0807
Chi-square 29.7781 80.7414 95.0782 71.2556
Observations; 31 207 118 120
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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consistent with the results for the NASDAQ subset of the full 
sample. For NYSE/Amex firms the results differ with a
negative (-0.018 coefficient), significant (-1.86 t-stat, 
Table 7-6, equation 2) relation between UNSECURE and CPEs 
found for NYSE/Amex firms with information on COMPUSTAT, but 
an insignificant relation (-0.010 coefficient, -1.32 t-stat, 
Table 6-3, equation 2) for NYSE/Amex firms in the full sample 
(but the regression for NYSE/Amex firms in the full sample is 
insignificant, l.14 F-value).
For firms with COMPUSTAT information, loans that are 
transferred have a positive, significant relation to CPE's 
regardless of whether the firm is listed on NASDAQ (0.11 
coefficient, 2.67 t-statistic) or NYSE/Amex (0.04 
coefficient, 3.21 t-statistic). This result is consistent 
with those of the full sample and offer further evidence of 
the importance to market participants of a change in a 
banking relationship.
A positive (0.009 coefficient) and significant (1.70 t 
statistic) exists between CPE's and interest rate information 
for NYSE/Amex firms with COMPUSTAT information and contrasts 
with the insignificant relation for NASDAQ listed firms with 
information on COMPUSTAT as well as NASDAQ listed firms 
contained in the full data sample. A negative (-0.018) and 
significant (-2.05 t-statistic) relation exists between the 
logarithm of firm size and CPE's for NASDAQ firms with 
COMPUSTAT information and is not consistent with the
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insignificant relation found for NYSE/Amex firms with 
COMPUSTAT information as well as NASDAQ firms in the full 
data sample.
When COMPUSTAT firms are separated by size, TRANSFER is 
the only variable with a coefficient significantly different 
from zero (0.69 coefficient, 4.28 z-statistic, Table 7-6, 
equation 3) for small firms, a result consistent with the 
full data sample and those for NASDAQ traded firms with 
information on COMPUSTAT. For large firms with COMPUSTAT 
information, the only significant variable is LOGSIZE, which 
is positively correlated with CPE's (0.022 coefficient, 1.76 
z-statistic, Table 7-6, equation 4), a result opposite that 
found for NASDAQ traded COMPUSTAT firms. The paucity of 
significant variables for COMPUSTAT firms when separated by 
size further supports the view that exchange listing is an 
important determinant of the significance of information in 
a loan announcement.
Very little information is contained in loan 
announcements for firms not on COMPUSTAT. The F-value of the 
regression for firms that do not have accounting information 
on COMPUSTAT is 0.999, indicating a lack of goodness of fit 
at the 10 percent level (Table 7-5, equation 2). The lack of 
significance of the non-COMPUSAT regression is unexpected. 
These firms should be lightly monitored, bank loan 
announcements should be a significant source of information 
to the market for these firms. When regressions are
separated by size and exchange only large non-COMPUSTAT firms 
have an F-value indicating that some of the coefficients in 
the regression are significantly different from zero at the 
10 percent level (Table 7-7, equations 1 through 4). For 
large non-COMPUSTAT firms, UNSECURE has a positive (0.030 
coefficient) relation to CPE's that is significant at the 5 
percent level (2.05 t-statistic, Table 7-7, equation 4), a 
result consistent with COMPUSTAT NASDAQ firms but different 
in sign from COMPUSTAT NYSE/Amex firms. Transferred loans 
have a negative (-0.086) relation with CPE's at the 1 percent 
level (-3,22 t-statistic) , a result opposite that of the full 
data sample and COMPUSTAT NASDAQ, COMPUSTAT NYSE/Amex and 
COMPUSTAT small firms. RATE is positively related to CPE's 
(0.018 coefficient) and significant at the 5 percent level 
(2.22 t-statistic), a result consistent with large firms in 
the full data sample and COMPUSTAT NYSE/Amex firms. LOGSIZE 
has a negative relation with CPE's (-0.0037 coefficient) that 
is significant at the 10 percent level (-1.94 t-statistic), 
a result not found for large firms in the full data sample 
and opposite that found for large COMPUSTAT firms.
In summary, event study results and multiple regressions 
of variables representative of loan characteristics, pre 
announcement information and forms of external monitoring 
against market returns for firms on COMPUSTAT are not 
consistent within sub-categories nor with those of non 
COMPUSTAT firms or the full data sample and provide further
1 6 3
Table 7-7
Weighted ordinary least squares regression of cumulative 
prediction errors of market model regression against various 
loan characteristic, pre-announcement information and 
monitoring variables for firms without COMPUSTAT information. 
All variables weighted by the inverse of the standard 
deviation of the prediction error of the market model 
regression.
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Equation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable NASDAQ NYSE/Amex Small Large
INTERCEPT 0.7439* 0.0369 0.5313* 0.1080
(1.95) (0.11) (1.67) (0.20)
SECURE -0.0173 0.0107 -0.0049 0.0167
(-1.09) (1.06) (-0.42) (1.41)
UNSECURE -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0228 0.0309
(-0.17) (-0.07) (-1.63) (2.05)
NEW -0.0055 0.0046 0.0203 -0.0153
(-0.25) (0.16) (0.69) (-0.73)
RENEW 0.0026 -0.0139 -0.0073 -0.0116
(0.23) (-1.52) (-0.74) (-1.20)
TRANSFER -0.0005 -0.0521* 0.0028 -0.0868
(-0.03) (-1.94) (0.15) (-3.22)
LINE 0.0018 0.0052 -0.0144 0.0163
(0.14) (0.55) (-1.32) (1.55)
TERM 0.0301** 0.0094 0.0106 0.0065
(2.13) (1.16) (1.15) (0.57)
MATURE -0.0436*** 0.0050 -0.0151 0.0065
(-3.17) (0.63) (-1.63) (0.63)
RATE 0.0076 0.0111 0.0047 0.0185
(0.74) (1.36) (0.51) (2.22)
LOANMKT -0.0036 0.0008 -0.0047* 0.0007
(-0.71) (0.38) (-1.71) (0.10)
NEGRUN 0.0180 0.0167 0.0091 0.0152
(1.34) (0.81) (0.54) (1.04)
POSRUN 0.0336*** 0.0013 0.0189 0.0026
(2.40) (0.10) (1.44) (0.19)
LOGSIZE - 0.0000 -0.0019 0.0024 -0.0037’
(-0.01) (-1.45) (1.07) (-1.94)
EXCHANGE - - 0.0010 0.0042
— — (0.13) (0.53)
F-value 1.512 0.964 1.231 1.721*
Adj R2 0.0760 -0.0036 0.0234 0.1159
Chi-square 74.6344 82.9496 76.8078 72.5823
Observations 82 132 136 78
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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evidence of the need to examine financial ratios in order to 
test the hypotheses explaining the role of secured debt.
7.3 Secured loans and Altman9 s bankruptcy model
Altman creates a discriminant analysis model for 
predicting bankruptcy based on key financial ratios. (See 
section 3.3.2 for a detailed discussion.) The application of 
Altman9s model to the prediction of secured debt can indicate 
whether secured debt is used by lenders when they believe 
that the borrower is financially distressed. The dependent 
variable is whether the loan announcement indicates that the 
loan is secured, unsecured or unknown. The financial ratios 
used by Altman are summarized below:
WCTA Working capital to total assets. This ratio
measures liquidity and should be smaller for firms 
experiencing distress.
RETA Retained earnings to total assets. This ratio
should be smaller for small firms and firms with 
deteriorating earnings.
EBITTA Earnings before interest and taxes to total
assets. This ratio should be low for firms with 
relatively unproductive assets or reduced 
operating earnings.
MVEBKTL Market value of equity to book value of total
liabilities. This ratio measures how much the 
firm9s assets can decline in value before the firm
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becomes insolvent and should be low for firms with 
a high probability of default.
SLSTA Sales to total assets. This ratio contributes to
the overall discriminating ability of the model.
For the sample of COMPUSTAT firms described in section 
7.1, Altman's discriminant analysis model15 is unable to 
separate secured loans from unsecured loans and loans whose 
security status is unknown. Although the overall error rate 
of the model is 21.4 percent, the model incorrrectly 
categorizes 85.7 percent of the secured loans and 80 percent 
of the unsecured loans (Table 7-8) . One possible explanation 
for the poor performance of Altman's discriminant analysis 
model is that 7 8.5 percent of the loans in the COMPUSTAT 
sample do not disclose security status.
All of the miscategorized secured and unsecured loans 
in Altman's model are reclassified as unknown. None of the 
secured loans are classified as unsecured, neither are any of 
the unsecured loans classified as secured. Although only 9 
of the 51 secured and unsecured loans are not classified as 
unknown, those 9 firms can be separated by financial distress 
criterion and properly classified according to whether 
collateral is present in a loan.
15Result3 are reported using quadratic discriminant analysis 
(separate covariance matrices for the various samples) since, if secured 
debt indicates that firms are financially distressed, the covariance 
matrix of financial ratios for firms with secured loans should differ 
from that of firms with unsecured loans. Should a common covariance 
matrix exist, quadratic discrimimant analysis and linear discriminant 
analysis produce identical results.
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Table 7-8
Quadratic discriminant analysis of information announced 
information on security for 238 loan announcements of 
COMPUSTAT firms.
SECURE Frequency Probability
Unknown
Secured
Unsecured
187
21
30
0.785714 
0.088235 
0.126050
Number of Observations and Percent Classified into SECURE:
SECURE Unknown Secured Unsecured Total
Unknown 178 2 7 187
95.19 1.07 3.74 100.00
Secured 18 3 0 21
85.71 14.29 0.00 100.00
Unsecured 24 0 6 30
80.00 0. 00 20. 00 100.00
Total 220 5 13 238
Percent 92.44 2.10 5.46 100.00
Priors 0.7857 0.0882 0.1261
Error Count 
Estimates for SECURE:
Unknown Secured Unsecured Total
Rate 0.0481 0.8571 0.8000 0.2143
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When unknown security status announcements are discarded 
in order to more clearly focus on the differences between 
secured and unsecured loan announcements, Altman's model 
properly categorizes 85 percent of the secured loans but only 
40 percent of the unsecured loans (Table 7-9)„ This 
indicates that secured loans can be properly categorized on 
the basis of financial distress indicators, but the majority 
of unsecured loans are indistinguishable from secured loans 
based on these ratios. These results are not supportive of 
separation of explanations of secured debt based upon 
Altman's financial distress ratios and discriminant analysis. 
They indicate that whereas security may be based on 
indications of financial distress, the explicit lack of 
security is not an indicator of the lack of distress.16
As an alternative to discriminant analysis, multinomial 
logit regressions are also performed on the COMPUSTAT data 
set using Altman's ratios. Although the likelihood ratio 
test statistic (19.6, Table 7-10) indicates that some of the 
paramaters of the model are significantly different from zero 
at the 5 percent level, this model does a poor job of 
categorizing secured, unsecured and unknown security status 
loans. All of the secured and unsecured loans are predicted
16The discriminant analysis model employed describes the common 
characteristics of firms that receive secured, unsecured or undisclosed 
security status loans. This model does not predict when security should 
be required for a given loan.
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Table 7-9
Quadratic discriminant analysis of information announced 
information on security for 51 secured and unsecured loan 
announcements of COMPUSTAT firms.
SECURE Frequency Probability
Secured 21 0.411765
Unsecured 30 0.588235
Number of Observations and Percent Classified into SECURE:
SECURE Secured Unsecured Total
Secured 18 3 21
85.71 14.29 100.00
Unsecured 18 12 30
60.00 40.00 100.00
Total 36 15 51
Percent 70.59 29.41 100.00
Priors 0.4118 0.5882
Error Count 
Estimates for SECURE:
Secured Unsecured Total
Rate 0.1429 0.6000 0.4118
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Table 7-10
Unordered Multinomial Logit regression of information on a 
security provision in a loan announcement against Altman's 
financial distress variables for 238 clean observations. T- 
statistics reported in parentheses.
Secured Unsecured
Parameter Parameter
Variable Estimate Estimate
INTERCEPT -0.544 _ . _ „ «** -2.091
(-0.93) (-4.48)
WCTA -1.533 -0.311
(-0.92) (-0.24)
RETA -3.108 -2.010
(-1.45) (-1.28)
EBITTA -4.462 4.635
(-0.82) (1.25)
MVEBTL -0.639 0.340**
(-1.32) (1.99)
SALESTA -0.073 -0.100
(-0.29) (-0.46)
-2 LOG 
Pseudo
Likelihood
R2
Ratio
Predicted
19.575** 
0. 061
Actual Unknown Secured Unsecured Total
Unknown 186 0 1 187
Secured 21 0 0 21
Unsecured 30 0 0 30
Total 237 0 1 238
significant at 1 percent,
significant at 5 percent,
significant at 10 percent.
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Table 7-11
Binomial Logit regression of information on a security 
provision in a loan announcement against Altman's financial 
distress variables for 51 secured and unsecured observations. 
T-statistics reported in parentheses. Probability(event) is 
secured.
Secured
Variable
Parameter
Estimate
Odds
Ratio
INTERCEPT 2.201" 9.040
WCTA
(2.11) 
-1.179 0.307
RETA
(-0.48)
-1.400 0.246
EBITTA
(-0.49)
-12.394* 0.000
MVEBTL
(-1.79)
-1.138" 0.370
SALESTA
(-2.20) 
-0.114 0.891
(-0.29)
-2 LOG Likelihood Ratio 15.258* 
Pseudo R2 0.220
Predicted
Actual Secured Unsecured Total
Secured 14 7 21
Unsecured 7 23 30
Total 21 30 51
significant at 1 percent,
significant at 5 percent,
significant at 10 percent.
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to be in the same category as loans that do not disclose 
security information.
Table 7-11 indicates that when limited to loans that are 
known to be secured or unsecured, binomial logit regression 
based on Altman's financial ratios correctly classifies 66 
percent of the secured loans and 77 percent of the unsecured 
loans. The coefficient for the market value of equity to the 
book value of total liabilities ratio is negative (-1.14) and 
significant at the 5 percent level (-2.20 t-statistic) with 
an odds ratio of 0.37 indicating that firms with declining 
asset values receive secured loans. The ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets is negative (-12.39 
coefficient) and significant at the 10 percent level (-1.75 
t-statistic) with higher ratios for firms with unsecuredloans 
(0.00 odds ratio) indicating that firms with reduced 
operating earnings obtain secured loans. These results 
indicate that firms with higher levels of financial distress 
receive secured loans and support the increased default risk 
hypothesis.
7.4 Logit analysis using financial distress ratios
As an alternative to methods based on Altman's financial 
ratios, logit regressions based on more general conditions of 
financial distress explanations for secured debt are also 
employed. The dependent variable has three possible values 
depending of whether the announcement indicated that the loan 
is secured, unsecured or unknown with respect to security
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status. The financial distress variables used for this 
analysis are defined in Chapter 4 and briefly summarized 
here.
WCTA The working capital to total assets ratio measures
the liquidity of the firm and should be smaller 
for distressed firms.
LEVERAGE The book debt to market value of equity ratio 
should be higher for distressed firms.
INTCOVER Distressed firms should have high ratios of 
interest expense to cash flows.
BKEQMKEQ High book to market equity ratios should prevail 
for poor performing firms.
Consistent with the results of the multinomial logit 
regression on announcement data and the multinomial 
regression and discriminant analyses based on Altman's 
financial ratios, the large percentage of unknown security 
status loan announcements renders multinomial logit 
regression for the full data sample ineffective. All of the 
loans in the sample are classified as unknown when 
alternative financial distress ratios are used (Table 7-12), 
even though the regression is significant at the 5 percent 
level (18.9 Log-Likelihood ratio).
When limited to secured and unsecured loans, logit 
regression indicates that the alternative financial ratios 
are approximately as effective as Altman's in predicting 
secured loans based on financial distress. Sixty-six percent
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Table 7-12
Unordered Multinomial Logit regression of information on a 
security provision in a loan announcement against financial 
distress variables for 238 clean observations. T-statistics 
reported in parentheses.
Secured Unsecured
Parameter Parameter
Variable Estimate Estimate
INTERCEPT —3 .033*** -0.091
(-4.43) (-1.56)
WCTA -2.528 0.253
(-1.54) (0.19)
LEVERAGE 0.033 0.076
(0.21) (0.45)
INTCOVER 4.084” -1.957
(2.15) (-0.90)
BKEQMKEQ 0.240 -0.825”
(1.07) (-2.16)
-2 LOG 
Pseudo
Likelihood
R2
Ratio
Predicted
18.876”
0.059
Actual Unknown Secured Unsecured Total
Unknown 187 0 0 187
Secured 21 0 0 21
Unsecured 30 0 0 30
Total 238 0 0 238
significant at 1 percent,
significant at 5 percent,
significant at 10 percent.
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Table 7-13
Binomial Logit regression of information on a security 
provision in a loan announcement against financial distress 
variables for 51 secured and unsecured observations. T- 
statistics reported in parentheses. Probability(event) is
secured.
Secured
Parameter Odds
Variable Estimate Ratio
INTERCEPT -2.281** 0.107
(-2.34)
WCTA -4.518* 0.011
(-1.65)
LEVERAGE -0.167 0.846
(-0.74)
INTCOVER 6.888** 980.928
(2.16)
BKEQMKEQ 1.449 4.260
(2.63)
-2 LOG Likelihood Ratio 17.993***
Pseudo R2 0.260
Predicted
Actual Secured Unsecured Total
Secured 14 7 21
Unsecured 5 25 30
Total 19 32 51
significant at 1 percent,
significant at 5 percent,
significant at 10 percent.
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of the secured loans are properly classified as are eighty 
three percent of the unsecured loans (Table 7-13). The most 
significant variable for separating loans is the ratio of the 
book value of equity to the market value of equity (2.63 t 
statistic) with an odds ratio of 4.26, indicating that firms 
with high book to market value of equity receive secured 
loans. The interest coverage ratio is significant at the 5 
percent level (2.16 t-statistic) with a 980.9 odds ratio 
indicating that firms with higher interest expense as a 
percentage of cash flows receive secured loans. The working 
capital to total assets ratio is significant at the 10 
percent level (-1.65 t-statistic) with a 0.01 odds ratio, 
indicating that firms with lower liquidity receive secured 
loans.
The results of logit analysis using alternative ratios 
indicative of financial distress support the logit results 
using Altman's ratios and indicate that firms with low 
liquidity, high interest expense as a percentage of cash 
flows and higher ratios of the book value of equity to the 
market value of equity receive secured loans. Further 
support is found for the increased default risk hypothesis. 
This finding is consistent with Berger and Udell's (1989) and 
Booth's (1991) finding of higher risk premiums for secured 
loans. This result, along with the positive reaction for a 
security provision for small firms found in Chapter 5 is 
consistent with Smith and Warner's (1979) and Stulz and
Johnson's (1985) view that collateral is used for firms that 
pursue risky projects (increased default risk) and that 
collateral decreases the monitoring costs of resolving moral 
hazard problems for these firms. It is also consistent with 
the implication of the bankruptcy studies of Franks and 
Torous (1989), Weiss (1990), and Slovin, Sushka and Waller, 
(1992) that collateral is employed for firms with high 
bankruptcy probability (increased default risk) due to the 
adequate protection afforded the lender by collateral in the 
event that the borrower declares bankruptcy. The share price 
of the firm increases because the receiving or renewal of 
credit (which the market did not wholly anticipate) gives the 
firm an option to continue operating and increase shareholder 
wealth. The negative relation of secured debt to market 
returns found for NASDAQ traded firms in the multiple 
regression studies of Chapter 6 are consistent with the role 
of collateral under bankruptcy, the high probability of 
bankruptcy restricts credit availability (and the ability to 
pursue positive net present value growth opportunities) for 
the firm. The negative relation of secured debt and market 
returns is also consistent with Barro's (1976) view that 
collateral is used to resolve moral hazard problems.
The positive market reaction found for small firms may be 
reconciled with the negative relation between market response 
and collateral found for NASDAQ listed firms. Small firms 
may benefit from the reduced monitoring costs of collateral,
178
whereas NASDAQ listed firms may bear the increased costs of 
collateral. The differences in market reaction may also be 
reconciled when collateral is used because of its adequate 
protection under bankruptcy, the market has different priors 
about small and NASDAQ listed firms. The use of collateral 
to solve moral hazard and bankruptcy problems are compatible. 
Collateral is used to resolve moral hazard problems since the 
firm pursues riskier projects (increased default risk) and 
the lender repossesses the asset in the event that the firm 
defaults. One of the options available to the firm if it has 
severe financial problems (high default risk) is to declare 
bankruptcy. Collateral gives the lender adequate protection 
should the firm choose this option.
7.5 Market returns and financial distress
In order to determine the importance of indicators of 
financial distress to market returns, multiple regressions 
are performed on cumulative event window prediction errors 
(CPE's) using Altman's ratios and the alternative ratios. In 
addition to ratios indicative of financial distress, separate 
regressions are performed including information on a security 
provision and firm size and exchange. Security information 
is included because it may be important in the presence of 
information indicative of financial distress for the firm. 
Firm size and exchange are included because of their relation 
to security and market returns found in Chapters 5 and 6.
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Negative correlation ranging from -0.39 to -0.49 and 
significant at the 1 percent level exists between INTCOVER 
(Table 7-14), a variable suggested by Whited as indicative of 
financial distress and three of ratio's suggested by Altman: 
RETA, EBITTA and MVEBTL. This result indicates that firms 
with high levels of interest expense as a percentage of cash 
flow have reduced earnings, lower levels of retained surplus 
and declining asset values. In addition correlations exist 
among Altman's variables, RETA has a positive correlation 
with WCTA (0.32) and EBITTA (0.34). LOGSIZE is negatively 
correlated to INTCOVER (-0.33) and EXCHANGE (-0.31) 
indicating that small firms have higher percentages of 
interest expense as a percentage of cash flows and are listed 
on NASDAQ. SECURED and UNSECURED have a high negative 
correlation (-0.91). The absolute value of all other 
correlations is below 0.30.
The regression of all of the variables indicative of 
financial distress against CPE's has an F-value of 1.611, 
statistically not significant (Table 7-15, equation 1) . 
However, when limited to Altman's ratios, the regression is 
significant at the 5 percent level (2.38 F-value, Table 7-15, 
equation 2) . A negative relation exists between earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets (EBITTA) and CPE's, 
indicating that larger market responses are found for loan 
announcements for firms with reduced operating earnings. 
This is consistent with the view that the capital renewal or
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Table 7-14
Pearson correlation coefficients for various financial 
distress, monitoring and security information variables for 
238 COMPUSTAT observations. The probability of the 
correlation coefficient being significantly different from 
zero is listed below the associated correlation.
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Variable WCTA RETA EBITTA MVEBTL SALESTA LEVERAGE
WCTA 1.000
0.0
RETA 0.321
0.00
1.000
0.0
EBITTA 0.182 
0. 00
0.344 
0. 00
1.000
0.0
MVEBTL 0.205
0.00
0. 276 
0. 00
0.266
0.00
1.000
0.0
SALESTA 0.231
0. 00
0.133 
0. 03
0.221
0.00
-0.045
0.48
1.000
0.0
LEVERAGE -0.230 
0. 00
-0.122 
0. 05
-0.093 
0.15
-0.105 
0.10
-0.122
0.05
1.00
0.0
INTCOVER -0.179 
0. 00
-0.470 
0. 00
-0.491 
0. 00
-0.394 
0. 00
-0.161 
0. 01
0.14
0.0
BKEQMKEQ 0. 040 
0.53
0.073
0.26
-0.051
0.42
-0.142
0.02
0. 006 
0.91
0. 02 
0.6
LOGSIZE -0.197 
0. 00
0.213 
0. 00
0.157 
0. 01
0.148 
0. 02
-0.198 
0.00
0. 00 
0.9
SECURE -0.041 
0.52
-0.078
0.23
0.041
0.52
0.176
0.00
-0.038 
0.55
-0.10
0.0
UNSECURE 0.015
0.80
-0.015
0.80
0. 120 
0.06
0.229
0.00
-0.019 
0.75
-0.11 
0.0
EXCH 0. 031 
0.62
0. 001 
0.97
0.133 
0.03
0.261
0.00
0.013
0.83
0. 07 
0.2
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Table 7-14 cont'd.
Variable INTCOVER BKEQMKEQ LOGSIZE SECURE UNSECURE EXCHANGE
INTCOVER 1.000
0.0
BKEQMKEQ -0.087
0.17
1.000
0.0
LOGSIZE -0.336 
0. 00
-0.085 
0. 18
1.000
0.0
SECURE -0.079
0.21
0.001
0.98
-0.028
0.65
1.000
0.0
UNSECURE -0.142
0.02
-0.093 
0.15
0.036
0.57
0.912
0.00
1.000
0.0
EXCHANGE 0.006
0.92
-0.053 
0.41
-0.316 
0.00
0.098 
0.12
0. 078 
0.22
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Table 7-15
Ordinary least squares regression of cumulative prediction 
errors of market model regression against various financial 
distress ratios for firms with COMPUSTAT information.
Equation (1) (2) (3)
All Altman's Alternativi
Variable Variables Variables Variables
INTERCEPT 0.0403*** 0.0304**’ 0.0087
(2.58) (3.69) (0.97)
WCTA -0.0240 -0.0252 -0.0377*
(-1.07) (-1.15) (-1.79)
RETA -0.0304 -0.0199 -
(-0.94) (-0.65) -
EBITTA -0.1485** -0.1290* -
(-2.18) (-2.04) -
MVEBTL -0.0018 -0.0014 -
(-0.69) (-0.55) -
SLSTA -0.0006 -0.0003 -
(-0.16) (-0.10) -
LEVERAGE 0.0001 - 0.0001
(0.15) - (0.17)
INTCOVER -0.0350 - 0.0272
(-0.88) - (0.86)
BKEQMKEQ 0.0007 - 0.0014
(0.38) — (0.75)
F-value 1. 611 2.382** 1. 364
Adj R2 0.0202 0.0283 0.0062
Chi-square 35.1380 12.3214 12.2796
Observations 238 238 238
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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Table 7-16
Ordinary least squares regression of cumulative prediction 
errors of market model regression against various financial 
distress ratios, information on a security provision, 
exchange listing and the logarithm of firm size for firms 
with COMPUSTAT information.
Equation (1) (2) (3)
All Altman's Alternative
Variable Variables Variables Variables
INTERCEPT 0.1301*** 0.0887*’* 0.1052“*
(3.84) (3.14) (3.22)
WCTA -0.0552** -0.0537“ -0.0678***
(-2.48) (-2.44) (-3.21)
RETA -0.0056 0.0147 -
(-0.18) (0.48) -
EBITTA -0.1411** -0.0881 -
(-2.15) (-1.40) -
MVEBTL -0.0020 -0.0003 -
(-0.75) (-0.11) -
SALESTA -0.0055 -0.0040 -
(-1.45) (-1.08) -
LEVERAGE -0.0000 - 0.0001
(-0.00) - (0.14)
INTCOVER -0.0994** - -0.0454
(-2.52) - (-1.36)
BKEQMKEQ -0.0005 - 0.0000
(-0.30) - (0.00)
SECURE 0.0013 0.0011 -0.0024
(0.09) (0.08) (-0.17)
UNSECURE -0.0053 -0.0032 -0.0139
(-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.47)
EXCHANGE 0.0045 0.0038 -0.0013
(0.35) (0.03) (-0.11)
LOGSIZE -0. 0142*** -0. 0123*** -0. 0139***
(-4.89) (-4.37) (-5.00)
F-value 3.711*** 4.180*** 4.411***
Adj R2 0.1210 0.1077 0.1033
Chi-square 52.7188 31.9062 93.36*’*
Observations 238 238 238
significant at 1 percent, 
significant at 5 percent, 
significant at 10 percent.
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infusion provided by a lender is positively received by the 
market for firms with poor earnings. The intercept is 
significant at the 1 percent level (3.69 t-statistic) and 
indicates that most of the variation in CPE's is not 
explained by Altman's variables. The low R2 of the model, 
0.02, further supports the view that Altman's financial 
ratios have weak power in explaining loan announcement excess 
returns. No significant relation exists between loan 
announcement PE's and the alternative variables indicative of 
financial distress (1.36 F-value, Table 7-15, eguation 3). 
Overall, these results indicate that loan announcement market 
excess returns are not very sensitive to the availability of 
financial distress information about the firm. These results 
support the view that the loan announcement provides 
information not derivable from the available accounting 
information. The bank's decision to provide or renew funds 
is based on information not available to the market.
The explanatory power of all three equations is 
significant at the 1 percent level when information on 
security provision, exchange and firm size is included in the 
regressions (Table 7-16). For the full model (Table 7-16, 
equation 1), as well as the models with Altman's distress 
ratios (Table 7-16, equation 2) and alternative distress 
ratios (Table 7-16, equation 3), the most significant factor 
for explaining CPE's is the logarithm of firm size (LOGSIZE) , 
which is negative and significant at the 1 percent level.
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This result differs from regressions of market response on 
exchange and firm size in the presence of loan announcement 
and pre-announcement information for the COMPUSTAT sample 
(Table 7-3, equation 1), and the full sample (Table 6-2, 
equation 2) and indicates that bank monitoring for small 
firms is affected by information contained in the loan 
announcement. Knowledge that a loan is secured (SECURE) or 
unsecured (UNSECURE) is insignificant for all three 
equations, which is consistent with prior results and further 
supports the view that information on financial distress is 
needed in order to separate the various hypotheses on secured 
debt.
These results also support the view that information on 
secured debt (SECURE and UNSECURE) is derivable from publicly 
available information. Thus disclosure is not usually 
information to the market except in specific limited 
information cases (NASDAQ traded firms).
For all of the models (Table 7-16, equations 1 through 3) 
a significant negative relation exists at the 5 percent level 
between CPE's and working capital to total assets (WCTA), 
indicating a higher market response to loan announcements for 
less liquid firms. For the full model, earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets (EBITTA) is inversely 
related to market response (-0.14 coefficient), indicating 
that firms that have lower earnings have higher market 
responses. Both of these results suggest that market
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response is more sensitive to loan announcements for 
distressed firms. A significant (-2.57 t-statistic) inverse 
relation exists between interest expense to cash flow ratios 
(INTCOVER) and CPE's (-0.099 coefficient), indicating that 
firms with less financial distress have higher market 
responses, an effect opposite that of WCTA and EBITTA. The 
significance of EBITTA and INTCOVER only in equation (1) , 
together with the negative sign in both while the two are 
significantly negatively correlated, suggests that their 
significance stems from some (unobserved) interaction between 
the two variables.
7.6 Summary
This study provides evidence that while the granting of 
a loan reveals private information to the market, the 
decision to require security is in large part determined by 
the lender from publicly available information on financial 
distress. Logit regression of variables indicative of 
financial distress indicate that firms that receive secured 
loans exhibit signs of financial distress and have reduced 
market value. Firms with deteriorating asset values, 
decreasing liquidity, reduced earnings, high interest expense 
to cash flow ratios and high ratios of the book to market 
values of equity receive secured loans. These results 
support the increased default risk hypothesis for secured 
debt. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Berger and Udell and Booth who find increased risk premiums
for secured loans. They support Smith and Warner, Stulz and 
Johnson and Barro's view that collateral is used to solve 
moral hazard problems. They also support the findings of 
Franks and Torous, Weiss, and Slovin, Sushka and Waller, that 
collateral gives the lender adequate protection under 
bankruptcy. The use of collateral to solve moral hazard and 
bankruptcy problems can be considered as parts of a single 
dilema. Lenders require collateral as an aid in monitoring 
firms with risky projects (moral hazard). Since these firms 
have higher probabilities of bankruptcy, collateral also 
gives the lender adequate protection should the firm declare 
bankruptcy.
Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the role of a 
security provision in a loan contract. Existing literature 
suggests that collateral can be used to solve problems of 
adverse selection (Chan and Kanatas, 1985), underinvestment 
(Stulz and Johnson, 1985), incentive contracting (Barro, 
1976, Smith and Warner, 1979, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, 
Stiglitz, 1985, Stulz and Johnson, 1985 and Igawa and 
Kanatas, 1990) and bankruptcy (Franks and Torous, 1989, 
Weiss, 1990 and Slovin, Sushka and Waller, 1992) . It is also 
suggested that collateral dilutes the monitoring services 
provided by banks (Diamond, 1984). These explanations may be 
empirically separated by two criteria: the effect of
collateral on shareholder wealth and the relation between 
collateral and the default risk of the firm. Explanations 
for collateral based on resolution of adverse selection and 
underinvestment problems predict a positive market reaction 
to secured debt due to smaller default risk associated with 
secured debt. Incentive contracting and bankruptcy 
explanations for collateral are consistent with either 
positive or negative market reactions, but with larger 
default risk. Monitoring dilution explanations predict 
either negative or no market reaction for secured loans, but 
with no differential in default risk between secured and 
unsecured loans.
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A confounding issue in using market reaction to separate 
the competing theories of secured debt is that empirical 
evidence supports Diamond's (1984) view that positive market 
reactions to loan announcements are attributable to the 
monitoring activities of lenders. However, controversy still 
exists over the exact source(s) of borrower share price 
increases. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) find lines of credit 
to be the primary cause of overall positive borrower share 
price increases associated with bank loans, James (1987) 
finds term loans to be the source, Lummer and McConnell 
(1989) find positive market response concentrated in renewed 
loans and Slovin, Johnson and Glascock (1992) find positive 
share price effects primarily for small firms. Further 
confounding an investigation of the joint effects of 
collateral and bank monitoring on share price is Booth's 
(1992) view that monitoring by other external agents 
(investment banks, bond rating agencies) reduces the 
effectiveness of bank monitoring. Reinganum (1990), Chan and 
Chen (1991) and Fama, French, Booth and Sinquefield (1993) 
provide evidence that the level of public monitoring received 
by a firm may depend on the exchange that the firm is traded 
on. Thus an empirical separation of the various theories of 
secured debt based on market reaction is subject to the 
caveat that no market reaction may exist for secured loan 
announcements because lenders employ information that is
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already known by the market when requiring collateral in a 
loan contract.
Consistent with previous empirical studies, the average 
market reaction is positive and statistically significant 
from zero for the entire set of bank loan announcements. The 
market reaction differs across various subsets of the 
observations, being not significantly different from zero in 
the likely presence of non-bank monitors: large firms,
NYSE/Amex firms and firms with investment grade bonds. 
Significant positive market reactions are observed for small 
firms, NASDAQ firms, and firms without investment grade 
bonds. These differences support the concept of banks as 
monitors primarily for firms in a "low public information" 
environment.
Within the above subsets of the data (size, exchange, 
presence of investment grade bonds), the market reaction for 
secured loans is positive and significant only for small 
firms. For all other categories secured loans, and for all 
unsecured loans, the market reaction for each subset is not 
significantly different from zero. Significant and positive 
market reaction for small firms, NASDAQ firms, and firms 
without investment grade bonds is also observed when the 
security status of the loan is unknown. In all subsets, the 
difference in average market reaction between secured and 
unsecured loans is not significantly different from zero. 
These results indicate that, in general, the market reaction
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is not significantly affected by the security status of a 
loan.
The lack of significance of the security provision can 
result from several conditions. There is a security effect, 
but information about the loan is anticipated by (leaked to) 
the market prior to the loan announcement, offsetting its 
impact on share price at announcement. There is an effect, 
but it is masked by the impact of other loan conditions. 
There is no effect because the lender uses publicly available 
information to determine whether security is required. Each 
of these is considered in turn.
Using price changes preceding the announcement to 
indicate the presence of news about the firm, no significant 
difference is found between the average market reaction when 
the prior news is adverse and when it is neutral (although 
only the latter of the two is significantly different from 
zero). The market response when the prior news is favorable, 
however, is greater than that for either adverse or neutral 
news, and is significant and positive. Therefore, favorable 
prior news does not appear to include information about the 
loan, but is associated with a greater market reaction to the 
loan announcement. The result for adverse prior news is 
inconclusive, being statistically not different from either 
zero (implying there is leakage) or the market reaction to 
neutral news (implying no leakage).
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Any association between the security provision and prior 
news is weak. The correlation between security and adverse 
news is negative and small, but statistically significant (p 
= -0.09, p-value = 0.05), while that between security and 
favorable news is positive, small, and also significant (p = 
0.12, p-value = 0.01). The explicit absence of a requirement 
for collateral is not significantly correlated with either 
positive or negative prior news. Therefore, although the 
market response to the loan announcement differs when the 
observations are segemented by the nature of the news 
preceeding the announcement, the evidence does not indicate 
that this news mitigates any effect of the security 
provision. In multivariate regressions, pre-announcement 
information (i.e. prior price movemements) has no effect on 
the market reaction, further rebutting the argument for 
information leakage.
The second condition leading to the lack of significance 
of the security provision is if the effect of security on 
share price is masked by other loan conditions. Multivariate 
regressions are conducted to determine if the influence of 
the security provision on the market reaction is obscured in 
the event studies by other factors. The results indicate 
that little of the market response to a loan announcement is 
explained by characteristics of the loan, prior price 
movements, or the presence of non-bank monitors (overall
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adjusted R2 = 0.056). The coefficients on the security 
variables are not different from zero.
When the observations are segmented by size or exchange, 
the results from the multivariate regressions are not 
consistent with those from the event studies. The event 
studies suggest that there is a positive market reaction to 
a security provision for small firms, but no effect for 
NASDAQ or other subsets of observations. In the multivariate 
regressions, the coefficients on the security provision 
variables are significant only for the NASDAQ firms. In 
particular, a provision requiring collateral reduces the 
market reaction, while the explicit absence of such a 
provision increases the average market reaction among NASDAQ 
firms. For this subset of the observations, the evidence 
indicates collateral has an adverse effect on the market 
reaction to the announcement. Whether this influence of the 
security provision is due to the market perceiving increased 
default risk or reduced monitoring is not determined by these 
regressions.
The third possible explanation for the general lack of 
significance of a security provision is that the lender uses 
publicly available information to determine whether security 
will be required. To further explore the issue of default 
risk, and to determine if the inclusion of a security 
provision is based on private or publicly available 
information, various discriminating analyses are conducted.
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Excluding those observations for which the security provision 
is unknown, logit regression of security against 
characteristics of the loan, prior price movements, and 
proxies for the presence of non-bank monitors are able to 
correctly classify 90 (76 percent) of the 119 observations 
(34 of 48 unsecured and 56 of 71 secured). In particular, 
significant positive coefficients are found associating the 
requirement for security to the loan being a line of credit 
or a term loan (as opposed to no disclosure of type of loan), 
and to larger loan size relative to the market value of the 
firm's equity, while a significant negative coefficient is 
found for the disclosure of the loan's maturity.
When discriminant analysis is conducted using financial 
statement information (from COMPUSTAT) to classify the 
observations by the security requirement, a model with 
Altman's (1968) z-score variables correctly classifies 30 (59 
percent) of the 51 observations. This model classifies the 
firms with secured loans accurately (18 of 21 or 86 percent) , 
but does less well with the unsecured loans (12 of 30 or 40 
percent). Logit regressions of the same variables classifies 
the sample more accurately, being correct for 37 (72 percent) 
of the total observations, 14 (67 percent) of the secured, 
and 23 (77 percent) of the unsecured. An alternative set of 
variables related to financial distress (based on Chan and 
Chen 1991, Whited 1990, and Fama, French, Booth and 
Sinquefield 1993) but still using COMPUSTAT data, fares
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slightly better, correctly classifying 39 (76 percent) of the 
total observations, 14 (67 percent) of the secured, and 25 
(83 percent) of the unsecured. Secured loans can be 
distinguished from unsecured loans on the basis of the firm 
having greater financial distress. The requirement for 
security appears to be determined by the lender using 
publicly available information, rather that private 
information obtained in the loan negotiation.
Restricting the sample to COMPUSTAT firms imposes a 
possible bias related to the ready availability of 
information on these firms. However, no significant 
difference in market reaction is observed between COMPUSTAT 
and non-COMPUSTAT firms. When the observations are segmented 
by information environment, greater explanatory power is 
observed for the control variables (characteristics of the 
loan and prior price movements) with the COMPUSTAT firms than 
with the non-COMPUSTAT firms, opposite to what would be 
expected if COMPUSTAT imposed a bias against the loan 
announcement imparting information to the market.
There are three overall conclusions from these analyses. 
First, the average market reaction to bank loan announcements 
is positive. Second, the presence of a security provision 
has a non-positive effect on the market reaction, and is 
associated with greater default risk. Moreover, the bank's 
assessment of default risk is not based on private 
information, but on publicly available information. Third,
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if the market reaction to a loan announcement reflects the 
benefits of monitoring by the lender, this role for banks is 
mitigated by the presence of other monitors of the firm. 
Their presence reduces the market reaction to these
announcements of bank loans to statistical insignificance.
The results of this study with respect to security may be 
extended in two related areas: 1) examining the role of a 
security provision in bonds and 2) examining the
substitutability of leases for secured debt. Preliminary 
bond data for the years 1980-1984 yields 242 secured bond 
announcements in the Journal. However 219 of these are 
mortgage bonds of utility companies, indicating that 
regulatory concerns or tradition may induce utility companies 
to issue secured bonds. The issue to be resolved is why
industrial concerns do not issue secured bonds. Perhaps the
numerous parties involved in contracting and the long 
maturity of bonds precludes the use of bonds as a financing 
mechanism if the market perceives a firm to have high default 
risk (and require collateral).
Leases are a substitute for secured debt. The lessor 
retains the underlying asset in the event of default by the 
lessee. Unlike bonds, leases have few contracting parties 
and can be renegotiated in the same manner as a loan. The 
issues to be resolved are under what conditions is a lease 
employed over a security provision, and whether the 
availability of lease financing explains the aversion to
198
secured bonds outside the utility and transportation 
industries.
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Appendix A: Summary of Existing Theory 
and Evidence of the Role of 
Collateral in a Loan Contract
Theories on the Role of Collateral.
Adverse selection:
Collateralized debt solves adverse selection problem for 
lenders: Chan and Kanatas 1985, Igawa and Kanatas 1990.
Predictions: Positive market reaction, decreased default 
risk (firms with high quality projects receive loans).
Evidence: Against market reaction: Lummer and McConnell 
1989, Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 1992. Against default 
risk: Berger and Udell 1986, Booth 1992.
Underinvestment problem:
Collateralized debt solves Myers (1977) underinvestment 
problem: Stulz and Johnson 1985.
Predictions: Positive market reaction, decreased default 
risk (positive net present value project not feasible 
with unsecured debt).
Evidence: Against market reaction: Lummer and McConnell 
1989, Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 1992. Against default 
risk: Berger and Udell 1986, Booth 1992.
Incentive contracting:
Collateral solves moral hazard problem for lender and is 
forfeited to lender in the event of default: Barro 1976.
Predictions: Negative market reaction, increased default 
risk (increased loan costs for borrower due to bankruptcy 
deadweight costs).
Evidence: Against market reaction: Lummer and McConnell
1989, Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 1992. For default 
risk: Berger and Udell 1986, Booth 1992.
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Collateralized debt solves moral hazard problem of 
lenders: Smith and Warner 1979, Stulz and Johnson 1985.
Predictions: Positive market reaction, increased default 
risk (shareholders gain from reduced monitoring costs of 
collateral).
Evidence: Against market reaction: Lummer and McConnell 
1989, Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 1992. For default 
risk: Berger and Udell 1986, Booth 1992.
Collateralized debt is a screening device for lenders: 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981.
Prediction: Positive, neutral or negative market reaction 
depending on level of collateral required by lender. 
Evidence: Not applicable.
Collateralized debt reduces risk of lenders: Stiglitz
1985.
Predictions: Negative or neutral market reaction, no
default risk differential (Lenders fund low risk 
projects).
Evidence: For market reaction: Lummer and McConnell 1989, 
Slovin, Johnson and Glascock 1992. Against default risk: 
Berger and Udell 1986, Booth 1992.
Bankruptcy:
Collateralized debt has adequate protection under 
bankruptcy and solves claim dilution problems for holders 
of secured debt: Franks and Torous 1989, Weiss 1990,
Slovin, Sushka and Waller 1992.
Predictions: Negative, neutral or positive market
reaction depending upon market1s prior knowledge of 
firm's distress, increased default risk.
Evidence: For default risk: Berger and Udell 1986, Booth 
1992.
NYSE firms have high default risk (and are candidates for 
collateralized debt): Chan and Chen 1991, Fama, French, 
Booth and Sinquifield 1993.
Evidence: For: Chan and Chen 1991, Fama, French, Booth 
and Sinquefield 1993.
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Theories on the Monitoring Role 
of Commercial Banks
Lenders provide monitoring services for borrower's 
shareholders: Diamond 1984, 1991, Ramakrishnan and Thakor 
1984, Fama 1985.
Prediction: Positive market reaction.
Evidence: For: (Continuing banker/borrower relationship) 
Lummer and McConnell 1989, (Small firms) Slovin, Johnson 
and Glascock 1992.
Theories on the Cross-monitoring 
of External Agents
Cross monitoring by commercial banks, investment banks 
and bond rating agencies reduces overall monitoring 
costs: Booth 1992.
Prediction: Monitoring by investment banks and bond
rating agencies reduces importance of bank monitoring. 
Evidence: For: Booth 1992.
NASDAQ firms have high investor interest: Reinganum 1990. 
Evidence: For: Reinganum 1990.
Appendix B: Hypotheses Separating the 
Various Roles for Collateral
H,: Collateralized loans have a positive market response.
Hu: The positive reaction to collateralized loans is a result 
of decreased default risk. The presence of collateral 
indicates reduced default risk of the borrower when solving 
adverse selection, (Chan and Kanatas, 1985), or moral hazard 
(Igawa and Kanatas, 1990) problems. Riskless collateralized 
loans solve the underinvestment problem (Stulz and Johnson, 
1985). A positive market reaction for secured loans is 
expected due to high borrower quality (Chan and Kanatas, 
Igawa and Kanatas) or project feasibility (Stulz and 
Johnson). Normal market responses are expected for unsecured 
loans since the firms are average or do not have reduced 
interest rates.
Hlb: Collateralized loans have a positive market reaction
through increased default risk. Collateral decreases the 
monitoring costs of resolving moral hazard problems for 
lenders. The borrower's shareholder value increases due to 
decreased monitoring costs (Smith and Warner, 1979, Stulz and 
Johnson, 1985). Shareholder wealth is unaffected by 
unsecured loans since monitoring costs are not decreased. 
Collateral is used to give adequate protection to lender when 
borrower declares bankruptcy (Franks and Torous, 1989, Weiss, 
1990, Slovin, Sushka and Waller, 1992) . The share price of 
the firm increases because the receiving or renewal of credit 
(which the market did not wholly anticipate) gives the firm 
an option to continue operating and increases shareholder 
wealth. Unsecured loans receive either neutral or positive 
market reactions depending on the market's assessment of the 
probability of bankruptcy for the firm.
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H2: Collateralized loans have a negative market response.
H2a: The negative market reaction of collateralized loans is 
a result of increased default risk. The increased monitoring 
cost of collateral to resolve moral hazard are borne by the 
borrower, whose share price decreases (Barro, 1976). 
Unsecured loans do not affect share price since monitoring 
costs are unaffected. Collateral is used to give adequate 
protection to the lender when the borrower declares 
bankruptcy (Franks and Torous, 1989, Weiss, 1990, Slovin, 
Sushka and Waller, 1992). The share price of the firm 
decreases because the high probability of bankruptcy 
restricts credit availability (and the ability to pursue 
positive net present value growth opportunities) for the 
firm. Unsecured loans receive either neutral or positive 
market reactions depending on the market's assessment of the 
probability of bankruptcy for the firm.
H2b: Although a negative market reaction exists for
collateralized loans no default risk differential exists for 
them. Share price for both secured and unsecured loans is 
negative since lenders provide loans for projects with low 
risk and low return (Stiglitz, 1985). The borrower's share 
price is reduced for collateralized loans since lenders 
monitor an asset (collateral) instead of the activities of 
firm's managers (interpretation of Diamond, 1984). Unsecured 
loan announcement should be positive since shareholders 
receive the benefit of bank monitoring.
H3: Collateralized loans have a neutral market response and 
no default risk differential exists between secured and 
unsecured loans. Share price for both secured and unsecured 
loans is unaffected since lenders' interests are not aligned 
with shareholders' (Stiglitz, 1985). The borrower's share 
price is unaffected for collateralized loans since lenders 
monitor an asset (collateral) instead of the activities of 
firm's managers (interpretation of Diamond, 1984). Unsecured 
loan announcements should be positive since shareholders 
receive the benefit of bank monitoring. Shareholder wealth 
may not be affected for either secured or unsecured loan 
announcements if the firm receives monitoring from other 
agents that reduce the importance of bank monitoring (Booth, 
1992).
Appendix C: Variables Employed
APE
BKEQMKEQ
COMPUSTAT
CPE
EBITTA
EXCHANGE
INTCOVER
INVGRAD
LEVERAGE
LINE
LOANMKT
LOGSIZE
MATURE
Average cumulative prediction error of the market 
model regression for a group of observations.
Book to market equity ratio. Poor performing 
firms should have high ratios.
Binary variable with a value of 1 if COMPUSTAT 
information is available on the firm.
Cumulative two day prediction error of the market 
model regression for a particular observation.
Earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets. This ratio should be low for firms with 
relatively unproductive assets.
Binary variable indicating the exchange that the 
firm is listed on (0 for NYSE/Amex, 1 for NASDAQ) .
Ratio of interest expense to cash flow (operating 
earnings before depreciation + depreciation + non­
operating income + special items + net interest 
income).
Binary variable indicating the existence of 
investment grade bonds (1) or not (0).
The book debt to market value of equity ratio, 
which should be higher for distressed firms.
Binary variable indicating whether the loan is 
announced as a line of credit or revolving line 
(1) , or not (0) .
Loan value divided by the market value of equity 
of the firm one week prior to event.
Natural logarithm of firm size measured the market 
value of equity one week prior to event.
Binary variable indicating whether maturity 
information is disclosed in the announcement (1 if 
disclosed, 0 otherwise).
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MVEBKTL
NEGRUN
NEW
POSRUN
RATE
RENEW
RETA
SECURE
SLSTA
TERM
TRANSFER
UNSECURE
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Market value of equity to book value of total 
liabilities. This ratio should be low for firms 
with a high probability of default.
Binary variable indicating negative-valued pre­
announcement information. It is coded as 1 if the 
firm has significant (10 percent, one tailed) 
share price rundown starting 30 and ending 11 days 
before the event, 0 otherwise.
Binary variable indicating whether the loan is 
disclosed as new in the announcement (1) or not 
(0) .
Binary variable indicating positive-valued pre­
announcement information. It is coded as 1 if the 
firm has significant (10 percent, one tailed) 
share price runup starting 3 0 and ending 11 days 
before the event, 0 otherwise.
Binary variable indicating whether rate 
information is available in the announcement (1) 
or not (0).
Binary variable indicating whether the loan is 
announced as renewed (1) or not (0).
Retained earnings to total assets. This ratio 
should be smaller for small firms as well as firms 
with deteriorating earnings.
Binary variable indicating whether the loan is 
announced as secured (1) or not (0) .
Sales to total assets. This ratio contributes to 
the overall discriminating ability of Altman's 
discriminant analysis model.
Binary variable indicating whether the loan is 
announced as a term loan or revolving line and 
term loan (1) or not (0).
Binary variable indicating whether the 
announcement indicates that the loan has been 
transferred from one bank or group of banks to 
another (1) or not (0).
Binary variable indicating whether the loan is 
announced as unsecured (1) or not (0).
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Working capital to total assets. This ratio 
should be smaller for firms experiencing reduced 
operating earnings.
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